become effectual as a contract by delivery. But quære if (upon the sup position that the addition of a name after the note is complete is an alteration) cases like Keith v. Goodwin are not now to be treated as coming within the later authorities considered earlier in this note, so as to discharge the defendant even though he was somewhat negligent?

The addition of another signature in the nature of an indorsement, how ever, though put upon the face of the paper, cannot be made ground of objection. Ex parte Yates, 2 DeG. & J. 191.

Figures in the margin are said to be no part of a bill or note; and an alteration making them conform to the body of the paper, though without consent of the defendant, has no effect. Woolfolk v. Bank of America, 10 Bush, 504.

It has also been held to be no alteration for the person to whom a note is given in blank, save the figures for the amount, placed on the upper margin of the note, to change the figures and fill up the note accordingly. Schryver v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St. 308. See, however, ante, pp. 549, 550, 574, where the question of negligence in connection with alterations is considered.

Although a signature is forged, if knowing the fact and intending to accept it, the defendant acknowledge it as his own, he thus assumes the paper, and is bound as though the signature were genuine. Wellington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157; Bartlett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336, 341; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen, 447. But the evidence of assent to an alteration should be clear. Swift v. Barber, 28 Mich. 503. And there must be full knowledge of the facts. Cravens v. Gillilan, 63 Mo. 28; First National Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33; German Bank v. Dunn, 62 Mo. 79.

The ratification need not be based upon a consideration. Cravens v. Gillilan, supra; First National Bank v. Gay, supra.

It is clear than an erasure of indorsements subsequent to the indorsement of the payee may be made by a bona fide indorsee for value of a bill or note. Hayden v. Goodnow, 39 Conn. 164. Such an act in no way affects the liability of prior parties, and is a matter of every-day occurrence in the courts.

Proof of the signature to a note or bill affords prima facie evidence of the genuineness of the body of the instrument; but if any question is raised upon this point, and evidence introduced by the defendant, it devolves upon the plaintiff, according to 'the rule in Massachusetts at least, to establish the genuineness of the paper. Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Davis v. Jenny, 1 Met. 221, 224; Wilde v. Ormsby, 6 Cush. 314. See Elbert v. McClelland, 8 Bush, 577.

In Simpson v. Davis, supra, the following instruction of the lower court was held correct. The proof of the signature of a party to a note is prima facie evidence that the whole body of the note is the act of said party. But such proof is merely prima facie, and when (as in that case) proper pleadings present the issue, the plaintiff is bound to prove affirmatively that the note declared upon and put in evidence is substantially the note made by the defendant; and when evidence has been offered by the defendant tending to show a material alteration, the burden of proof is with the plaintiff to satisfy the court or jury, upon the whole case, that the note so declared upon was in substance and effect the note of the defendant.

In approving this instruction, the Supreme Court took occasion to say that the same rule applied to such a

Ind. 401; State v. Berg, 50 Ind. 496; Cochran v. Nebeker, 48 Ind. 459; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, § 566.

It is difficult, however, in some cases to determine who is a stranger within the rule. The most that can be said by way of a general proposition of law is that every person is a stranger who has neither actual nor presumptive authority to act for the defendant. And no one has presumptive authority who has not been held out by the defendant, either directly or by a course of conduct equivalent to a direct holding out, as having the right to do the act in question. See Brooks v. Allen, supra, and Ætna Ins. Co. v. Winchester, 43 Conn. 391, that an alteration made by a person to whom a note is delivered as agent of the payee is fatal, if he had, in fact, no authority to alter it. Ante, p. 576.

§ 4. Want of Assent. Fraud. — The difference between the class of cases heretofore under consideration and those represented by the principal case, Foster v. Mackinnon, is that, while in those already considered a valid contract was, in fact, at one time executed, and its validity destroyed by a subsequent act, in cases like Foster v. Mackinnon, no assent was ever given to the execution of the contract in question.

There is another distinction worthy of notice between the two classes; to wit, that, while by most of the later authorities mere negligence in the defendant will not preclude him from alleging an alteration after he signed his name to the paper, negligence in respect of the contract itself to be executed will, by inference from Foster v. Mackinnon and other cases, preclude him from alleging against an innocent indorsee for value that he never assented to the contract to which his name is signed. In other words, if there be no alteration, negligence will be equivalent to assent. See Anderson

v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113; Gibbs v. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479; Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415; De Camp v. Hamma, 29 Ohio St. 467; Ross v. Doland, 29 Ohio St. 473; Winchell v. Crider, 29 Ohio St. 480; Shirts v. Overjohn, 60 Mo. 305; Frederick v. Clemens, 60 Mo. 313; Corby v. Weddle, 57 Mo. 452; Martin v. Smylee, 55 Mo. 377; Briggs v. Ewart, 51 Mo. 245; Griffiths v. Kellogg, 39 Wis. 290; Butter v. Carns, 37 Wis. 61; Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194; Kellogg v. Steiner, 29 Wis. 626; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Maine, 194; Whitney v. Snyder, 2 Lans. 477; Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137.

The general result of the authorities may be thus stated: Where the evidence shows that, without negli gence on the part of the defendant, he was imposed upon by the fraudulent representations, tricks, or artifice of another party to the paper, as to the nature of the contract he was signing, and the defendant signed the instrument innocently, without knowing that it was a bill, note, or check, and under the belief thus caused that it was another sort of instrument, there can be no recovery against him by any person. If, however, the defendant were guilty of negligence in not ascertaining the nature of the engagement to which he was giving his signature, he will be liable to any holder into whose hands the paper may pass for value and without notice of the facts, and to any one claiming under such a holder, though himself not a bona fide holder for value. As to this last point (the general right of a holder to recover upon the title of an earlier party), see Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51, 58; ante, pp. 439, 506.

It is held, however, in Indiana and in Iowa, that one who executes a note without reading, upon a false representation that it is an engagement of

another kind, cannot set up the fraud against a bona fide holder for value. Kimble v. Christie, 55 Ind. 140; Nebeker v. Cutsinger, 48 Ind. 436; Wright v. Flinn, 33 Iowa, 159.

The court of Illinois hold that where the execution of a promissory note has been obtained through the usual device of men who go about the country as dealers in patent-rights or new inventions, with papers so prepared as to obtain the signatures of the people to promissory notes, when the latter have no intention of executing such instruments, the paper is not enforceable against the maker. And this, too,

even though the maker cannot explain just how the device or trick was made successful. Champion v. Ulmer, 70 Ill. 322. See Gibbs v. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479. But this has been made the subject of statute.

It is hardly necessary to say that a blank piece of paper containing a man's signature cannot be filled up in the form of a promissory note so as to bind the party whose name has thus been used, even in favor of a bona fide holder for value, unless there was an intention to that effect. Cline v. Guthrie, 42 Ind. 227; Caulkins v. Whisler, 29 Iowa, 495.