THE STATE REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT*

1

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS**

Jacksonian Democracy, the popular revolt against the "boss and the machine," the settlement of the west, the development of a complex urban and industrial society, and the mounting cost of government were underlying forces which led to the movement for the reconstruction of state governments. These factors weakened the governor's administrative position, and the reorganization movement, distinctly crystallized by 1915 proposed to return the governor to his original status-"about the same relative position as the President.” Two distinct constitutional tendencies arose from these social forces. One was the popular election of state officials. The other was the enormous increase of independent administrative agencies. The two trends cannot be strictly confined to distinct periods, nor are they mutually exclusive. But the former was dominant during the first half of the Nineteenth Century and reached its peak by 1850. The latter became manifest especially in the second half of the century and continued approximately to 1915. The causes of the first tendency were the democratizing and equalizing influence of the Jacksonian Era, on one hand, and the rising tide of opposition to invisible government on the other. At present the futility of popular election of state executives (except the governor) as a means of eliminating the boss is generally recognized. But in the last century most people believed that such an electoral process would accomplish that end. That this misconception continued in the popular mind, even into the latter part of the past century, is evident from the direct election of such officials as Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners. In time, however, it was realized that such a practice merely played into the hands of the professional politician and entrenched the machine more firmly than ever.

*This aritcle continued from 1 DAK. L. REV. 12. It will be concluded in the next issue of the REVIEW.

**Instructor in American History, University of North Dakota.

Elihu Root in his speech before the New York Constitutional Convention August 30, 1915 explained the implications of the terms "boss and machine" and "invisible government" in an inimitable fashion: "The government of the state has presented two different lines of activity; one of the constitutional and statutory_officers of the state, and the other of the party leaders; they call them party bosses. They call the system-I don't coin the phrase, I adopt it because it carries its own meaning-the system they call "invisible gov. ernment." For I don't know how many years Mr. Conkling was the supreme ruler in this state. The governor did not count, the legislatures did not count, comptrollers and secretaries of state and what not did not count. It was what Mr. Conkling said Then Mr. Platt ruled the state . . . The capitol was not here; it was at 49 Broadway; Mr. Platt and his lieutenants. It makes no difference what name you give ... Fenton or Conkling or Cornell or Arthur or Platt or by the names of men now living. The ruler of the state during the forty years of my acquaintance . has not been any man authorized by the constitution or by law; and, sir, there is a deep and sullen and long-continued resentment at being governed by men not of the people's choosing. The party leader is elected by no one, accountable to no one, bound by no oath of office, removable by no one... What does the boss have to do? He has to urge the appointment of a man whose appointment will .. preserve the organization. The invisible government proceeds to maintain its power by a reversal of the fundamental principle of good government. Everyone of you knows what I say about the use of patronage under the system of invisible government is true They were appointed, to promote the power of political organization. A great number, seldom here, rendering no service are put on the payrolls as a matter of party patronage. Both parties are alike". MUNICIPAL RESEARCH, No. 63, 627-9, July 1915. See infra Charles Evans Hughes statement on patronage, and Orth, S. P. The Boss and the Machine, CHRON. OF AM., Series XLIII.

GOODNOW, F. J., COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 81. See Field v. People, 3 Illinois 79, and Exparte Holmes, 12 Vermont 643, for difference between the legal status of the governor and the President; JOHNSON, A. AND ROBINSON, W. A.: READINGS IN RECENT AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 1876-1926, chs. 35 and 36; HOLCOMBE, STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, revised ed, 289, CLEVELAND AND BUCK, THE BUDGET AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 62 for political, social and economic favors weakening the governor's powers.

The causes of the second tendency were the speedy building up of the west, the disappearance of the frontier, the astounding growth of cities and rise of manufactures and commerce. Colossal undertakings were made in the field of public works and state enterprises. The Erie Canal was one of the initial undertakings in an era of internal improvements. The new democracy demanded equality in education, and the consequence was the state board of education and the state university. Concentrated populations brought a cry for protection against the ravages of disease, the provision for good water supply, pure milk and food. Aided by recent advances in science, the states have undertaken to care for the mentally and physically disabled, the criminals, the poor, and the other unfortunate wards of the state. The rapid exploitation of the natural resources led to the creation of agencies to prevent their destruction. In an effort to aid in the solution of the problems of modern industry, services were established to deal with the relations of employer and employee, to control or supervise in a general way the wages, hours, and conditions of labor, and to protect the consumer against monopoly and fraud. Massachusetts was one of the first states to create new administrative services. In 1837 the state board of education was established; in 1838, the bank commissioner; in 1853, the board of agriculture; in 1855, the insurance commissioner; in 1863, the state board of charity; in 1865, the tax commissioner; in 1866, the commission on fish and game; in 1869, the state board of health, the railroad commission, and the bureau of labor statistics, and in 1870, the office of corporation commissioner. By the second decade of this century Massachusetts had over 100 different administrative services. Her experience was typical of all states.

For our purposes, the most significant aspect of this trend is not the number of new administrative agencies. Rather it is the independence of these agencies from the governor's control. Through such independence, the specialized humanitarian, social, and public welfare groups favoring the establishment of these new services hoped such agencies would not be embroiled in partisan politics. Experience with practical politics had taught them that control of the governor and the executive branch by political parties meant the appointment of faithful partisans regardless of competence. Political machines, they found, were potent forces and unless they faced the problem squarely and set up every possible barrier against the encroachment of the spoilsman, their new agency would be inefficiently and incompletely managed, if, indeed, the whole object of creating the service was not nullified. In brief, their desire with regard to their particular agency was to replace partisan administration with competent administration, to replace professional politician with professional technician. Their task was not any easy one. They had little reason for optimism. All the other government services were controlled by the machine. How could their newly proposed agency be made an exception? In the attempt to solve this problem a “new species of political propaganda" arose. Unable to compete with the invisible government at the polls, they could through their human appeal secure the legislation they desired.

What was to be their technique of keeping their agency "out

Illinois had 100, New York 187 and Michigan 116.

Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 65.

of politics?" One scheme had already been tried and had failed utterly -popular election of the head of the service. Their approach to the problem was sufficiently realistic to avoid placing their faith in the alleged "responsibility" of any popularly elected executive, not excluding the governor. They sought a system of appointment which would give the agency independence. Several varieties of boards and commissions were tried. After many disheartening experiences, these humanitarian groups found that the most fool proof method was to head the service with a board of seven or more members appointed by the governor for seven or more years with terms overlapping in order that a governor with a two year term might not be able to dominate the board. The board in turn was to appoint the executive head of the service. The governor realizing his inability to dominate the board usually made those appointments on the basis of merit alone. The fact that the board members were unpaid further eliminated the spoilsman's influence. As an additional precaution, the governor was frequently required to make his appointments upon the recommendation of interested social groups. Authorities are agreed that this process of appointment removed administration from politics as completely as possible. Not only did this type reduce political influence to a minimum but continuity was secured and experts were appointed for the highest offices as well as for the routine positions.

Thus, these two decentralizing tendencies, the popular election of executives and the establishment of independent administrative agencies, weakened the governor's administrative powers. Consequently, the proponents of the federal plan of reorganization opposed them. The advocates of this plan attacked the preceding movement to take certain services out of "politics" not only because the executive branch had become disorganized and lacked correlation but because it did not provide for responsible leadership. Instead of disposing of the irresponsible boss, they contended that the irresponsible humanitarian leader took his place along side the boss. They conceded, however, that, under the preceding movement, administrative agencies were for the first time manned by skilled technologists who held office on the basis of ability alone. But this apparently was not enough. The advocates of reorganization worked upon the assumption that if the governor was placed in control of the entire state administration and if the people in turn held him strictly accountable, then he would make the government as a whole efficient where before only certain segregated branches were efficient. This was the theory on which they justified the destruction or reconstruction of those agencies which had succeeded in installing a personnel of technologists instead of spoilsmen. Did their theory work? Was the reconstruction of those services justified?

All criticism of inefficient, and irresponsible, government remained academic until the public began to wince under the burden of taxes. Then practical politicians took up the cry and seized upon the scheme of the political scientists and research organizations as a practical remedy for the high cost of government. The opportunistic politician and the idealistic student united in their efforts to establish state reorganization and efficiency and economy commissions. politician playing the role of the economist was not unique. Indeed, the originators of the "spoils system" in the United States preached

Ibid., 65, 66. Holcombe, Op. Cit., 395.

"efficiency and economy" in their campaigns. From that day to this politicians have promised economy. During this "era of efficiency and economy commissions", or since 1910, economy was masked in a new garb. Taxes were to be cut down not by "turning the rascals out" as before, but by a pseudo-scientific reorganization of the executive branch of the government. Since 1910 politician and student have agreed that "the chief cause of the high cost of government was waste and inefficiency" inherent in existing methods. This emphasis upon finances effected a movement for fiscal retrenchment. Consequently, this era of efficiency and economy commissions saw the inauguration of a movement for budget reform, a companion movement to that for administrative reconstruction.

The greatest impetus to the reorganization movement was given by President Taft when he appointed his Efficiency and Economy Commission of 1910 headed by Dr. F. A. Cleveland. True, prior to this time states had considered administrative consolidation, but the reforms had been only "piecemeal", that is, the unifying of agencies within a certain field such as labor, education, commerce, health. But, after the creation of Taft's Commission, plans were forwarded for comprehensive reconstruction of the entire state administration. The following year, 1911, Oregon and Wisconsin considered schemes for reorganization. In 1912, commissions were appointed in New Jersey and Massachusetts; in 1913, in New York, Iowa, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. Thus the movement continued apace, until now thirteen states have been completely reorganized along the most approved lines and a score of others have considered such projects.

The general demand on the part of all of the efficiency and economy commissions was that there should be a more scientific functional consolidation of agencies in related fields. All were agreed upon the necessity of eliminating overlapping jurisdiction, duplication of effort, inefficient budget and accounting methods, and the lessening of overhead. But the commissions were not agreed regarding the proper status of the governor. Some proposed that the governor should be in the main a political and titular officer, others that he should be the real administrative chief in addition to his political and formal duties. Thus two types of reorganization were advanced. The first carried the movement to take particular services "out of politics" to its logical conclusion. Sometimes it has been called "government by commission", and at other times it has been called the board of directors plan because the constitutional structure of the business corporation with a board of directors and a general manager was proposed for each major department. The second type has been called the federal plan and its idea of placing all administrative power in the governor who is directly responsible to the people has already been noted. The advocates of each of the two types said that it was the manifest destiny of American government that their particular type should be accepted; that to accept the other alternative would be to go contrary to the inevitable trend of our political institutions.

"Efficiency and Economy", was a phrase used by Thomas Benton in praise of Jackson "who had made a clean sweep of the office-holders, and filled their places with 'true Republicans.' It is interesting to observe the originators of the first great national party machine using the term "efficiency and economy" in the same breath with "rotation" and "to the victor belongs the spoils of the enemy." STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY, I, 153. See also WRIGHT, BOSSISM IN CINCINNATI.

Holcombe, Op. Cit., 305.

Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 70.

For instance an advocate of the second type said: "The constitutional history of the states is a history of the growth of limitations upon the authority of the legislature and of the expansion of that of the executive." But the proponents of the first type might reply that history also is one of the growth of the boss and invisible government a trend deplored by both, and that the governor's supremacy depends upon invisible government. If such is the case then the hue and cry about the governor's direct responsibility to the people is futile. Indeed, some leaders of the federal plan type of reorganization concede its failure because the governor in reality has not been responsible in spite of the fact that this plan has centered all power in his hands.10

The first type was proposed for Wisconsin in 1911, for New Jersey in 1912, for Michigan in 1919, and for Maryland in 1921. The New Jersey plan is the most clear cut case of the board of directors idea. It proposed the establishment of eight major departments each headed by a board and a commissioner appointed by and responsible to the board. To quote:

"All modern enterprises are conducted by corporations guided by a board of directors; in fact, the law in this state—as in others provides that the business of any corporation shall be managed by its directors, and that each shall have a chief executive called its president. . . . It has, therefore, been our aim to group together commissions and officials engaged in the same kind of work, and to consolidate such work in one department, with a board of directors, and a chief corresponding to the president of the corporation. The powers of consolidated departments we believe should be conferred upon the board of directors, so that it may define the policy to be pursued by the department, and to enact rules and regulations to be observed by the chief and all employees.""

Their primary object in creating the boards was to eliminate political partisanship and to insure the appointment of technologists to all offices and positions. The chief precautions against parisanship were to appoint members to the boards with long overlapping terms in order that one governor might not dominate the boards, to prohibit the appointment of a majority of members from any one party, to make positions on the board non-salaried, and to prevent removal of the commissioner of the department by the governor except upon the demand of the majority of the board and after a cautious process of public hearings. In opposing the payment of salaries to board members the reorganization commission declared:

"We have seriously considered the advisability of paying some small salary, but experience has shown that for every salary offered there are numerous office seekers, the majority of whom scarcely measure up to the salaries to be paid. We believe that there are many public-spirited men in the state who cannot be induced to enter the employ of the state on a salary basis, but who would cheerfully give their services if they are afforded fair opportunity to have a voice in shaping the policies of the state and improving general conditions."1

Advocates of the second type of reorganization, based upon the

⚫ Holcombe, Op. Cit., 403.

20 Ibid., 305; Cleveland and Buck, Op. Cit., 111.

11 Ibid., 96. Report of the Commission upon the Reorganization and Consolidation of the different Departments of the State government of New Jersey.

13 Ibid., 96-7. NEW JERSEY SESSION LAWS, 1915, ch. 241.