school system assumes it to be the one true system, and asserts that there can be no possible error in it. Each has thus with the same assumption justified his ends. As we have seen, when the assumption of the unity of spiritual faith, born of the authority of the Church, was utterly broken down, thereupon freedom, both secular and religious, received a new impetus, and a new and enlarged civilization resulted. So it seems to me that when the artificial methods which interfere with the incentives of life, with the natural family relation, shall be abolished, we shall experience a like enlargement of moral, industrial, and political freedom, and a still better civilization. But, in order to take this step, we will have to realize how easy it is to mar the incentives of a child by the application to his mind of artificial

well for a people aiming to be free that they be jealous of any religious institution which tends towards proselyting the citizen, and leading him from the principles of freedom, it cannot be a logical step for such a people to seek to counteract these evil tendencies by imitating the methods which prevail in the obnoxious organizations. The chief means by which the downfall of Romanism in England was accomplished were the secularization of the Church and of politics, and the institution by this secularization of methods of free thought, which were entirely opposed to the paternal authority of the Romish Church. The most efficient means possible for overcoming any untoward growth of that Church to-day, are those which cultivate the individuality of the citizen; and these means cannot be effectively employed whilst there exists an organization which systematically represses this individuality. Romanism must always be expected to make its least progress in a country where the paramount idea consists in guarding the individual freedom. It is far less likely to flourish in a free country, kept free, than in any conditions where its methods of authority are imitated. The effort to form the human faculty and the effort to form the human conscience originate in the same notion of authority, and they are alike out of accord with the principles of individual liberty.

methods unadapted to those incentives; how easy it is to produce by such means a discontent with one's lot in life; how much easier it is for all of us to fall into habits of indolence and thriftlessness than to acquire those of industry and thrift; and we will have therefore to realize that no rigorous rule can be made which will be suited to diverse capacities; that we can no more depend upon a paternal government, and an artificial method for the accomplishment of a wholesome secular education, than we formerly could depend upon the paternal hierarchy for the accomplishment of spiritual welfare. The ultimate attainment of a civilization must, of necessity, rest at last upon the recognition of the individual right, and of the fact that all incentive

grows from within, and cannot be created by enactment; that we cannot, in the effort to maintain the standards of life, expect artificial agencies to create the moral initiative; that we cannot disregard the more potent influences of surrounding circumstances upon character; that we can depend no more upon a paternal government for freedom than we formerly could upon a paternal hierarchy. I confess there is no fair prospect for immediate or near realization of this hope. While no array of statistics nor any argument from principal could ever have convinced the early Romanist to whom I have referred, that the concession of individual right in matters of belief was anything other than a surrender of all that was sacred and true, so no array of statistics nor any ar

gument from principle can be expected to convince the advocate of the common-school system that a dependence upon individual freedom with the consequent diffusion of incentive for the support of such freedom is the only basis for normal growth. This system is too deeply rooted in the minds of the people, as was unified faith under ecclesiastical domination; and it is therefore altogether likely that we shall have to await its removal by dynamic influences similar to those which broke down forever the supreme authority of the Church of Rome.

CHAPTER XI

PATERNAL GOVERNMENT

-CONTINUED

CONTINUING in the order which I marked out at the beginning of the last chapter, I will briefly notice those instances of paternalism which have their origin in the interference by legislatures and courts with the freedom and sanctity of contract.

The constituents of a contract are certain and constant, and in all contracts, whether of a public or a private nature, there inhere the following elements: first, the proposal and acceptance; second, the presence of either form or consideration; third, the capacity of the parties to make the contract; fourth, the genuineness of their consent; and fifth, the legality of the object which the contract proposes to affect. In other words, these essential qualities may be thus expressed: first, the parties intending to contract must be able; second, they must be willing; third, they must actually contract; fourth, there must be a consideration, express or implied; and fifth, the subject matter of their agreement must come within the limits of public policy, the public policy being mainly a guard against immoralities and perpetui

1 Sir William Anson, "The Law of Contract," Oxford, 1886, p. 10.

ties. Thus the power to contract in a free government imports the right of citizens to make agreements with one another in reference to their lawful possessions or services, unrestrained except by a clear and definite public policy, and the sanctity of contract includes the right to enforce performance of the agree ments so made or to obtain compensation for violation. The freedom for industrial contract in a free State exists equally, without distinction of person or class, to all who are within the industrial field. When this right is preserved equally to each individual citizen, a fundamental basis of industrial liberty is established, and the equal incentive of industrial liberty is maintained. This is the brief of the freedom of contract; and the preservation of this freedom unimpaired necessarily includes the preservation of its sanctity. These elements cannot be created; they do not exist only because a legislative or judicial body enacts or defines them; they owe their real being to natural economic laws. They arise out of the conditions which inhere in the idea of agreement: as a thing made by free consent without duress or interference; made by those who have unchallenged right in the subject-matter, the obligations of which, once entered into, cannot be discharged otherwise than by performance or by common consent. Legislative attempts to interfere with the operation of this freedom, and judicial decisions which interrupt it, do not annihilate the principle. It is, however, only when judicial decision and legislation conform to these natural