1861. April Term. Henry V. Graves. tiffs, and a final decree was rendered in their favor in October next thereafter. From these two decrees the defendant Henry obtained an appeal to this court. Bouldin and Reade, for the appellant. MONCURE, J. delivered the opinion of the court: The appellant's claim is founded on the assumption that his deed is entirely voluntary. If it was executed for a valuable consideration, in whole or in part, it is certainly valid and effectual, whether it be regarded as an executed or a merely executory contract. The deed recites that it was executed for a valuable consideration received by the grantors, and is evidence of that fact against them, even in a court of equity; though not conclusive evidence, or an estoppel in that court. The deed also recites that it was executed "out of pure love and affection." And the appellant in his answer denies that any valuable consideration was paid or intended to be paid, and avers that the conveyance was purely voluntary. The evidence tends to support the answer, though it may well be doubted whether both together are sufficient to outweigh the effect of the admission contained in the deed. However that may be, it will be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that the deed was entirely voluntary, and we will proceed to consider the question submitted by the appellant in his answer: Whether a merely voluntary deed, executed under such circumstances, and without any change of the possession of the property, is binding upon him? The Code, ch. 116, § 1, p. 500, provides, that "no gift of a slave or of any goods and chattels shall be valid, unless by deed or will, or unless actual possession shall have come to and remained with the donee or some person claiming under him." Under this provision such a deed would be valid between the parties even without being recorded; though under the act of 1819, 1 R. C., ch. 111, § 51, p. 432, which was in force when the gift in this case occurred, the deed as to slaves was required to be recorded to make it valid even between the parties. The gift in this case, being by deed duly recorded, would certainly have been valid, though unaccompanied by a change of possession, even if the interest conveyed had been a present interest in possession; and a fortiori if it had been a vested interest in remainder of the donor in his own right; in which case the interest would have been in its nature incapable of a change of possession. But the interest conveyed is the husband's interest in his wife's vested remainder, dependent on a life estate in slaves; and the question is, whether a voluntary conveyance of such an interest is valid, in the event which has occurred of the husband's surviving both his wife and the tenant for life? It must be observed, that though the wife united with her husband in this case in signing the deed, it is his deed only and not her's, as the law then in force provided no mode whereby a wife could convey an interest in personalty (except her separate estate); though the present law does provide such a mode, (Code, ch. 121, 4, p. 513,) which mode, however, was not pursued in this case, even if it were governed by the present law. The counsel for the appellees contend that a wife's vested remainder in personal estate is not a mere chose in action, which the husband must reduce into possession to perfect his title thereto, but vests in him absolutely and immediately jure mariti. So that if the husband should die before the wife, and before the determination. of the particular estate, the remainder would belong to his personal representative. If this were so, it would be conclusive of the case against the appellant; as the deed would be an exe 1861. April Term. Henry V. Graves. 1861. April Term. Henry V. Graves. cuted gift of a vested remainder in slaves, which would certainly be valid. But it is now too well settled to admit of question, that where a wife has a vested remainder in personal estate expectant on the death of a tenant for life, and both the wife and tenant for life outlive the husband, the wife is entitled, by right of survivorship, to the interest or remainder, not only against the representatives and general assignees of the husband, but even against the particular assignee for valuable consideration. Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Mad. R. 16; Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. R. 1; Honner v. Morton, 3 Russ. R. 65, 3 Cond. Eng. Ch. R. 298; Browning v. Headley, 2 Rob. R. 340, 370. And this is the case as well where the property consists of slaves as where it consists of stock, money, or other personalty. See Dade v. Alexander, 1 Wash. 30; Upshaw v. Upshaw, cc., 2 Hen. & Munf. 381; Wade v. Boxley, &c., 5 Leigh 442; 1 B. Mon. 152; 7 Id. 535; 9 Id. 94; 12 Id. 40. In Upshaw v. Upshaw, &c., Judge Tucker said that the husband "might have sold his wife's reversionary right, it being a vested interest; yet, if he neglected to do so, he could not dispose of it by will, but it would survive to her." The former part of this remark is a mere dictum, and is not law at least to its full extent-as a sale by the husband would have been defeated by the wife's right of survivorship. But the case shows that the wife's vested remainder in slaves does not vest, absolutely and immediately, in the husband. The deed in this case, then, must be regarded as a conveyance by the husband of his contingent interest in his wife's vested remainder in the slaves. And so regarding it, is it valid? If it had been for valuable consideration, instead of being voluntary, it would certainly have been valid, (as before stated,) in the event that has occurred; though it would have been ineffectual if the wife had survived the husband and the life tenant. A husband's assignment for value of his wife's legal chose in action is good against the wife, because it is equivalent to a reduction into possession. Having a right to reduce it into possession, he, in effect, does so, when he receives value for it. By selling it, he agrees to reduce it into possession for the benefit of the vendee; and a court of equity, in such a case, considers that as done which is agreed to be done. But the husband's assignment of a vested remainder of the wife has not that effect; because, not having then a right to reduce the property into possession actually, he cannot do it constructively. The assignment for value by the husband places the assignee in the husband's shoes, and invests him with the husband's contingent interest, which will become absolute in the assignee when and as it would have become absolute in the husband if he had made no assignment. See Browning v. Headley, 2 Rob. R. 370, and the cases cited. But what is the effect of a voluntary conveyance by the husband of his contingent interest in his wife's vested remainder in slaves? That is the question we now have to consider; and it is the only remaining, though most important, question in the case. An executed gift is valid, though voluntary, and passes the title in the subject to the donce. But an executory gift does not, of itself, pass the title; and to perfect it the aid of a court of equity would be necessary. That court will never aid a volunteer-at least if he be a mere stranger to perfect his title, unless the property was so transferred as to create the relation of trustee and cestui que trust. 2 Sug. Vend. 936. A court of equity will not assist to create a trust in favor of a volunteer, but, where the trust is actually created, equity will enforce its execution. And a party may so constitute himself a trustee that a court of equity will execute the trust in favor of a volunteer. Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. R. 656; 1861. April Term. Henry V. Graves. 1861. April Term. Henry v. Graves. 1 Leading Cases in Equity 199, marg. and notes, Am. ed. 1859. But it is unnecessary to consider further the subject of trusts, as none was created, or intended to be so, in this case. Then, was the gift in this case executed or executory? In form it is certainly an executed gift. It is by a present conveyance of an interest; not a contract for a future conveyance. If the interest 'had been a present or vested one, the conveyance would certainly have been an executed, not an executory gift. But the interest being contingent, it is contended that it could not be conveyed, and therefore the conveyance cannot be valid as an executed gift. It might in that view still be valid. as an executory, though in the form of an executed contract, if it were founded on valuable consideration. A court of equity would, in that case, treat it as a contract to convey when the interest, by becoming absolute, should become capable of being conveyed. But being voluntary, a court of equity would not give effect to it in that way, since that court, as before stated, never assists a volunteer to perfect his title. The question then resolves itself into this: Can such a contingent interest be conveyed? If it can, the interest in this case was conveyed, by a good and valid conveyance. If it cannot, the conveyance is ineffectual, either as an executed or an executory gift. It is a general rule that property is not only liable for the owner's debts, but may be sold, or even given away, at the pleasure of the owner. 2 Spence's Eq. Ju. 896. It was a rule of the common law, subject only to a few exceptions, that "no possibility, right, title, nor anything in action should be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would be the occasion of multiplying contentions and suits." Id. 850. But the court of chancery, from the earliest times, has given effect to assignments of every kind of future and contingent interests and possibilities |