Valencia had appointed five syndics to organize a rebellion. Martin de Irionde, a Frenchman, resident in Alacuas, brought into communication with them a French spy, Pasqual de S. Etienne, who was informed of what was on foot and that they desired to make over the country to France. He took Miguel Alami, one of the syndics, to Henry IV. with a memorial in which the Moriscos stated that in Valencia they numbered 76,000 families, divided into five tribes, each with three syndics who alone need to be cognizant of the matter. They could furnish 60,000 men who would cost nothing save arms, for they would furnish everything else and even pay a subsidy in addition. Valencia lay at their mercy, and with aid from France they would make him its king. The castle of Bernia was the only one garrisoned; in the Morisco towns and villages there were no Christians save one or two officials. If a fleet were sent to Denia the Spaniards would fly; the city of Valencia would fall into their hands, where there was ample store of arms. They could no longer exist as they were, for the Inquisition was stripping them of their property; not content with making them pay to it two reales per annum for each family, amounting to 152,000 reales a year, it had subtle means for grasping more, and told them it was merciful in not taking all. The fueros granted to them and to those of Aragon by the ancient kings had been demanded by Charles V, who had burnt them. In Aragon there were more than 40,000 families who would furnish 40,000 men, for they were similarly oppressed and had to pay the same to the Inquisition. If the king would march through Navarre he would find more friends than enemies, for many Christians would join him. In Catalonia

there were 3000 families and in Castile 5000 ready to die in the cause, and there were Protestants and Jews, numerous though concealed—all knew and consoled each other, praying God for an opportunity to attack the Spaniards.

Henry was sufficiently impressed with the proposal to send Alami, September 2, 1602, to the Marshal Duke of la Force, Governor of Navarre and Bearn, with instructions to send back with him to Spain a man of experience to survey the situation accurately. La Force suggested that if Pampeluna could be seized and if Queen Elizabeth would simultaneously attack Coruna, the King of France could help the Valencians. Therefore, while he sent an emissary to Valencia with Alami, S. Etienne was despatched to England, where he discussed the matter with a secretary of the queen who encouraged him, but when at a further stage of the plot he returned there in 1604 with an Englishman named Thomas Oliver Brachan Elizabeth was dead, and Lord Burghley told them that the treaty just concluded with Spain rendered it impossible for England to take part in the enterprise, but he gave them money and advised them to apply to Holland.1

Meanwhile la Force's emissary remained in Valencia fifteen months, acquainting himself with the situation, and on his return a Gascon gentleman named Panissault was sent there disguised as a merchant. He was present at an assembly of sixty-six syndics, held at Toga about Christmas, 1604, where Luis Asquer, of Alacuas, was

1 Hume (Spain, its Greatness and Decay, p. 211) says that, on the conclusion of the treaty, James I. sent to Philip III. some documents found among Elizabeth's papers showing that the Valencians had been endeavoring to induce her and the Swiss Protestants to aid them in a rebellion. The Burghley of the text is doubtless Robert Cecil, then Viscount Cranbourne and subsequently Earl of Salisbury.

elected king and arrangements were made for a rising on Holy Thursday (April 7) 1605. Ten thousand Moriscos were to gather in the vicinity of the city of Valencia, rush in during the night, set fire to the "Holy Sepulchres" erected in the churches, which would draw all the Christians to extinguish them, and by the cry of "Francia! Francia!" secure the support of the innumerable Frenchmen residing there, so that the city could be pillaged and a large store of arms be secured. Panissault returned to France perfectly satisfied; the Moriscos promised to raise 80,000 fighting men, to deliver three cities, one of them a seaport, and as an earnest they paid over at Pau 120,000 ducats to la Force, who took Panissault to the king and showed him the map which he had made, the places necessary to be fortified, and every requisite for the execution of this great design, which would overturn the Spanish monarchy. Henry was much pleased, but la Force tells us simply that circumstances at the time were not favorable, and the plan was postponed. The truth probably is that one of the original five deputies, Pedro Cortes, of Alacuas, turned traitor; the plot in some way was revealed, and when, June 23, 1605, he and S. Etienne, Alami and Irionde were sentenced by the viceregal court of Valencia, his life was spared. It was also said at the time that information came from James I.; that the Inquisition of Aragon discovered the matter when trying some Moriscos for apostasy, and that details of the plot were received from several other sources.1

1 Mémoires du Due de la Force, I. 217-20, 339-45.—Bleda, Cronica, pp. 925-29.—Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol 94-96; Guadalajara in Historia Pontifical, V. 129-30.

This failure resulted in quiet for two or three years, but, in 1608, there was a fresh alarm, which was not easily allayed. In Morisco a civil war was raging between King Muley Xeque and his brother Muley Cidan. The Moriscos of Valencia sent fifty envoys to the latter, representing to him that it would be much better for him to reconquer Spain, which was destitute of soldiers and of arms, for nearly all the latter were in their possession. They would furnish 200,000 men, and if he would bring 20,000 and seize a port he would find no resistance inland, for Spain was exhausted and in no condition to resist. Negotiations were also entered into with some Hollanders to furnish ships, who replied that they would bring enough to build a bridge from Africa to Spain. The full significance of this is apparent when, early in 1509, Muley Cidan overcame Xeque, and the latter sought shelter in Spain and offered the port of Alarache in exchange for assistance. Philip III., considering the danger imminent, in 1608 communicated these reports to the Royal Council and ordered it to consider the situation to the exclusion of every other subject, as it was the one of the most extreme importance. He admitted the defenceless condition of Spain; Muley Cidan was their declared enemy; Sultan Ahmed I. was released from the war with Persia and with his own rebels; Spain's Italian possessions were exhausted and discontented and ready for rebellion, while at home the multitude of Moriscos was eager to throw off the yoke, and God must be offended with the long toleration shown to these heretics and apostates, who had obstinately resisted every effort at conversion. He therefore commanded the council to consider the means of preserving

the peace of the kingdom, short of slaughtering them all, and also plans for organizing a military force sufficient for defence.1

This immediate danger passed away; when the Moriscos sent another mission to the victorious Muley Cidan he laughed at them and told them he was not seeking adventures outside his own dominions; though he came in sight of Tangier he did no damage, for he desired to avoid irritating Spain, and he assured the merchants that they could trade without interruption. Besides, the tables were turned when Muley Xeque's son defeated Cidan, and, moreover, Ahmed I. sent his fleet against the Italian coasts.2 But however unfounded these fears may have been, there was genuine peril from another quarter. In the comprehensive plans of Henry IV. for the permanent humbling of the power of Spain, the Moriscos were not forgotten. Although those of Valencia were expelled in the autumn of 1609, and those of Aragon in the spring of 1610, it was thought that enough were left to cause grave embarrassment to Spain. While Lesdiguieres, with the assistance of Savoy, was to invade Italy, and Henry himself was to lead into Flanders an army assembling at Chalons, la Force, with ten thousand men, was to attack Spain with the co-operation of the Moriscos, with whom relations had been resumed. He and the king were consulting over it on the fatal fourteenth of May, 1610, and he was in the royal carriage that afternoon when in the Rue de la Ferronerie the knife of Ravaillac released Spain from a most serious danger, for although

1 Janer, p. 274.-Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 364, 366, 367, 374.