4. COMPANY-FARMERS EXPORT CO., P.O. BOX 2647,

Accident Date: Dec. 27, 1977.

GALVESTON, TEX. 77553

Percent of injuries and fatalities: 22 injured; 18 dead.
Inspection date: Dec. 27, 1977 to Feb. 7, 1978.

Date of citation: Feb. 23, 1978.

Type of violation

1. Cited for serious violations under the General Duty Clause in that:
a. The employer did not provide non-Sparking tools and equip-
ment in places where metal to metal contact could cause
sparking in an area likely to have explosive concentrations
of dust.

b. The employer did not provide an exterior stair or basket
ladder type fire escape from the roof of the head house to
ground level or to the roof of an adjoining annex.

c. In the scale room of the car dump there was only 1 door in or
out and the windows were bolted shut.

d. The employer did not use approved means of moving railcars
into and out of the car dump, such as a car puller, spacer
cars or an approved locomotive. (The locomotives being
used were not approved in that: (i) generators and other
electrical equipment on the locomotives were not dust
ignition proof or totally enclosed or pipe ventilated; (ii)
spark arrestors or other similar devices were not provided
on the exhaust pipes of the locomotives; and (iii) the loco-
motives were not operated in such a manner so as not to
produce sparks from the wheels and couplers.).

e. The employer did not prohibit smoking in places where com-
bustible dust was present or was in such proximity that a
match or a lit cigarette could become a source of ignition.
f. The employer did not require employees and subcontractors
to obtain written permission from the manager, super-
intendent, or other recognized officer before a welding or
cutting job was undertaken.

g. The employer did not prohibit the use of compressed air for
blowing down static dust from motors, walls, floors, ledges
and other areas while machinery in the area was still
running.

h. The employer did not as a practice clean up grain spills with-
out delay in the vicinity of conveyor belts and other grain
handling equipment in the elevator.

i. The employer did not have a training program to inform em-
ployees of the hazards that might be encountered in grain
elevators as in dust explosions, sources of ignition, fumi-
gants, bin cleaning, confined spaces, switch engine driver
training, and emergency procedures for fire and explosion.
j. The employer did not collect dust at all dust producing points
within the processing facilities.

k. Means or methods were not provided to remove tramp or
foreign metals from incoming grain shipments at the estab-
lishment's truck dump receiving area- -

2. Cited for serious violations of OSHA's electrical standards in that:
a. Fittings and boxes in which taps, joints, or terminal connec-
tions were made had openings through which dust might
enter or through which burning material might escape.
b. Raceways and/or conduits between enclosures required to be
ignition proof, and those which were not, had no suitable
means to prevent dust from entering the dust ignition proof
enclosure through the conduit or raceway.

c. The employer did not provide portable radios that conformed
with requirements.

d. Motors, generators, and other rotating electrical equipment
were not approved for their locations_ -

Penalty

$82, 000

$13,000

3. Also cited for the following violations of OSHA standards and
regulations:

a. The employer did not provide safety instruction signs where
there was a need for general instructions and suggestions
relative to safety measures.

b. The employer did not provide fire alarm facilities to warn oc-
cupants of the existence of a fire..

c. Openings in exit openings and through fire rated enclosures
separating an exit from other parts of the building were not
protected by an approved self-closing fire door.

Total penalties----

Disposition of penalties

$1,000

$10,000

$10,000

$116, 000

OSHA has referred the case to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution. A hearing scheduled on the contested citations in March, 1979, has been postponed by the administrative law judge who has indicated that he will not hear the case until a decision is reached on the criminal prosecution.

5. COMPANY-DESERT GOLD FEED CO., P.O. BOX 297, LIBERTY, MO. 64068 Accident date: 1/19/78.

Number of injuries and fatalities: 6 injured; 3 dead.
Inspection Date: Jan. 28, 1978 to Feb. 24, 1978.
Date of citation: Mar. 21, 1978.

Type of violation

1. Cited for serious violations of the General Duty Clause in that:
a. A duct made of PVC plastic was used as part of a pneumatic
conveying system for grain dust and this conveyor installation
was known to create a static electricity charging condition.
b. Compressed air was used to clean grain dust accumulations dur-
ing the time when static electrical sparks were being emitted
from a pneumatic conveying system which was handling grain
dust
2. Cited for serious violations of OSHA's electrical standards such as:
a. Live parts of electrical equipment operating at 50 volts or more
were not guarded against accidental contact by approved
cabinets or other forms of approved enclosures.

b. Wireways, fittings and boxes were not provided with close-fitting
covers or other effective means to prevent the escape of
sparks or burning material.

c. Fuses, switches, circuit breakers, motor controllers, push but-
tons, relays, and similar devices were not provided with tight
metal enclosures, which were designed to minimize the en-
trance of dust, or were not equipped with close fitting covers
or with other effective means to prevent the escape of sparks
or burning material.

d. Motors, generators and other rotating electrical machinery were
not dust-ignition proof or totally enclosed pipe-ventilated.
e. Receptacles and attachment plugs were not designed so that
connection to the supply circuit could not be made or broken
while live parts were exposed.

f. In signal, alarm, remote-control, and loudspeaker intercom-
munication systems the contact enclosures were not designed
to minimize the entrance of dust, or were not equipped with
close fitting covers or other effective means to prevent the
escape of sparks or burning material_._.

3. Cited for the use of industrial trucks, which were not approved, in
atmospheres in which combustible dust was not normally in suspen-
sion in the air but where deposits or accumulations of such dust may
be ignited by arcs or sparks originating in the truck...

Penalty

$850

$850

$450

Total penalties – –

C

$2, 150

Disposition of Penalties:

The DOL solicitor and Desert Gold agreed to a proposed settlement in November 1978. However, this proposed settlement was disapproved by Judge David Harris, and DOL is currently appealing the judge's decision to the Review Commission.

Source: Compiled from information provided to the subcommittee by Dr. Eula Bingham of OSHA in her testimony on July 18, 1978. (Hearings, pp. 669-717).

What Has OSHA Done to Improve the Safety and Health of Grain Elevator Employees? OSHA has taken the following actions as a result of grain elevator explosions and fires last year:

Prepared and distributed a "Grain Elevator Industry Hazard Alert" to 10,000 grain elevators across the country. (See Appendix E)

Issued a letter, signed by the Department of Agriculture and with the concurrence of the Environmental Protection Agency, advising 153 export companies of the policy of these agencies, i.e., that dust recirculation within grain elevators should be prohibited. Industry was urged to follow this policy voluntarily.

Met with grain elevator officials to discuss progress OSHA has made in its intensive grain elevator inspection program and to clarify any problems the grain industry had experienced in relation to OSHA enforcement actions. On May 19, 1978, written instructions were issued to the field staff clarifying OSHA's enforcement policy toward the grain elevator industry.

Prepared various training and informational materials, including a 12-hour training package entitled, "Safety and Health Hazards in Grain Elevators,' to help in the instruction of compliance officers.

Contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to study the adequacy of the information and techniques available for determining causes of explosions and fires in grain elevators and to make recommendations for correcting potentially hazardous conditions.

VI. REPORTS OF OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

Two reports, one prepared by the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the other prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO), have been issued since the subcommittee's hearings. The DA report 58 prepared by a Special USDA Task Force for the Secretary of Agriculture in response to the devastating grain elevator explosions and fires that occurred in December 1977 and January 1978. The report "recommends possible solutions which could increase overall safety in grain handling facilities and reduce the numbers of fire and explosion incidents. . . The report reviews the history of grain dust fires and explosions, analyzes information concerning 250 explosions (recorded incidents), and surveys U.S. grain exporting facilities." The DA Task Force points out that "in solving the problems of dust fires and explosions in grain handling facilities, many alternatives are available. If applied many could correct or at least alleviate the present situation." The DA Task Force further observed that:

*** The United States has possessed the necessary knowledge and many of the prevention techniques for at least 60 years. It is obvious that they have not been adequately implemented. Otherwise, these problems would not exist.

The present U.S. grain handling system is significantly different than in the past. The changes which have occurred have added to the magnitude of the current problem. Grain dust fires and explosions now must be viewed as systemic problems in the handling system. Because they result from present conditions and practices, they are an inherent part of the operations and policies of the system. This does not mean that they will not respond to treatment.59

58 U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Prevention of Dust Explosions in Grain Elevators-An Achievable Goal. Draft Report." Washington, April 1979, p. 1-1.

59 Op. Cit., U.S. Department of Agriculture, p. 1-2.

The DA Task Force stressed "one particular recommendation" from (among) the numerous recommendations made, i.e., "the removal of grain dust from handling facilities and the prohibition of its reintroduction into the handling stream. Application of this single recom mendation can be expected to significantly reduce the magnitude o the current problem.'

It may be of interest to note that recommendations were made tha applied specifically to corn, for example

Specific handling techniques which address the presence o large amounts of corn and its substantial artificial drying require ments should be applied.

Requirements for dust collection systems that specifically address the unique characteristics of corn and the large volume of corn handled should be developed.

Specific techniques suited to the handling of corn that wil reduce breakage and dust generation and dispersal should b developed and applied. These techniques should include increase application of containerized corn shipments to reduce handling All grain dust, particularly corn dust, should be collected an removed from handling facilities.

In its survey of 66 explosion incidents from December 1969 throug October 1978, the DA Task Force found that for the products tha were being handled just prior to each incident, corn was being handle 40.9 percent of the time. The second highest figure was for "none", i.e the facility was not handling or processing prior to the incident 16. percent of the time prior to the incident. Overall figures for product being handled at the time of the explosion are as follows: 60

Recommendations were also made concerning investigating expl sions and fires. These include the following:

Establish an interagency team of officials with specific expe tise to make immediate investigations of all explosions and maj fires in grain handling facilities. This team should provide bo guidance and direction to facility operators and agencies respon sible for enforcement of safety requirements.

Develop the analytical capability to describe and predict th fire and explosion experience.

Study and determine exactly those factors which cause an contribute to variations in the explosion experience.

Determine why particular days of the week and certain perio of the month have higher incident rates than others.

60 Adapted from Table 3-4, op. cit., U.S. Department of Agriculture, p. 3-19.

Develop and make training available on the techniques of explosion investigation as well as on uniform guidelines and procedures for investigating explosions in grain handling facilities. These guidelines should set the minimum scope for investigations. Establish a reporting system for fires and explosions in grain handling facilities which generates an accurate data base.

Require that all explosions and major fires in grain handling facilities be investigated and the results reported for analysis. Designate to a single Government agency the responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the implementation of explosion prevention measures. This designation should be made only if the results of voluntary compliance prove inadequate.

Establish a permanent interagency council for evaluating the present and future needs of the grain handling and processing industries as they concern grain dust fires and explosions and other operational problems. The interagency council should provide the necessary guidance and direction to the grain handling and processing industries.

In addition to the above, other recommendations are included on consensus standards; site of explosions (i.e., particularly in the elevator leg); grain dust collection, control, storage, and uses; grain elevator design, hazards, and maintenance; housekeeping; humidity; safety; and technology transfer. With regard to technology transfer, it was recommended that a system for technology and information transfer be developed and used; that a National Information Center geared to the problems of grain dust fires and explosions be established; and that appropriate mechanisms for disseminating pertinent information and techniques relating to safety in grain handling facilities be developed for use by the grain industry and others involved in handling grain.

The GAO report 61 prepared in response to congressional requests, "discusses the grain dust explosion disasters of December 1977 and January 1978 and potential ways to prevent similar disasters." This report includes discussions on the following topics: (1) Specific causes of grain elevator explosions not known; (2) Have Federal regulations contributed to explosions; (3) Are Federal efforts to protect workers adequate; and, (4) What should be done to reduce explosions. The report gives a history of grain dust explosions as well as describes characteristics of a grain elevator.

GAO concluded that:

Although the number of grain explosions has remained relatively constant over the last 20 years, the results have changed. The years 1975, 1976, and 1977, while accounting for 18 percent of the explosions during the period 1958 to 1977, also accounted for 73 percent of the deaths and 31 percent of the injuries.

Why deaths and injuries have increased is unknown. Several possible reasons have been advanced, including:

The increased volume of grain handled and increased elevator capacity; The replacement of older facilities with more efficient, larger, and often reinforced concrete facilities;

The Environmental Protection Agency regulations that require the confinement of grain dust and make explosion venting more difficult; and

The reintroduction of filtered grain dust, especially the smaller and drier particles, to the grain stream *** 62

61 U.S. General Accounting Office, "Grain Dust Explosions-An Unsolved Problem." Report to the Congress of the United States by the Comptroller General. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., March 21, 1979. 85 p. HRD-79-1. 62 Ibid, p. 34.