to have recourse to arms to defend it. Second, we ought to have at least some probable appearance of success; for it would be a criminal temerity, and a real folly, wantonly to expose ourselves to certain destruction, and to run into a greater, in order to avoid a lesser evil. Lastly, there should be a real necessity for taking up arms; that is, we ought not to have recourse to force, but when we can employ no milder method of recovering our rights, or of defending ourselves from the evils with which we are menaced. These measures are agreeable not only to the principles of prudence, but also to the fundamental maxims of sociability, and the love of peace; maxims of no less force, with respect to nations, than individuals. By these a sovereign must, therefore, be necessarily directed; even the justice of the government obliges him to it, in consequence of the very nature and end of authority. For as he ought always to take particular care of the state, and of his subjects, consequently he should not expose them to all the evils with which war is attended, except in the last extremity, and when there is no other expedient left but that of arms." In addition to these great authorities, permit me to refer severally to the opinions of two more modern writers, Martens and Paley. The former says, that all amicable means for redress must be tried in vain, before an appeal to arms, unless it is evident that it would be useless to try such means: and the latter is of opinion, that the only justifying causes of war are deliberate invasions of right, and maintaining the balance of power. It is not necessary to decide upon the justice of the last observation, because it does not apply to the case before us. But can any man lay his hand upon his heart, and declare that he believes the present case a deliberate invasion of right by the Spanish government? Can any man say, that it would be fruitless to attempt amicable means of redress, and that the sword alone can restore us to our rights?

The opinions of these celebrated writers are corro

borated by the general usage of nations. A demand of redress, before the application of force, has been almost uniformly practised by the most barbarous, as well as the most civilized nations. Instances may, indeed, be found to the contrary, but they are to be considered as departures from established usage. The ancient Romans, who were a military nation, and who marched to empire through an ocean of blood, always demanded satisfaction from the offending nation before they proceeded to war, and fixed upon a certain time in which the demand was to be complied with; at the expiration of which, if redress was still withheld, they then endeavored to obtain it by force. It has been the general practice of the civilized nations of Europe to promulge manifestos justificatory of their conduct, in resorting to arms. These manifestos contain a full statement of their wrongs, and almost always declare that they had previously endeavored by negociation to obtain a friendly adjustment of their complaints. What is this, but a declaration, that the law and the sense of nations demand this course? What is it, but an appeal to the intuitive sense of right and wrong, which exists in every human bosom? The reign of the present king of Great Britain has been emphatically a war reign. In 1760, he ascended the throne and found the nation at war with France. Besides his wars in the East and West Indies, almost half of his reign has been consumed in wars with this country, and some of the nations of Europe. He has been three times at war with France, three times with Spain, twice with Holland, and once with the United States. The most strange events-events, which have pleased and dazzled, astonished and terrified mankind, have passed upon the theatre of the world in his time. The ordinary maxims of policy, and the cardinal principles of action, have been reversed and prostrated. The world has seen the revival of the crusades, all the great powers of Europe in arms, and a destroying and desolating spirit go forth, unknown to past times. Por

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tentous as a portion of this reign has been, when a deviation from the established laws of nations might naturally be expected, and degraded as the power and condition of Spain is represented to be, I am willing to stake the whole controversy upon the reciprocal conduct of these governments to each other. Of all wars, one with Spain is the most popular in England, from the opportunities it affords for maritime spoliation, and lucrative enterprize. For the same reasons it is anxiously deprecated by Spain; and it has even grown into a Spanish proverb, "Peace with England, and war with the world." Notwithstanding the preponderating force of Great Britain, the allurements of popularity and cupidity, her great and extraordinary acquisition of maritime power, and the martial temper which has marked her character during the present reign-we find the very power, with whom we are now called upon to measure swords, meeting her propositions for negociation or arms on the ground of perfect equality, maintaining a steady posture, and an erect attitude, passing through her collisions with unspotted reputation and unsullied dignity, and teaching us an instructive lesson, that while we ought never to bend into degrading compliances, we are not to expect that a nation, which has not yielded improperly to the power in the world most able to injure her, will tamely submit to the insulting and imperious measure recommended so earnestly to our adoption. Six controversies have occurred between Great Britain and Spain during the reign of the present king; three have terminated amicably by negociation, and three have resulted in war. In 1761, when Great Britain was at war with France, a memorial was presented by the French ambassador at London to the English minister, which implicated some demands of Spain upon Great Britain, and which gave great offence to her ministry. A negociation took place, which being attended with an insolent demand for a sight of a treaty concluded between France and Spain, and which being very properly re

fused, a war ensued. Notwithstanding the conduct of Great Britain, in the course of this transaction, was precipitate and unjust, negociation was attempted before an appeal to arms: and the future disclosure of the real transaction furnished her with a salutary lesson; for it was afterwards found, that the treaty did not refer to the existing state of the belligerent powers, but that the guarantee, it contained, was not to operate until the termination of the war.

In the year 1770, the remarkable case of the Faulkland Islands occurred. Six years before, a settlement. was made and a fort erected by the British government on one of them, with a view to accommodate navigators in refitting their ships and furnishing them with necessaries previous to their passage through the Straits of Magellan, or the doubling Cape Horn. This settlement gave great umbrage to Spain, not only on account of its interference with her claim of sovereignty to almost the whole southern continent of America, and the adjacent islands, but also on account of the facility it would afford, in case of a future war, to an attack upon her South Sea territories. Ineffectual remonstrances were made on the part of Spain, and at last, notwithstanding the claim of Great Britain by discovery and occupancy, an armed force was sent, the fort was taken, the settlement was broken up, and the honor of the British flag violated by the taking off of the rudder of a king's ship, and detaining it on shore twenty days. What course did the British pursue on this occasion? In this case the insult was flagrant; the honor of their flag, the dignity of the crown, and the commerce of the nation were implicated. Was the sword immediately unsheathed, and the door to peace effectually closed? No: negociations ensued: a convention was formed. Spain disavowed the violence, and engaged to restore the possessions, but with an express declaration, that the restitution should not effect the question concerning the prior right of sovereignty. The islands were also evacuated three years

afterwards by Great Britain, in consequence of a secret agreement.

In 1779, Spain declared war against Great Britain, alleging unredressed depredations on her commerce, and that she was insulted in an attempt to negociate between France and Great Britain. It is evident that this step on the part of Spain was in pursuance of the family compact; and was not justifiable by the laws of nations. It appears, however, that previous to taking this measure, she had attempted to attain her objects by negociation.

In 1786, the long disputes, respecting the English settlements on the Mosquito shore and the coast of Honduras, were settled by negociation. The English abandoned their Mosquito settlements, and many hundreds of families, who had inhabited them under the protection and faith of the British government, were peremptorily compelled to evacuate that country. The boundaries of the English Honduras settlements were enlarged, but in such a manner as to leave Spain in full possession of her territorial rights and exclusive domin

ion.

In 1790, the controversy about Nootka Sound arose. Two years before, a settlement was made there, by an association of British merchants, on land purchased from the natives with a view to carry on the fur trade. This interfering with the chimerical rights of Spain, a Spanish frigate was despatched by the viceroy of Mexico, which seized the fort, and captured the English vessels trading there. A negociation took place, the vessels were restored, and the settlements agreed to be yielded back: but there was an express reservation, on the part of Spain, of the right of sovereignty for ulterior discussion. In 1796, Spain, in pursuance of a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with France, declared war against Great Britain.

From this short narrative it will appear, that in almost every case negociation was attempted, even when indignity and violence had been committed;