hundred pounds. Upon investigation it was found that, at the time shipment moved, the rate was made up on basis of five cents per one hundred pounds, Boulder to Denver, and twentytwo and one-half cents per one hundred pounds, Denver to Grover. Since that time the rate Denver to Grover has been reduced to nineteen cents per one hundred pounds, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, when the matter was brought to its attention, was agreeable to the protection of the nineteen-cent rate on the shipment in question, making a throught rate, Boulder to Grover, of twenty-four cents per one hundred pounds.

H. Henger vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company and the Colorado Midland Railway Company. Rate on grain products from Denver, Colorado, to Grand Junction, Colorado. Complainant stated he was unable to buy grain products, such as bran and chops, at Denver. Investigation showed that there was such a movement from nearby points, such as Montrose and Rifle; and complainant was requested to advise this Commission of the necessity of buying these products at Denver when same could be obtained at much nearer Colorado points, but no reply was received.

Charles Mantor vs. The Union Pacific Railroad Company. Shipment of furniture from Hotchkiss, Colorado, to Sterling, Colorado. The matter was taken up with the Freight Claim Agent of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Claimant now advises that the claim has been paid in full.

A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Company vs. The Adams Express Company. Delay in shipment, Chicago to Denver. Claimant requested certain information regarding such claims which was supplied by the Commission. Nothing further was heard of the matter.

W. F. Chesley. Re-consigning shipment of oil at Weskan, Kansas, reshipped to Colorado. Mr. Chesley was advised that the transaction consisted of an interstate movement, over which this Commission had no jurisdiction, and he was referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Company vs. The Pacific Express Company. Overcharge on shipment improperly routed. The Commission submitted a basis of settlement which it thought would be proper under the circumstances, and the same was accepted by both complainant and defendant.

A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Company vs. The Adams Express Company. Lost shipment, New York to Denver. Information was desired as to the liability of the carrying company in the case outlined. Complainant was supplied with reference to the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission in such matters.

The Tilton-Stephens Lumber Company vs. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. The question was the rea

sonableness of a rate of sixteen cents on mine props from Lyons, Colorado, to Louisville, Colorado. The matter was taken up with the transportation line, and a rate of five cents per one hundred pounds secured for the shipment in question and for future shipments.

Frank Swift vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company. Overcharge on household goods. The Commission received a letter from complainant, setting forth the circumstances of this shipment and the overcharge. The matter was investigated by the Commission, and Mr. Swift was advised as to the proper rate, and the manner in which to take the matter up with the Railroad Company; and he later advised that these instructions had been followed and the overcharge refunded.

Cola L. Sim vs. Manitou & Pike's Peak Railway Company. An alleged overcharge. After investigation it was found that the amount of fares collected from complainant was fifty cents less than should have been collected, due to the misinterpretation of the Company's rules by the conductor, and complainant was so notified.

The Union Tea & Coffee Company vs. The Union Pacific Railroad Company. Rate on spices from the Pacific Coast to Greeley, Colorado. Complainant had been charged in excess of the Colorado Common Point rate, and applied to the Commission for relief. The Commission requested documentary evidence, and later was advised by the complainant that the Common Point rate had been protected.

C. A. Dockman vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company. Overcharge on household goods from Canon City to Hotchkiss, Colorado. Complainant alleged that he had been charged a rate higher than the rate from Colorado Common Points. The Commission investigated and found that through an oversight the tariff from Canon City had not been revised in line with the tariff from Denver, etc., and called the attention of the defendant railroad to the status of their Canon City tariff; and the same was promptly corrected and overcharge refunded.

H. Henger vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company. Overcharge on hay. On receipt of complaint the matter was investigated, and the Commission found there had been an overcharge in weight, which the railroad promptly corrected.

The Cotopaxi Granite Company vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company.

Complainant alleged that the present adjustment of rates on stone from Cotopaxi to Canon City and Pueblo discriminates against the Cotopaxi Granite Company in favor of quarries at Texas Creek, Colorado. A comparison of the rates from the two points indicated that there was not a uniform basis for these rates, due probably to oversight, and the Commission wrote the defendant Railroad Company to that effect. Under date of De

cember 26 the General Freight Agent of the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company advises that he will publish reduced rates to both of the points, and the complainant has been so advised.

H. M. McDonald vs. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company.

Complainant alleged that the defendant railroad company assessed charges against bicycles transported in baggage cars. Upon examination, the Commission found that the tariff of the said railroad provides for the assessment of charges on basis of regular excess baggage rates, which is in violation of the Colorado statute (Revised statutes 1908, Sec. 5520), and so wrote the defendant railroad company who replies; that without waiver of the question of the unconstitutionality of the above section, the Burlington has decided to transport bicycles as free baggage on passenger business, local to Colorado, until further or dered. The complaint is thereby satisfied.

RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE STATE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF COLORADO IN CASES AND PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMON CARRIERS.

I.

Public Sessions.

The general sessions of the Commission for hearing contested cases will be held at its office on such days and at such hour as the Commission may designate.

When special sessions are held at other places, such regulations as may be necessary will be made by the Commission.

II.

Parties to Cases.

Any person, firm, company, corporation or association, mercantile, agricultural or manufacturing society, body politic or municipal organization, may complain to the Commission by petition, of anything done or omitted to be done, in violation of the provisions of the act to regulate common carriers, by any common carrier or carriers subject to the provisions of said act. Where a complaint relates to the rates or practices of a single carrier, no other carrier need be made a party, but if it relates to matters in which two or more carriers, engaged in transportation by continuous carriage or shipment, are interested, the several carriers participating in such carriage or shipment are proper parties defendant.

Where a complaint relates to rates or practices of carriers operating different lines, and the object of the proceedings is to secure correction of such rates or practices on each of said lines, all the carriers operating such lines must be made defendants.

Persons or carriers not parties may petition in any proceeding for leave to intervene and be heard therein. Such petition shall set forth the petitioner's interest in the proceedings. Leave granted on such application shall entitle the intervenor to appear and be treated as a party to the proceeding, but no person, not a carrier, who intervenes in behalf of the defense, shall

have the right to file an answer or otherwise become a party, except to have notice of and appear at the taking of testimony, produce and cross-examine witnesses, and be heard in person or by counsel on the argument of the case.

III.
Complaints.

Complaints of unlawful acts or practices by any common carrier must be by petition, setting forth briefly the facts claimed to constitute a violation of the law. The name of the carrier or carriers complained against must be stated in full, and the address of the petitioner, with the name and address of his attorney or counsel, if any, must appear upon the petition. The complainant must furnish as many copies of the petition as there may be parties complained against to be served.

The Commission will cause a copy of the petition, with notice to satisfy or answer the same within twenty days, to be served personally or by mail in its discretion, upon each carrier complained against.

IV.
Answers.

A carrier complained against must answer or satisfy the complaint within twenty days from the date of the notice above provided for, but the Commission may, in a particular case, require the answer to be filed within a shorter time. The time prescribed in any case may be extended, upon good cause shown, by special order of the Commission. The original answer, together with two copies thereof, must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, and a copy thereof at the same time served, personally or by mail, upon the complainant. The answer must specifically admit or deny the material allegations of the petition, and also set forth the facts which will be relied upon to support any such denial. If a carrier complained against shall make satisfaction before answering, a written acknowledgment thereof, showing the character and extent of the satisfaction given, must be filed by the complainant, and in that case.the fact and manner of satisfaction, without other matter, may be set forth in the answer. If satisfaction be made after the filing and service of an answer, such written acknowledgment must also be filed by the complainant, and a supplemental answer setting forth the fact and manner of satisfaction must be filed by the carrier.

V.

Notice in Nature of Demurrer.

A carrier complained against who deems the petition insufficient to show a breach of legal duty, may, instead of an