struct the jury that the facts set forth, if not rebutted, raised a legal presumption of the further fact of guilty knowledge, which bound the jury to find the prisoner guilty. And this, it is fair to infer, was the belief of the jury; for it appears by the sixth bill of exceptions that, after the case had been committed to the jury, they came into court the next day and enquired if they must take the instruction of the court as law, and were informed they were, in the opinion of the court, so bound; but they must consider and decide upon the evidence in the case-thus limiting the jury to the enquiry whether the evidence proved the facts set forth in the instruction; and, if they were satisfied that those facts were established, that they raised of themselves the legal presumption of guilty knowledge, and the jury should find the prisoner guilty. The question how far a jury is bound to presume guilt, or a guilty intent, from any state of facts, is involved in very great doubt by the authorities. The various decisions on the subject are reviewed and commented on by Bishop on Criminal Law, §§ 248, 249 and 513; 2 Starkey's Ev., part 2, 928, note p; 3 Arch. Crim. Prac. 550; and Best on Presumptions, ch. 1, 2, 3. By one elementary writer it is said that where the policy of the law and ends of justice require that a presumption should be made, the jury should be told they ought to make the presumption, unless some evidence be given to the contrary; it should not be put to them as a matter of discretion. Larceny, for example, it is said, is inferred from the recent possession of stolen property. Best on Presumptions, ch. 3, § 40. Starkey, ubi supra, says that though the fact of a connection between the recent possession of stolen property by the accused with the fact that he stole it are usually combined, experience shows that this connection, although usual, is not necessary. No artificial weight can be attached to it, and juries do not convict 1861. October Term. Wash's Case. 1861. October Term. Wash's Case. unless fully satisfied of the actual guilt of the prisoner. Artificial presumptions can therefore never be safely established as a means of proof in criminal cases. The author reprobates in proper terms what he calls the abominable and sanguinary statute of 21 Jas. I., ch. 27, which made the concealment of the bastard child by the mother evidence that she murdered it. It is a maxim laid down by all writers on criminal law that every person must be presumed to intend that which is the immediate and natural consequence of his deliberate acts. And therefore, it is said, that the uttering a forged document is conclusive evidence of an intention to defraud the person who would naturally be affected by it. And the weight of authority would seem to be in favor of that proposition. But the cor rectness of the rule seems to be controverted by the reasoning of Starkey, ubi supra; and Bishop on Crim. Law, § 248, says it is probably impossible to lay down any exact rule in the present state of the authorities. In homicide it is conceded to be a presumption of law that where the fact of slaying has been proved, malice must be intended; and that all circumstances of justi fication or extenuation are to be made out by the prisoner, unless they appear from the evidence adduced against him. Foster's C. L. 255, 290. Perhaps, in most other criminal prosecutions, the jury, instead of being bound down by artificial rules, should be instructed that, in the absence of all rebutting evidence, they might fairly make such presumption. The question of guilty knowledge involved in the present case is of a different character from that of presumed intention from a given state of facts. The guilty knowledge is itself a fact, constituting an essential ingredient of the offence charged. The actual existence. of the fact must be proved, either directly or by such other facts and circumstances as, when fairly investiga ted by the proper tribunal for the ascertainment of facts, can leave no reasonable doubt that the fact does exist. The court cannot assume, in supposed adherence to any artificial rule of law, that, other facts being proved to exist, there is in all cases a legal and necessary connection between such facts and the other fact to be presumed. The determination rests exclusively with the jury; and they must decide truly, according to their own convictions, upon a consideration of all the evidence before them. From a state of facts being proved to exist to their satisfaction, such as those detailed in the bill of exceptions, most men disposed to act fairly would deduce the fact of guilty knowledge as being satisfactorily established; and so that the offence charged was proved beyond all reasonable doubt. But evidence of general good character might tend to rebut the presumption. And under peculiar circumstances the general presumption of innocence until guilt was proved might have the like effect. The weight of such evidence and presumption in any case is to be determined by the jury alone. The proof of such facts as those set out in the instruction, in the absence of everything to contradict or explain them, might in general be sufficient to warrant a conviction; yet, as was remarked by the judge in his opinion in Spencer's Case, 2 Leigh 751, 756, it would not bind the jury with conclusive force. It is nothing more than a high degree of presumptive proof; and that in some cases of presumptive proof the inferences would be very strong and irresistible, in others weak and wholly inconclusive. And in all cases the jury are to weigh the circumstances, and draw from them what inferences they may warrant. The instruction as given did not leave the jury such liberty; it constrained them, paying a proper respect to the opinion of the court, to draw the inference of guilt as a legal presumption from the facts as set forth, if 1861. October Term. Wash's Case. 1861. October Term. Wash's Case. they believed them, unless that presumption was rebutted-deciding in effect that if such facts were found by a special verdict, supposing a special verdict proper in a criminal case, the court would presume from them the additional fact of guilty knowledge necessary to make out the crime, though such fact was not expressly found. I think the instruction was erroneous, and, if asked for in the same terms, should not be given. JUDGMENT REVERSED. Richmond. SAMANNI V. THE COMMONWEALTH. November 23d. 1. S occupies a house, the front room on the first floor as a store, the back room as a dining-room, the upper rooms as sleeping apartments for her family; but the only mode of ascent to the upper rooms is outside the house. A riotous destruction of the front door and window of the store-room is an offence under the act, Code, ch. 194, § 6. 2. A partial pulling down or destruction of a dwelling-house is an offence under the act, Code, ch. 194, § 6; in this differing from the English statute. This was an indictment against Thomas Samanni in the Hustings court of the city of Richmond, held by the judge thereof, for that he did, with other white persons, to the number of three or more, unlawfully and riotously assemble themselves together to disturb the peace of the Commonwealth; and being so unlawfully and riotously assembled together, the dwelling-house of one Mina Schweitzer, situate in the city, did then and there feloniously destroy in part, to the great terror, &c. On the trial it was proved that there was a riot in Richmond at the time stated in the indictment, and that the prisoner and a number of others, mostly women, made an attack upon the store of Mrs. Schweitzer, who had shut the door; that there were several blows upon the door with a hatchet, some of them by Samanni and others by a woman, by which a panel of the door was broken, and then the bar which fastened the door was removed by some person, who put his or her hand through the broken panel, and the door was thus opened, 1863. October Term. |