1860. July Term. Fox's adm'rs V. Commonwealth. only to the persons and subjects mentioned as aforesaid, In 1852-3 an act was passed (April 7, 1853,) entitled claring that there shall be levied and collected on the persons and subjects mentioned in the act of assembly passed on the 7th day of April, 1853, entitled " An act concerning the assessment and collection of the public revenue," the taxes following, to-wit. This act is almost a literal copy of the act of 1852, page 14, except that it increases the amount of taxes, and does not, as that does, profess to be for a year only. Nor does it, as the 40th chapter of the Code does, direct the taxes to be "yearly as follows." Like the act of 1852, it embraces the tax on "collateral inheritances," and expressly repeals the 40th chapter of the Code. It is a perfect tax law, comprehending all the taxes intended to be imposed for the support of government. In 1853-4, (Sess. Acts, p. 3,) an act was passed entitled "An act imposing taxes for the support of government," which seems to be a literal copy of the act of 1852-3, p. 19, containing, as that does, the tax on "collateral inheritances," and an express repeal of chapter 40 of the Code. And it is, therefore, like that, a perfect tax law. In 1854-5 there was no session of the legislature, and therefore the tax law passed in 1853-4 was the law for the fiscal years ending in 1854 and 1855. In 1855-6, (Sess. Acts, p. 11,) an act was passed entitled "An act imposing taxes for the support of government," the commencement and first seven sections of which seem to have been literally copied from the act of 1853-4, (except that the amount of the taxes is very much increased in the act of 1855-6,) and many other sections of the two acts bear a close resemblance, showing that the latter act was penned with the former before the draftsman; though in many respects the two acts differ both in form and substance. The point of difference most material to the present enquiry is that the act of 1855-6 wholly omits the tax on collateral inheritances, while it literally copies, except as to amount 1860. July Term. Fox's adm'rs V. Common wealth. 1860. July Term. Fox's adm'rs V. Common wealth. of taxes, the section which next precedes and that which next follows the section imposing a tax on collateral inheritances in the act of 1853-4, and also in the act of 1852-3. It contains no express repeal of chapter 40 of the Code, as does the act of 1853-4, and also do the two next preceding tax acts. In 1856-7 there was no session of the legislature. In 1857-8 there was, but no tax law was passed, and consequently the act of 1855-6 remained in full force. In 1858-9 there was no session of the legislature. In 1859-60 there was; and a tax law was passed, in which is again omitted the tax on collateral inheritances, as it occurs in chapter 40 of the Code and in subsequent acts, though a tax on "collateral inheritances" of real estate is imposed by another act then passed. Acts, ch. 1, § 38. Sess. I have thus set out in detail the course of legislation on this subject, because I thought it very material to the present enquiry, which, I repeat, is: whether the section in the act of '53-4, imposing a tax on collateral inheritances, is repealed by implication by the act of '55-6, which contains no such section. The latter act contains no repealing clause or words, and, therefore, it repeals nothing expressly. If it repeals any other law, or part of a law, it only does so by implication. Statutes may be repealed by implication, as well as expressly. Every statute is by implication a repeal of all prior statutes, as far as it is contrary and repugnant thereto, and that without any repealing clause. Sedg. on St. and Con. Law, 123-129. Or, as it is elsewhere expressed, "every affirmative statute is a repeal by implication of a precedent affirmative statute, so far as it is contrary thereto; for leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant Dwarris 673, (9 Law Lib.) But the leaning of the courts is against the doctrine. The law does not favor a repeal by implication, unless the repugnance be quite plain, and then only to the extent of such repugnance. Id. 674. The presumption is that the legislature, when it entertains an intention, will express it in clear and explicit terms; and it is generally to be taken that the legislature only meant to modify or repeal the provision of any former statute in those cases where such its object is expressly declared. Id. 717. This, however, is not always the case, and statutes are often passed without the precaution being used of expressly repealing other, or parts of other, statutes intended to be repealed. Whether a former statute is intended to be repealed by a later one, is always a question of intention, which is to be ascertained, when not plainly expressed, by construction of the later statute. The intention thus ascertained must prevail, as well in regard to the question of repeal as in regard to any other question which can arise as to the meaning and effect of the statute. The rules of construction of a statute are in most respects the same as the rules of construction of deeds and wills; but in some respects they are not, the difference arising from the different nature of the subjects. Such of the rules of construction of a statute as seem to have a bearing upon this case will be noticed. Most of them may be found in Dwarris, ch. xii. In the exposition of a statute the leading clue to the construction to be made is the intention of the legis. lator, and that may be discovered from different signs. As a primary rule, it is to be collected from the words; when the words are not explicit it is to be gathered from the occasion and necessity of the law, being the causes which moved the legislature to enact it. Id. 693. The safe and established rule of construction is, that the intention of the law-giver and the meaning of the law are to be discovered and deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of a statute taken and VOL. XVI.-2 1860. July Term. Fox's adm'rs V. Common wealth. 1860. July Term. Fox's adm'rs V. Commonwealth. compared together. It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part by another part of the same statute, for that best expresses the meaning of the makers, and such construction is ex visceribus actus. And this, construction, of itself, imports, ex vi termini. Id. 698, 703. As one part of a statute is properly called in to help the construction of another part, and is fitly so expounded as to support and give effect, if possible, to the whole, so is the comparison of one law with other laws made by the same legislator, or upon the same subject, or relating expressly to the same point, enjoined for the same reason and attended with a like advantage. In applying the maxims of interpretation, the object is, throughout, first to ascertain, and next to carry into effect, the intentions of the framer. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. It is, therefore, an established rule of law that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law; and they are directed to be compared in the construction of statutes, because they are considered as framed upon one system, and having one object in view. And the rule, it is said, equally applies, though some of the statutes may have expired, or are not referred to in the others. Id. 699, 700. Besides the occasion and the reason of the enactment, the letter of the act, the context, the spirit of the act, the subject matter and the provisions of the act have all to be considered. Id. 702. It is a well-settled rule of law, that every charge upon the citizen must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language. Statutes which impose a duty upon the public will be critically construed with reference to the particular language in which they are expressed. |