published as "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," Villanova Law Review, v. 13 (Winter 1968), pp. 303-46. Banzhaf, using 1960 census figures and the 1964 and 1968 electoral vote apportionment, computed that citizens of New

York, the most populous State at that time and for several previous decades, had 3.312 times the voting power of the most deprived "State," in this case the District of Columbia.

The advantage

to the most populous States under the electoral college, according to Banzhaf's study, correlated very closely with the size of the electoral vote, lessening as the electoral vote dropped, but increasing again when the electoral vote fell low enough to begin reflecting the effect of the "constant two," with States having 3 or 4 electoral votes. The lowest relative voting power was found in the 4 to 5 electoral vote range. The findings indicated that the more populous States had a clear advantage, with nine of the most populous States having a greater computed advantage than Alaska, the most advantaged of the less populous States.

A survey of biases of the electoral college written by John H. Yunker and Lawrence D. Longley, "The Biases of the Electoral College: Who Is Really Advantaged?" in Donald R. Matthews, ed., Perspectives on Presidential Selection (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 172-203, also concluded that "Large states, metropolitan area residents (including residents of central cities, SMSAS, and especially suburbs), population of foreign stock,

blue-collar workers, and the regions of the Far West and the East were found to be advantaged by the electoral college" (p. 202).

Another major study, Voting for President: The Electoral College and the American Political System (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1970) by Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris, concluded that "The method of allocating electoral votes among the states, like the representation scheme for Congress, was originally intended to balance small-state and large-state interests. Although the principle of the old compromise remains, the political situation has changed. On balance, the populous states are more powerful.

The generalticket system has worked to the advantage of the populous states" (p. 44).

Others have analyzed this question, and while there are disagreements among analysts, there is a preponderance of opinion that the general ticket tilts the electoral college system in favor of the most populous States.

Conclusion: There are two independent biases operating in the electoral college. One, which was illustrated by the March 5, 1979, computation to which you referred, definitely favors the less populous States. A second, the general ticket, definitely favors the inore populous States. It has thus far lay beyond the expertise of political scientists to prove quantitatively and conclusively which of these

biases is more significant. The most persuasive evidence tends to

support Yunker and Longley's conclusion that the present system
gives a significant advantage to the most populous States, a
smaller advantage to the less populous States, and disadvantages
to the greatest extent the medium-sized States, having between 4
and 12 electoral votes, which are too large to benefit to any
significant degree from the "constant two" but are too small
to derive significant benefit from the general ticket system.
I trust this memorandum responds to your inquiries.
of further assistance on this or any other matter, please call me on

426-5824.

If I can be

[Brief recess.]

Senator BAYH. Could I ask Dr. Bailey if he wants to get started, with the understanding if Senator McClure gets back we will suspend long enough for questions? We have a time problem here because we have two very distinguished witnesses yet.

Mr. Bailey?

STATEMENT OF DR. HARRY BAILEY, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, PHILADELPHIA, PA. Dr. BAILEY. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. First of all, I have read a number of comments in the newspapers which suggest that the electoral college should not be changed because it would benefit either black groups or Jewish groups. Let me say to you that the proposals I plan to make here, Mr. Chairman, are not offered to serve the selfish or even the better motivated interest of any person or group. It seems to me that, first of all, groups in America are often a moving balance of forces generating change through their struggles and tensions, and so the group that benefits today may not benefit tomorrow. The group that benefits tomorrow may not benefit the next day.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that what we are debating here is not the one man-one vote question but how we can maintain a unique system of 50 States, plus the District of Columbia, and a viable multinational polity. This free multinational polity is unique in all the world.

Now, I believe the electoral college can keep it so. So, Mr. Chairman, I would oppose Senate Joint Resolution 28, and would oppose that, Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that I have the greatest respect for the Chairman of this good committee, because I have watched his activities over the years. What I hope for today, Mr. Chairman, is to preserve the republic, and in this connection I would vote to keep the electoral college.

Let me talk about this matter, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the serious challenges which I think direct election poses for the republic. First of all, let us take the question of the States as separate political entities. The direct election plan, it seems to me, presents severe challenges to current roles of the States in the American Federal system. Herbert Wechsler has said:

The continuous existence of the States as governmental entities and their strategic role in the selection of a President are so immutable a feature of the system that their importance tends to be ignored."

That same observer has written:

And with the President, the crucial instrument of the election through electors is the States. States are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical determinants of a national as well as local politics.

Let me say, also, Mr. Chairman-or let me quote, also, one of my distinguished colleagues, Prof. Daniel Elazar of Temple University. He makes clear the special nature of each American State. He has written, for example, "Every State is a civil society, a relatively complex social system organized and defined politically which, one, pursues a particular conception of justice that it makes its own; encompasses a wide variety of social and economic interests; is charged with considerable responsibility for satisfying the technological and social needs of its people and is capable of authoritatively mobilizing the resources necessary to do so in a manner sufficient to insure its own maintenance.'

Precisely, Mr. Chairman, because each American State is a civil society, each becomes infused with the purposes and needs of its various ethnic, religious, racial and economic groups, and thus develops a separate identity.

My own judgment, Mr. Chairman, is that the electoral college helps to preserve that separate identity. Indeed, an important practical impact of the electoral college is its capacity to insulate the political system of the States or of one State from any other State. Beyond this very practical consideration, Mr. Chairman, the electoral college has tremendous symbolic value in that it confirms the Federal structure which guarantees small and large States equality in the Senate.

Let me talk for the next few seconds, Mr. Chairman, of the impact of the direct election, if it were to come about, on the administration of elections. Parenthetically, let me say it is always bad to come last, Mr. Chairman. One often feels superfluous and redundant because everyone that comes before seems to have said everything worth saying. But there is no better way to make a necessary emphasis than through repetition.

Let me say this, then, about the impact or the possible impact of direct election on the administration of elections. Meyer Kesnbaum, an eminent student of intergovernmental relations, said "The proper division of labor and authority between the Nation and the States is the key to maintaining the Federal nature of our system of government."

The direct election plan would alter this division since Federal controls over elections to include the setting of identical age, literacy, and registration requirements throughout the country. And

even more importantly, Mr. Chairman, the Federal administrations of election would be necessary.

This would be so, Mr. Chairman, because each voter would have an immediate interest in the fairness and accuracy of election machinery in every other State. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman, if we go to direct election, no matter the fact that the Congress of the United States would have the option as to whether or not it would institute nationwide rules, the interest then of citizens in every State would then be with the elections in every other State. Because State borders would be irrelevant in aggregating the vote for President, there would be no remaining separation between the States and the national Government.

Let me say something next, Mr. Chairman, and to the other members of this good committee, something about what I think the impact of direct election would be on the national will. By obfuscating the distinctions and powers of the States as separate entities from their citizens-that is to say, the principle of federalism, i.e., reduction of government into two separate levels with separate powers, functions, and responsibilities-each would be weakened. This one move, Mr. Chairman, in the direction of a clear undivided national will would, in my judgment, result in additional power accruing to the national Government at the expense of the States. National will, for example, presently refers to that conglomeration of interests which elects the President.

In actuality, Mr. Chairman, there is only a limited national will. What really exists, Mr. Chairman, other good members of this committee, are State wills

Senator BAYH. Doctor, would you suspend just a moment? Would it be rude if I suggested that I take off and try to catch a vote, and then you fellows can stay?

Do you think you can keep the hearing moving here, or what is your pleasure? I can be back here in a matter of 10 minutes. Senator THURMOND. All right.

Senator BAYH. I will be back in about 7 or 8 minutes, and in that way we will not interrupt your testimony.

Mr. BAILEY. Would you want me to continue?

Senator BAYH. Please continue. My colleagues will stay, and we are sorry to play bouncing ball.

Mr. BAILEY. Let me continue, if I may, with this good subcommittee.

In actuality, there is only a limited national will presently. What really exists are State wills, each of which is measured and given strength individually. In the election of a President, an individual's opinion has force only in the State in which he resides. Thus, there are mainly State wills which, from time to time, come into agreement to form what we call the national will. The electoral college is the device which makes this process possible and workable. Moreover, let me say to the members of this good committee the electoral college is a barrier between vast oscillations in public sentiment and the Presidency. In a pluralistic society with checks and balances set in the way of easy governmental action, the electoral college, by the same token, is set in the way of easy changes in public opinion.