were issued. Archbishop Guerrero earnestly urged Philip not to abandon the confiscations, while the Moriscos continued, at least until the close of 1561, to besiege him with petitions to grant their request or at least such relief as had been afforded to those of Aragon and Valladolid.1

The document from which these details are drawn ends here, but we may safely assume that nothing came of the effort of the Moriscos to obtain complete or partial relief from the Inquisition, and it is not unjust to infer from their persistence, and from a complaint of the expense to which they had been put in their journeys to the court in Flanders and elsewhere, that there were not lacking persons in high station who buoyed them up with false hopes in return for liberal donations. These transactions, however fruitless, are not without their importance, in the absence of statistics concerning the activity of the Holy Office, as showing how great was its pressure and how keenly felt by its victims. In every way, indeed, the condition of the Moriscos had been growing worse. The Inquisition, perhaps in retaliation for their efforts to restrict it, became more rigorous than ever. All the old abuses and oppressions by the priests and the petty officers of justice were flourishing rankly and a further cause of intense irritation was the progressive spoliation of their lauds by judicial process; "judges of boundaries" were established and claims were put forth in the name of the king by which they were deprived without a hearing of properties purchased or inherited from their ances

1 Archivo de Simancas, Inquisicion, Libro 926, fol. 83-4.

2 Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 71 (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Tom. XXI.).

tors-they were in short "gente sin lengua y sin fabor ". friendless and defenceless.1

Another fresh cause of trouble was the sudden revival, about 1565, of a dormant law of 1526 which deprived the lands of the feudal nobles of the right of asylum by extending over them the royal jurisdiction, and further reducing to three days the right of asylum in churches. There were numerous Moriscos who had made terms with their enemies and had settled on lands of nobles, where they lived in peace supporting their families, their crimes having been forgotten for years. The scriveners and justices, eager for fees, now examined the records for all the old cases and the alguaziles went in pursuit until there were scarce a Morisco in the land who did not live in daily fear of arrest. To this was added the oppression of the captain-general, of the archbishop and of the Inquisition, so that many peaceable men as well as criminals took to the mountains, joining the monfies or outlaws, and forming armed bands which committed many outrages that the ordinary justices could not prevent without soldiers. The suppression of these disorders naturally belonged to the captain-general, but there had been numerous competitions of jurisdiction between him and the judicial authorities which broke out afresh and the matter was confided to the President of the Chancellery, Alonso de Santillana, who formed squads of eight men to perform the duty, to whom extravagant pay was given and who were appointed from among the kindred and retainers of the president and alcaldes. They were useless and inexperienced, they exercised brutal licence at will and no one dared to com

1 Mendoza, loc. cit.

plain of them. This drove many more Moriscos to the mountains or to Africa, the bands of monfies increased and the relations of the Moriscos with Barbary were strengthened.1

It was markedly imprudent thus to aggravate the disquiet of the kingdom for it had long been recognized that the condition of Granada was dangerously explosive. To cut off all intercourse with it Moriscos from elsewhere had been prohibited from going there on any pretext, under pain of slavery, which was a severe hardship, as the chancellery of Granada was the highest court for all the territories of New Castile, as that of Valladolid was for Old Castile, but when the cortes of Madrid, in 1551, petitioned that this prohibition should be relaxed in favor of those who had lawsuits or other pressing business, the prayer was refused—the risk of intercommunication was too great.2 The prudence which dictated this might have also dictated an effort to soothe discontent, in place of which fresh causes of trouble were sought. In 1563 the order to present to the captain-general all licences to bear arms was revived, under a penalty of six years of galleys. The good Archbishop, Pedro Guerrero, on his return from the council of Trent in 1563, paused in Rome, where he lamented to Pius IV. that his Morisco flock were Christians only in name, and was commanded to tell King Philip that he should remedy it and save their souls, a message which was re-enforced by orders to

3

1 Marmol Carvajal, p. 160.-Cabrera, Felipe Segondo, pp. 393, 429 (Madrid, 1619).-Memoria de Mondéjar, pp. 14-16 (Morel-Fatio, L'Espagne au XVIe et XVIIe Siècle).—Mendoza, p. 71.-Pedraza, fol. 239.

2 Colmeiro, Córtes de Leon y Castilla, II. 245.

8

Danvila, p. 172.

the Bishop of Rosano, papal nuncio, to labor with the king for their conversion. On reaching home Guerrero assembled his provincial council of 1505, the action of which for the protection of the Moriscos was nugatory, but that for their irritation was effective. The bishops agreed to urge the king to adopt such measures as might prevent them from longer concealing their infidelity, and Guerrero accordingly wrote, begging him to purify his kingdom of the filthy sect; it could readily be found who were Christians by prohibiting some things by which they The Archbishop of Valencia, concealed their rites. Tomas of Vilanova, also wrote, saying that he had refused the see of Granada in order not to be the pastor of so evil a flock, but he had found that it was worse in Valencia.1

Diego de Espinosa, Philip's evil genius, was then rising high in favor. He had just been appointed to the presidency of the council of Castile; he was shortly to be made inquisitor-general, Bishop of Siguenza and cardinal, to die, in 1572, of mortification when the king reproached him severely with mendacity as to certain despatches from Flanders. In the present case he was stubbornly impracticable and, as Cabrera says, two priests' caps wrought irreparable mischief in a matter which concerned helmets. To him, with a junta of kindred spirits, including the Duke of Alva, Philip referred Guerrero's memorial and the answer was that, assuming the Moriscos to

Cabrera, Felipe Segondo, p. 393.-Pedraza, fol. 238.

Yet at his tomb Philip declared him to * Cabrera, op. cit. p. 699. have been the best minister he had ever had-"Aquí está enterrado et mejor ministro que he tenido en mis coronas."-Biblioteca Nacional, Seccion de MSS., Ii. 16.

be Christians by baptism, they must be so in fact, wherefore they must be ordered to abandon the garments, language and customs of Moors, to which end the edict of 1526 should be revived and enforced, and this they solemnly charged upon the royal conscience. On this Philip consulted privately Dr. Otadui, professor of theology in Alcald and subsequently Bishop of Avila, who in his reply told the king that if any of the lords of the Moriscos cited the old Castilian proverb, "The more Moors the more profit" he should remember that there was an older and truer one—"The fewer enemies the better," and he could combine the two into "The more dead Moors the more profit, for there will be fewer enemies," which we are told pleased Philip greatly.'

In the ecclesiastical atmosphere of Philip's court there could be no doubt as to the policy to be adopted. A pragmatica was speedily framed embodying the most offensive features of the edict of 1526; Pedro de Deza, a member of the junta and of the Suprema, was appointed president of the chancellery of Granada and was sent there May 4, 1566, with orders to publish and enforce it without listening to any remonstrances. Tendilla, now

1 Cabrera, pp. 394, 466.-Pedraza, fol. 238-9.

2 Deza's character is summed up in a letter of August 14, 1570, near the close of the rebellion, from Don John of Austria to his brother the king." V. M. must have heard from several sources that the methods of Deza with this people are very different from what they ought to be. The general opinion is that he was the great cause of the rebellion-so el Habaqui has told me-and the greatest obstacle to their reduction is their fear of being judged by him, of which I think there is no doubt. I entreat V. M. to consider carefully about him and give him a bishopric or some other preferment and remove him from here, which is one of the things most desirable for the service of V. M."-Coleccion de Doc. inéd. XXVIII. 126.