A bill of exchange may be accepted payable at a particular place in the city or town in which the acceptor resides, though it be not his place of business. Troy City Bank v. Lanman, 19 N. Y. 477.

But it cannot be made payable by the acceptance in a city or town other than that of the acceptor's residence (the bill itself not stating such place of payment?) so as to charge the drawer or indorser by presentment at the place named in the acceptance. Niagara District Bank v. The Fairman, &c., Manufacturing Co., 31 Barb. 403; Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod. & B. 165; Walker v. Bank of New York, 13 Barb. 636. But see Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. 202, in which the bill was drawn on a person in Liverpool, payable in London, and protested for non-acceptance and non-payment in the former place. Kent, C. J., said: "We are of opinion that, as no place of payment in London was designated, the demand for payment and the protest for nonpayment were well made upon the drawees personally at Liverpool."

A protest setting forth a presentment "at the late place of business" of the promisor "to the person there in charge," who answered the demand by saying "the promisor is not here now, nor have we any funds for the note," is not sufficient proof of presentment and demand to charge an indorser. Failing to find the promisor at his old place of business or residence, the notary should seek him elsewhere. Brooks v. Blaney, 62 Maine, 456; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483.

It is said that when the payor of commercial paper has become insolvent before its maturity, and has absconded from the State and gone into parts unknown, there must be a presentment and demand of payment at his last place of business or of resi

dence, or due efforts should be made to find the one or the other, in order to charge the indorser. Grafton Bank v. Cox, 13 Gray, 503. But this statement does not seem to be strictly accurate; and the learned judge perhaps had in mind the case of an ordinary removal by the payor into another jurisdiction. It would seem from the language of the rule stated in Reid v. Morrison, 2 Watts & S. 401, that the party need not have left the State to dispense with presentment. Sergeant, J., says on p. 405: "The rule of law on this subject seems to be that, if the drawee has merely removed from his usual place of residence to another in the same State or kingdom, it is incumbent on the holder to make every reasonable endeavor to find out whether he has removed, and, in case he succeed in such attempt, to present the note or bill for payment at that place. But if the drawee or maker has absconded, that circumstance will dispense with the necessity of making any further inquiry after him," citing Chitty, Bills, 261; Bayley, 95; Duncan v. McCullough, 4 Serg. & R. 480.

The connection of the two sentences indicates that the learned judge regarded as immaterial the place to which the payor had absconded; whether he had left the State or not. At any rate, it seems highly probable that if he had thought that there was such a distinction, he would have mentioned it. And there seems to be no solid ground for the distinction. An absconding debtor always endeavors to cover up his tracks, and usually succeeds in doing so; and how can it be determined whether or no he has left the State? Shall the holder wait in the probably vain endeavor to ascertain whether the payor has passed the jurisdiction, in order to determine whether he must make presentment at the debtor's last place of residence?

Such a requirement would be unreasonable. If the absconding is any excuse at all, it should be so without reference to the locality of the hidingplace, unless this is within the jurisdiction and the holder knows where it is. In such a case it would certainly be his duty to present the paper at the debtor's residence or place of business. But this is not the case stated in Grafton Bank v. Cox, supra. That case speaks of an absconding "into parts unknown."

This view is confirmed by Duncan v. McCullough, 4 Serg. & R. 480. Tilghman, C. J., said: “If the plaintiff had proved that Adams had absconded and was not to be found when the note fell due, a demand of payment would have been dispensed with, because it would have been impossible to make it." There was evidence that Adams had been seen in the State, and none that he had left the State. And Lehman v. Jones, leading case, post, directly decides the point that presentment in such case need not be made at the payor's last abode. See also Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28, 37; Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 2 Sneed, 425, 555; Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. 85, 89; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163; Edwards, Bills, 485487, and note; 1 Parsons, Notes and Bills, 449, 450. But Pierce v. Cate, 12 Cush. 190, declares a more strict rule than that held in the early Massachusetts cases. It is there held that where the maker of a note absconds, leaving no visible property that may be attached, a want of demand or inquiry for him is not thereby excused, though the indorser knew of the absconding. Opinion by Shaw, C. J. It is not stated, however, in the report that this point was argued; and it is said in 1 Parsons, Notes and Bills, 450, note, that "it is a fact personally

known to us that this point was not argued, nor indeed raised by counsel in this case. The defence was based upon other grounds." See Story, Promissory Notes, §§ 205, 237; Chitty, Bills, 280, 330, 367.

A very different question arises in the case of a mere removal by the payor into another jurisdiction; but there is conflict upon the necessity of presentment at the debtor's last abode, even in this case. The general rule is well settled that in such case the holder need not follow the maker or acceptor into another State; but the question is, must he still make presentment at the payor's last place of residence? Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met. 290, Wilde, J., holds the affirmative. Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 308, and Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28, Mason, J., dissenting, held the negative. Reid v. Morrison, supra, says that the rule which applies in the case of an absconding debtor, applies equally in the case of removal of the payor into another State.

M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. 598, post, merely decides that in case of such removal, presentment at the maker's last abode is sufficient; but it does not hold that it is necessary. That point was not involved in the case. In 3 Kent, Com. 96, the rule is stated in the same way. It is there said: "If he [the payor] has removed out of the State, subsequent to the making of or accepting the bill, it is sufficient to present the same at his former place of residence."

The reason of requiring presentment at the payor's last residence probably is, because he may have provided and left funds there for the payment of the paper; which is indeed a strong argument for the requirement, and seems sufficient to decide the question in the case of an honest removal. It wholly fails, however, in the case of an absconding debtor; such a person is not

apt to leave funds with which to pay his debts. See note to M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington, post.

The place of the date of a note or bill is only prima facie the place of payment. It is not part of the contract, and the actual place may be shown. Childs v. Laflin, 55 Ill. 156; Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361; Taylor v. Snyder, ante, p. 227. And even where a note or bill is payable "at the office" of the maker or acceptor, the place of date of the paper does not necessarily establish the place where payment must be demanded. If the party have an office at another place, demand may be made there. Childs v. Laflin, supra.

In the case of a bank having branches, the checks of a customer are to be paid only at the branch at which he keeps his account: the bank does not violate its engagement with its

customer by refusing to pay at another branch. The reason is obvious. It would be difficult for a bank to carry on its business by means of branches if a customer who kept his account at one branch might draw checks upon another branch, and demand that they should be cashed there. The latter branch could not ordinarily know the state of his account. Prince v. Oriental Bank, Law Rep. 3 App. Cas. 325, 332, Smith, L. J.; Woodland v. Fear, 7 El. & B. 519. See Garnett v. McKewan, Law Rep. 8 Ex. 10. It follows of course that the holder should present the paper at the particular branch at which it is made payable, or there is no dishonor. But it may be doubted whether presentment at the branch at which the drawer keeps his account would suffice when the paper was drawn on the principal bank.