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2. Limiting dust accumulations in work space, inside enclosed conveyors, inside turnheads, and inside silos.

3. Using methods to limit deflagrations within and explosions of enclosed machinery (by air purging and suppression).

4. Limiting propagation of deflagrations and explosions in order to limit damage by isolation of dangerous machinery; spout gating (i.e., using two-way gates to direct grain flow one way or the other); and by bin top gating.

5. Bin venting. "All storage bins should be independently vented to the atmosphere."

6. Explosion venting.

7. Increased use of automation such that "operating personnel and Federal Grain Inspection supervisors are located remotely from dangerous areas."

8. Use of new types of grain dryers in which the grain is dried in an enclosed vessel such that, in case of fire within the vessel, the fire is blocked and cannot spread and can be extinguished easily before damage is done.39

Dr. Bluhm, of Iowa State University, indicated that the design of new elevators should be improved "based on current research and development results reflecting increased fire and explosion safety." 40Mr. Spiegelman, of the American Insurance Association, pointed out that:

(1) There is a need to be very selective of the location of elevator office build-ings, such that falling debris from an elevator explosion will not cause occupant casualties. The other alternative is to utilize blast walls and heavy roof construction to insure that the explosion hazard and debris hazard are minimized.

(2) Elevator design should always provide separation of the workhouse or headhouse from the storage bins and unloading (or loading) areas (track shed or marine towers). Blast walls at both ends of conveyor bridges or tunnels should be considered, along with use of drag chain conveyors and atmosphere inerting in these areas, for the purpose of preventing the propagation of a dust explosion. (3) While the recommendation to cover grain bin tops is not new, where such use is contemplated, the main bin cover must be able to withstand an overhead explosion and the small grain inlet cover must be able to prevent flame propagation into the bin. Any bins with inlet covers open during bin filling operations could still be subject to dust explosion propagation.

(4) Consideration could also be given to limiting the number of bins in a block of bins, so that all the bins in the elevator complex do not become involved in one accident. It should be recognized that bin explosions can propagate through adjacent bin walls that fall. The only way bin explosions can be prevented during bin filling would be to provide atmosphere inerting.11

Inspections

Testimony concerning OSHA inspections recommended that "high hazard" elevators should be inspected at least three to four times a year. Mr. McGuigan, of the AFL-CIO, testified that:

For the 100 or so export elevators, where the movement of grain is most intense and the explosion risks and other job hazards are greatest, OSHA should have specialized grain safety inspectors stationed in the city where the elevators are located *** Each of the "high-hazard" elevators should be thoroughly inspected as indicated above, and smaller elevators and mills should receive spot checks."42

39 Hearings, pp. 434-448:

40 Hearings, p. 424.
41 Hearings, pp. 566-567.

42 Hearings, p. 744.

Dr. Bingham, of OSHA, stated that:

OSHA field offices have been told to devote additional resources to inspection of grain elevators. But OSHA alone cannot prevent further tragedies in these workplaces. This Agency has approximately 1,500 compliance officers who must protect 60 million American workers against thousands of workplace hazards. OSHA inspectors visit annually about two percent of the workplaces covered by the OSH Act. To assure that resources are available for the inspection of other high-hazard industries, the Agency cannot inspect every one of the more than 10,000 grain elevators. Therefore, grain company management, grain elevator operators, and elevator superintendents must be vigilant in their attention to safety and health problems. Not only must they exercise management controls to promote a safe work environment for their own employees; they should also carefully monitor and control the practices of contractors and subcontractors present in the workplace . . ." 43

Prof. Ginnold, of the University of Wisconsin, observed that there are gaps in the OSHA regulations:

Failure to limit explosible dust levels, lack of fire prevention requirements, and failure to adopt existing standards on grain explosion prevention are just a few problems hampering OSHA inspections ***44*

Mr. McGuigan, of AFL-CIO, also referred to gaps in the OSHA regulations that are necessary for inspection. These include the following:

(1) OSHA has no regulations on ceiling dust levels or the buildup of explosive dusts except a very weak and indirect application of 1910.22-Housekeeping and 1910.176 (c)-Storage of Materials. Most important, except for health limits, there are no specific design requirements for operating dust exhaust systems, central vacuuming systems or work practices necessary to avoid explosive atmospheres. (2) The OSHA nuisance dust standard used for grain dust is ambiguously written and outdated. It is not a useful standard for fire or explosion prevention since it is based on an 8-hour average dust concentration in the worker's breathing zone; also, even after citation, an employer could take from 3-5 years to put ventilation controls into place and use only respirators in the interim. Thus, the worker could be exposed to explosive atmospheres for several years while the employer is complying. Even after compliance, the ventilation system might allow peak buildups of dust above explosion limits, Finally, explosive concentrations in unmanned galleries might not be checked or cited by OSHA, even though an explosion there could eventually kill all workers in the elevator.

(3) OSHA has no standard on ceiling levels of combustible gases such as phosphine or petroleum distillates commonly used as grain fumigants, or the gases emitted by grain. There also is no ceiling level for total combustible atmospheres adding the dust and gas concentrations.

(4) OSHA does have a standard prohibiting welding in explosive atmospheres and a provision on explosion-proof electrical systems and equipment in the National Electrical Code. However, these codes are buried and the NEC is not even published in the Federal Register There also is no mention of many of the other ignition sources (belts, bearings, smoking, tramp metal).

(5) OSHA now has almost no fire prevention requirements, except for fire extinguishers. Even standpipe systems and fire alarms are not

43 Hearings, p. 199.

44 Hearings, p. 280.

mandatory. Two of the few applicable regulations such as the requirement for two exits and explosion prevention in bakery equipment are among those proposed for revocation. While the fire prevention area has been left to the State and local governments, they have frequently abdicated their authority, and elevators are constructed and operated without fire alarms, sprinkler systems, evacuation plans, fire drills, fire separations between floors and without proper means of escape (outside ladders, ropes and inside manlifts instead of elevators don't qualify).45

Standards

The hearing record shows that some witnesses felt the need to adopt the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) standard No. 61B. NFPA, in information supplied to the Subcommittee, stated that:

NFPA 61B, in its present form, contains requirements covering the structural features of the buildings, bins, and tanks. It covers ventilation of buildings, venting of bins and tanks, explosion relief venting, and dust collection. Special requirement apply to equipment such as the elevators and their drives, processing machinery for screening, grinding, cleaning, etc., screw conveyors, and grain spouts. An entire chapter is devoted to grain drying equipment, a subject previously covered by NFPA 93. Additional requirements cover housekeeping electrical installations, fire protection, fumigation, lightning and static electricity protection, welding and cutting, and power-operated tools.46

Mr. Bartelt, of FGIS, indicated that FGIS "proposed that the NFPA standard 61B be adopted as a part of 29 CFR 1910 OSHA standards" (i.e., as part of OSHA's general industry standards).47 Dr. Bluhm, of Iowa State University, recommended that:

OSHA should adopt, at least on an interim basis, the NFPA standard for grain elevators and bulk handling facilities. During the interim period, the standard should be reviewed critically for applicability to the elevator industry. Ultimately, all necessary revisions necessary to reflect the latest state-of-the-art could be made prior to final adoption of the standard.48

Mr. Gillice, of the Alliance of American Insurers, stated that: Insurance has for years used as guidelines in rendering safety services the various standards developed by the voluntary safety standards organizations. These include *** NFPA's standard No. 61B *** as well as other appropriate standards such as the National Electrical Code. The establishment and use of such standards has been a valuable guide in selling management on the merits of insurance safety recommendations, particularly when appropriate, professional judgment is used in their application.49

Professor Ginnold, of the University of Wisconsin, also discussed the: *** explosion prevention codes developed by industry committees of NFPA in 1925, and updated several times. Yet, 50 years later, many of these minimum requirements on dust control, housekeeping, electrical equipment, and control of welding and ignition sources are still voluntary guidelines or enforced only weakly by OSHA and State agencies.

*** However, the serious and growing fire explosion hazards demonstrate the failure of "voluntary compliance" in this highly competitive industry.50

Safety Procedures and Training Programs

The need for guidelines for safety procedures in grain elevators as well as training programs in safety practices in preventing explosions

45 Hearings, pp. 746-747.

46 Hearings, p. 1034.

47 Hearings, p. 15.

48 Hearings, p. 413. 49 Hearings, p. 549. 60 Hearings, p. 276.

and/or fires for grain industry personnel and training for OSHA personnel are reflected in the hearing record.

Grain industry personnel.-Dr. Bingham, of OSHA, pointed out that:

In order for grain elevator employers to protect the lives of their employees it is essential that they do the following things: establish a preventive maintenance program with written procedures for regular inspections of machinery and equipment; maintain adequate housekeeping procedures to keep the amount of dust at minimum levels; conduct safety and health training for both new and experienced workers; maintain close contact with local fire and rescue agencies which can provide advice and assistance in identifying and eliminating hazards; conduct physical examinations for all new employees to allow for later monitoring of exposures to health hazards ***"' 51

In addition, Dr. Bingham also indicated that:

All of the information dealing with hazards in grain elevators, as well as a list of steps to be taken to safeguard workers and a guide to sources of assistance for employers are contained in a "Grain Elevator Hazard Alert", prepared by OSHA almost immediately after the explosions last month (December 1977). 52

Mr. McGuigan, of the AFL-CIO, indicated that OSHA should: Provide hazard identification training to workers and supervisory personnel and training on filing complaints, walk-around procedures and other worker rights to non-supervisory employees. Safety committees with elected worker representation should be required even in non-union elevators. Management safety programs with in-house safety committee inspections and follow-through should be emphasized. Finally, each establishment should have designated union or worker walk-around representatives to be a communications link with OSHA inspectors and the district office.53

OSHA_personnel. With regard to training of OSHA compliance officers, Dr. Bingham, of OSHA, indicated that "in establishing a national grain elevator inspection policy OSHA has prepared various training and informational materials to help instruct compliance officers." A 12-hour training package entitled "Safety and Health Hazards in Grain Elevators", was sent to OSHA regional training officers. This training course, which includes slides and videotapes, outlines to the compliance officers the general operations of the grain industry from the country elevator to the export elevator, and “explains those types of safety and health hazards which the grain industry shares with other industries, as well as the hazardous conditions unique to the grain handling industry." 54

V. ACTIVITIES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, established pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1979 (84 Stat. 1590), develops and promulgates occupational safety and health standards; develops and issues regulations; conducts investigations and inspections to determine the status of compliance with safety health standards and regulations; and issues citations and proposes penalties for noncompliance with safety and health standards and regulations. OSHA has regional offices established in 10 areas throughout the United States.

51 Hearings, pp. 199-200.

52 Hearings, p. 199; also see Appendix E.

53 Hearings, pp. 744-745.

54 Herings, p. 636.

The role of OSHA is:

To assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. OSHA's authority, as it affects grain elevators, involves protecting the employees of these work establishments.

***For Federal employees in such facilities, Section 19 of the OSH Act (see Appendix C) and Executive Order No. 11807 (see Appendix D), provide that the Department of Agriculture, after consultation with its employees, is required to provide them safe and healthful places and conditions of work consistent with the OSHA standards. Under the same legal authority, OSHA acts in an advisory and evaluative role to the Department of Agriculture.55

As soon as possible after each major disaster, OSHA compliance inspectors were sent to the scene of the accident to begin investigating the workplaces seeking to determine possible causes of the explosion as well as determining if there had been violations of the OSH Act. Citations were issued to employers and monetary penalties were proposed when OSHA standards or the "General Duty" provisions of the OSH Act were violated.

In addition to OSHA compliance officers on the scene of an accident, there were representatives from the Department of Agriculture's Federal Grain Inspection Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as State and local officials and local fire inspectors. It was pointed out that in workplace investigations it was assumed that the explosions or fires were caused by workplace conditions.

OSHA has approximately 1,500 compliance inspectors who must protect 60 million American workers against thousands of workplace hazards. "OSHA inspectors visit annually about two percent of the workplaces covered by the OSH Act. To assure that resources are available for the inspection of other high-hazard industries, the agency cannot inspect every one of the more than 10,000 grain elevators." 56 However, as a result of the recent explosions and fires, OSHA stepped up its activities. A chronology of activities concerning grain elevators from December 21, 1977 to November 1, 1978 follows: December 21, 1977...

Explosion at B. & K. Grain Elevator in Wayne City,

Ill., resulting in one fatality. OSHA compliance officer sent to the scene.

December 22, 1977. Explosion at a Continental Grain Co. elevator near New Orleans, resulting in 36 fatalities and 9 injuries. OSHA inspection team dispatched to the scene. Explosion at Sunshine Mills, Tupelo, Miss., with 4 fatalities. Team dispatched.

December 22, 1977--
December 27, 1977....

December 30, 1977____

December 30, 1977--

1st week of January,
1978.
January 6-13, 1978____

55 Hearings, pp. 189-190. 56 Hearings, p. 194.

Explosion at Farmers Export Grain Elevator in
Galveston, Tex., resulting in 18 fatalities and 21
injuries. OSHA team began investigation.
A letter was sent to OSHA Regional Administrators
restating that OSHA will accept complaints about
grain elevators from any source, whether formal or
informal, including those from Federal Grain
Inspectors.

Meeting between OSHA officials and representatives
of grain elevator employers.

A preliminary list of all grain elevators mailed to
Regional Administrators.

OSHA mailed a grain elevator hazard alert to 10,000
grain elevator operators across the country and other
interested parties. During this period, the State of
California also issued its own alert and began an
inspection program for all elevators in the State.

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