And in Smith's case (b) above alluded to, the court were of opinion, that an indictment for forging an assignment would be vicious, unless it shewed that the assignment was signed. The distinction seems to be this, where the instrument appears to be valid, an indictment may be maintained, although from some collateral defect, that instrument, if genuine, could never legally have been put in ure; otherwise, where the defect is apparent on the face of the instrument (c). Hence an indictment has been holden to be maintainable for forging a conveyance, though the estate was described by the wrong name (d); for forging a protection in the name of one as a member of parliament, who was not so (e); for forging and publishing a writing as the last will of a person still living (ƒ); for forging an order for the payment of a seaman's prize money, though in fact the seaman was, at the time when the note bore date, in a situation which rendered the order invalid under the stat. (g) 32 G. 3. c. 34. s. 2. And to go one step further, it has been frequently decided (h), that an indictment is maintainable for forging an instrument upon paper, &c. without a stamp, even though a stamp could not afterwards be legally impressed, on the ground that the revenue laws do not make any alteration in the offence of forgery. And this seems to be (b) 3 Salk. 371. (c) Per Eyre, J. R. v. Jones and Palmer, East. P. C. 991. Leach, 405. (d) Japhet Crooke's case,' Str. 901. Fitzg. 57. Masterman's notes. (e) R. v. Deakins, 1 Sid. 142. (f) R. v. Murphy, 10 St. Tr. 183. R. v. Sterling, Leach, 117. Cogan's case, 2 Leach, 503. (g) R. v. M'Intosh, East, P. C. 965. case, (h) Hawkeswood's a mean class of cases between those where the defect is altogether collateral to the instrument, and does not appear on the face of it, and those where the defect exists in the very form and structure of the instrument; as where an assignment of a lease is forged without a signature, or a bill of exchange for three guineas, without specifying the payee's place of abode. For an instrument wanting a proper stamp is apparently and obviously defective; but still the defect does not exist in the form and construction of the instrument. It is not necessary, here to consider, how far, in order to support the allegation of forgery, the writing set out must agree, in form, with the kind of instrument which it is described to be; but it may be observed, generally, that, after setting forth the instrument, and shewing by proper averments that it is within the definition on which the indictment is founded, it is unnecessary to shew that it was stamped (i); or to set forth any collateral circumstances which might be necessary, in order to give the instrument (supposing it to be genuine) a legal operation. A mere literal mistake in (k) framing the forged instrument, will not bar an indictment (7); but it must be carefully copied in the indictment. Thirdly. With the intent to defraud another. In indictments for forgery it is also necessary to allege, (i) R. v. Morton, East, P. supposed testator had in the C. 955. (k) R. v. Wall, E. P. C. 953. The indictment was for forging a will of lands, the will as set out, appeared to have been attested by two witnesses only. No evidence was adduced to shew what estate the lands so devised. And the judges, after conviction, held it to be wrong, on the ground that it was to be presumed that the estate was freehold. See R. v. Moffatt, East, P. C. 953. (1) Clinch's case, East, P. C. 938, 953. that the act was done with intent to defraud a particular person or body; the averment of intention properly belongs to another division of the subject; but it may be observed here, that it is sufficient to allege a general intention to defraud a particular person, which intention must be proved as laid (m). But it is not essential, either in indictments for obtaining money under false pretences, or in cases of forgery after setting out the false pretences or forged writing, to aver the particular means by which the false pretences were made available in the one case, or how the forged writing was to be made the instrument of fraud in the other. Thus, in the case of R. v. Young (n), above referred to, after stating the false pretence; namely, a wager, which was pretended to have been betted upon a foot-race, the indictment avers that the defendant, under colour and pretence of having made the bet, obtained from the prosecutor the sum of 20 guineas, as a part of such pretended bet, with intent to defraud and cheat him thereof, without stating by what particular inducement they obtained the money. And in the case of forgery, it is sufficient to aver generally, that the defendant intended to defraud a particular person, without shewing upon the record (0) how he intended to do so. Of stating the means and manner in an indictment for perjury. It was formerly the practice to set out the whole of the circumstances in an indictment for perjury, with great (m) Powell's case, Leach, 90. Elsworth's case, East, P. C. 986. and see East, P. C. 989. (n) 3 T. R. 176. (0) Powell's case, Leach, 90. East, P. C. 989. Els-worth's case. Crook's case, P. C. 992. prolixity. In Coke's Entries (p), an information under the statute first sets out the statute itself, next the pleading in an action of ejectment, the issue joined, the proceedings upon the trial, the evidence given previous to that on which the perjury is assigned, the evidence on which the information is founded, and the assignment of perjury upon that evidence. But in later times this unnecessary and dangerous minuteness of detail has been much abridged, and principally by an excellent statute passed in the reign of George the Second, which (9) was made in order to remove difficulties attending prosecutions for perjury, and which enacts, that " in every indictment or information to be prosecuted against any person for wilful and corrupt perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offence charged upon the defendant, and by what court or before whom the oath was taken, averring such court to have competent authority to administer the same, together with the proper averment or averments to falsify the matter or matters wherein the perjury or perjuries is or are assigned, without setting forth the bill, answer, information, indict`ment, declaration, or any part of any record or proceeding, either in law or equity, other than as aforesaid, and without setting forth the commission or authority of the court, or person or persons before whom the perjury was committed." If the prosecutor undertake to set out more than 'is required by the act, a failure will be fatal (r). It has frequently been regretted by the judges (s), that prosecutors do not avail themselves of this beneficial law, from inattention to which, danger is too fre (p) Co. Ent. Inform. 367. See also Co. Ent. 165, 166. (q) 23 G. 2. c. 11. (r) R. v. Dowlin, 5 T. R. 317. (s) 5 T. R. 317. quently incurred, by the introduction of circumstances upon the record, which the statute has declared to be superfluous. The indictment ought to shew, 1. That a cause, complaint, petition, &c. is depending. 2. Before a court of competent jurisdiction. 3. That the matter sworn to was material. And further, 4. The substance of the matter stoorn must be set out. 5. And perjury must be assigned upon it. 1. It is sufficient, under the act, to allege, generally, that there was a certain cause depending, and that it came on to be tried in due form of law (t). So where a person is indicted for perjury committed upon the trial of a prisoner for murder, it is sufficient to allege, that A. B. was in due form of law tried upon a certain indictment then and there depending against him for the murder of C. D. &c. and that the defendant committed the perjury upon that trial (u), or that a certain complaint was made, &c. to E. F. then being lord chancellor of Great Britain (x). And it is unnecessary in any case to set out any part of the indictment, declaration, plea, &c. or the issue to be tried at the time when the perjury is alleged to have been committed (y). (t) Per Buller, J. R. v. Dowlin, 5 T. R. 320. (u) 5 T. R. 520. (x) R. v. Aylett, 1 T, R. 63. In an indictment for perjury in an answer to a rule to shew cause in the court of King's Bench, it was held to be unnecessary to allege where the court sate when the original application was made, or where the rule was made, calling upon the defendant to answer the charge. R. v. Crossley, 7 T. R. 315. (y) R. v. Dowlin, 5 T. R, 320. and under the express provision of the statute, |