The New Institutional Economics: A Collection of Articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical EconomicsEirik Grundtvig Furubotn, Rudolf Richter Mohr Siebeck, 1991 - 376 páginas |
Contenido
The New Institutional Economics | 1 |
Section I | 33 |
Institutionalist Economics Old and | 54 |
Reflections on Relational Contract | 62 |
Long Term Vertical Relationships and the Study | 96 |
A Comparison of Alternative Approaches | 104 |
A New Push in the Theory of Organization | 115 |
Section II | 125 |
Transaction Costs Institutions and Economic History | 214 |
The Incentives to Innovate under Alternative Property Rights | 233 |
Section IV | 251 |
The Political Institutions of Representative | 261 |
The Louvre Accord From the Viewpoint | 272 |
Section V | 289 |
Monitoring Agents With Other Agents | 313 |
Regulating Trade Among Agents | 335 |
Plant Closings | 145 |
Worker Reallocation Costs and Efficiency Gains to Labor | 154 |
The Cooperative Association as a Business Enterprise | 171 |
The New Institutional Approach to Economic History | 201 |
Different Approaches to the Economic Analysis | 356 |
Concluding Remarks | 363 |
| 372 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Términos y frases comunes
agency theory agreement ALCHIAN allocation American Economic Review analysis approach arise arrangements asset specificity assumed assumption bargaining behavior benefits bounded rationality capital coalition Coase Theorem competition constraints cooperative association costly dairy decision DEMSETZ depends economists efficient enforcement ex ante ex post example exchange firm firm's framework function FURUBOTN gesamte governance structures Grameen Bank individual industrial inputs Institutional and Theoretical institutional change institutional economics interest investments Journal of Economics Journal of Institutional Journal of Law labor Law and Economics Louvre Accord low-productivity agent maximization ment monitoring monopoly moral hazard Nash equilibrium neoclassical neoclassical economics noncooperative optimal organizational outcome ownership parties patent political potential principal problem production property rights quasi-rent relational contract relationship result risk rules side-contracting social solution concept Theoretical Economics JITE tion trade transaction cost economics transactors uncertainty utility wage workers
Referencias a este libro
Strategische Analyse Von Unternehmensakquisitionen: Das Beispiel Der ... Marcus Oehlrich Sin vista previa disponible - 1999 |
Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity Ash Amin,Jerzy Hausner Vista de fragmentos - 1997 |