Thus matters dragged on through the summer and autumn of 1569. On September 3d Mondejar was summoned to the court and disappears henceforth from the scene, for he took no further part in the war.1 His absence relieved the other members of the council, but as his advice had never been followed it made no other difference. It was in the highest degree fortunate for Spain that the Mahometan powers took no advantage of the dreary struggle, contenting themselves with expressions of good-will for the rebels and granting permission to such of their subjects as desired to go to their assistance. Under this some six or eight hundred went and formed a most valuable nucleus for the Morisco armies. Arms and munitions were likewise sent across from Africa as objects of trade and it seemed impossible for the Spanish navy to prevent the free communication between the coasts.

At length, on October 19th, Philip issued two edicts. The first one characteristically ordered the removal from the Albaycin of some remnants that had been left there —old men and children, mechanics and laborers whose services were valuable, and Mudejares who had claimed that they were not included in the earlier measure. The second edict was more serious. The forces which had been

1 This recall was virtually in disgrace, though softened in terms by the alleged reason of desiring his advice. He remained nominally captain-general until 1572, when he was appointed viceroy of Valencia and from there he was transferred to Naples, one of the most distinguished posts under the crown. The promotion however was only apparent. The viceroyalties were held for an uncertain and usually short term of years, while the captain-generalate of Granada had been for life and heritable. Probably Philip was glad of an opportunity to break up a system which gave such power to great nobles.

raised for Don John and los Velez in the spring, had melted away without checking the progress of the rebellion and it had become a problem how to replace them. The king therefore now proclaimed a guerra a fuego y a sangre, for hitherto the official talk had been about punishing a rebellion. At the same time he conceded campo franco to the soldiers—that is, that every man should enjoy whatever plunder he could get, whether slaves, cattle or property, without paying a fifth to the commander, so as to animate the dispirited people who had been much scandalized by the complaints of the deserters from los Velez. He also increased the pay to that of service in Italy—four gold crowns a month for the arquebusier and cuirassier and three for the pikeman. Further, as the cities and nobles throughout Spain were exhausted by paying their men, and as the octroi which they had laid on provisions did not suffice, Philip, in calling upon them again to fill up their companies and increase them, offered to pay the infantry while they should pay the horse. These measures we are told produced great results, but their necessity reveals how slender were the resources of the monarchy. Efforts, not very successful, were likewise made to reform the corruption which rendered the army inefficient through padded muster rolls and indescribable fraud in the commissariat and contracts for arms and munitions, and thirtytwo captains were cashiered.'

This was in preparation for a final effort, and to give it greater assurance of success Philip at last yielded to Don John's urgency and gave him permission to take

1 Marmol Carvajal, pp. 292, 309.-Mendoza, p. 107.

the field in person. This in itself aided in swelling the forces, for numbers of nobles and gentlemen, eager to distinguish themselves in the presence of the king's brother, came as volunteers with their retainers. In December everything was ready for the campaign planned to recapture Galera and the valley of the Almanzora in the eastern portion of the kingdom, but before starting it was necessary to take Guejara from which a Morisco garrison annoyed the city. A force of 9000 foot and 700 horse was collected for this enterprise, when it was delayed by a characteristic incident. The command of the city contingent belonged by custom to the Count of Tendilla, but at the last moment it was claimed by Juan Rodriguez de Villafuerte, the corregidor who was a special enemy of Mondejar. Over this matter the council wrangled without being able to reach a decision; it had to be referred to Madrid and the answer awaited, which of course was in favor of Villafuerte. The expedition, which started December 23d, was somewhat ludicrous. Spies had reported the garrison of Guejara at 6000 arquebusiers; a reconnoissance reduced the number to 4000; in reality there were but 120 Turks and Berbers and 430 natives, who had had ample warning and who discreetly retired in time with all the portable property. Don John returned to Granada a wiser man and he treasured up the lesson to see and think and act for himself.1

He finally started December 29th and by January 19, 1570, he was in front of Galera with 12,000 men. February 21st, the Duke of Sesa followed with 8000 foot

1 Mendoza, p. 109.-Marmol Carvajal, p. 306.

and 350 horse for a campaign in the Alpujarras, leaving Deza in command at Granada as captain-general with 4000 men to guard the city.1 Spain had strained every nerve and had raised an overwhelming force to accomplish what Mondejar had done with a few thousand men a twelvemonth earlier. It is not necessary to follow the vicissitudes of the campaign, in which the vicious ineptitude of los Velez and the incompetence of Sesa were balanced by the rapid development of Don John, in spite of the tutelage in which he was kept and the meddlesome interference from Philip. The war was carried on with vigor, though with the same capacity and brutality. At the storming of Galera Don John gave no quarter to the men and had four hundred women and children butchered in cold blood because their captors endeavored to secure them for themselves, while forty-five hundred others were preserved as slaves; soon afterwards, at Seron, he lost his tutor Luis Quijada with a third of his force and a thousand arquebusses and swords because his men scattered to plunder. He was subject to the same difficulties as his predecessors from the worthless quality of his troops. After reducing the valley of the Almanzora, on his return to Guadix he writes, August 8th, to Philip that he will endeavor to collect forces to enter the Alpujarras in obedience to instructions, but at present he has but 1200 men. On June 7th he had called the king's attention to the manner in which certain frailes, especially in Granada and Guadix, inveighed in the pulpit against the benignity and clemency which the king had commanded to be shown to these people. It is a matter,

1 Mendoza, p. 111.-Marmol Carvajal, p. 310.

? Marmol Carvajal, pp. 314, 316.

he adds, of profound regret that a point has been reached in which the soldiers who should fight are given to robbing and running away and the religious, who ought to intercede for these miserable people, the greater part of whom have sinned through ignorance, exert themselves to decry clemency and impudently interfere with matters foreign to them.1

The whole tragedy had been the result of clerical interference, but it is difficult to appreciate in what even the ferocious bigotry of the frailes could complain of Philip's so-called clemency, for only universal massacre would have been more cruel. Long before this the end was seen to be inevitable, the clearer-sighted Moriscos were negotiating for submission and the pitiless policy of expulsion had been commenced. As early as February 24, 1570, Philip ordered Don John to collect, with as little scandal as possible, all the peaceable Moriscos of Guadix and Baza and other places within his command, and deport them inland, allowing them to keep their women and children and to carry with them their movables. Don John replied from Seron that he could not leave there or divide his forces, to which the king assented on March 5th, saying that the royal council had determined that not a single Morisco should be left in the kingdom of Granada and that he placed the matter in Deza's hands. Deza lost no time in performing so agreeable a duty. He commenced with those of the Vega who were shut up in their churches on Palm Sunday (March 19th), from which they were transferred to the Hospital Real. They were allowed to sell their

1 Coleccion de Doc. inéd. T. XXVIII. pp. 100, 118.