-

national and state with separate powers, functions, and responsibilities for each) would be weakened. This one move in the direction of a clear, undivided 'national will' would result in additional power accruing to the national government at the expense of the states. 'National will,' in this case, refers to that conglomeration of interests which elects the president. In actuality, there is only a limited national will. What really exist are 'state wills,' each of which is measured and given strength individually. In the election of the president, an individual's opinion has force only in the state in which he resides. Thus there are mainly 'state wills' which from time to time come into agreement to form what we call the national will. The electoral college is the device which makes this process possible and workable.

Adoption of the direct election plan would threaten the continued existence of the present nominating process. The logical consequence would be a nationwide presidential primary operating along the same lines as the direct election. Already Senators Mike Mansfield and George Aiken have proposed a single national primary to be held in August of each presidential election year." If none of a party's candidates received a plurality of at least 40 percent, a run-off would be held four weeks later between the top two candidates. Thus if both direct election for the President and a nation-wide primary were adopted, the likelihood would be four national elections in a three-month period, since few candidates could be expected to get 40 percent of the vote where several candidates vie for the nomination of their party and several parties compete for the presidency. There is no gainsaying the wear and tear on the American voting public and the likely consequences, one of which would likely be increased voter apathy. More corrosive of federalism, a national primary would have the effect of reducing the importance of the states as civil societies in the election of the President.

Constitutional stability could be affected by abolition of

the electoral college. The direct election plan could make possible a worse situation than what has usually happened in the history of presidential elections. Under the extant system, most winners of the presidency have garnered a good deal more than 40 percent of the popular vote and thus have enjoyed considerable legitimacy20 as president because the popular plurality has almost always converted to a majority in the electoral college." Since 1824 when the popular vote was first recorded on a nationwide basis, only four presidents have secured less than 45 percent of the popular vote. They were John Quincy Adams in 1824 with 31.9 percent, Abraham Lincoln in 1860 with 39.8 percent, Woodrow Wilson in 1912 with 41.9 percent and Richard Nixon in 1968 with 43.4 percent. Twenty-nine of the 38 elections since 1824 have sent to the presidency men who secured more than 48 percent of the popular vote. The remaining five presidents who captured more than 45 percent of the vote but less than 48 percent were Zachary Taylor in 1848 (47.3%), James Buchanan in 1856 (45.6%), Rutherford Hayes in 1876 (47.9%), Benjamin Harrison in 1888 (47.8%), and Grover Cleveland in 1892 (46.0%).

The two-party system would be affected considerably by the abolition of the electoral college. Presently minor parties can win votes in the electoral college only by carrying an entire state. Since few minor parties can succeed at this, they soon wither and fade away. However, the run-off provision of the direct election plan would likely give rise to minor parties competing seriously for the presidency." Indeed, a minor party could conceivably earn enough votes to win an election where two major parties divide the vote. Failing this, a minor party, in forcing a run-off, could conceivably help elect a candidate who is in fact the voters' second choice. Dorothy Buckton James concludes that the electoral college inhibits development of a multi-party system."

The "umbrella function" - the bridging of a wide variety

of interests in American life

performed by each of the two major parties would be endangered by the direct-election plan. Just as the two-party system requires the various interests to bargain and form coalitions prior to elections as opposed to multi-party systems which foster bargaining and coalitions after elections, so it is that national conventions foster bargaining and compromise prior to elections as opposed to runoff elections which extend bargaining and compromise to a more critical juncture in the electoral process." The bargaining of politicians at a national convention seems eminently preferable to asking voters to reorder their choice for president at a run-off election. The very circumstance of the necessity to balance group and sectional interests in selecting a potential chief executive of a multi-group society engenders this preference.

Finally, the direct election plan would alter the relationship of state and local politicians to national politicians. States are the level at which American political parties are constituted. The real power is at this level with national parties emerging at four-year intervals to meet very defined tasks. Elimination of the role of the states in the presidential selection process would transfer much of the power of state and local politicians to national politicians." Here, again, the balance between national and state power would be considerably altered, and federalism jeopardized.

Conclusion

Many observers see the electoral college process of electing an American president as a remnant of an age when mass democracy was a possibility to be feared. These same observers argue the logic for such fears no longer holds and, what is more, the electoral college poses a greater threat than direct election because of its possibility for deadlock. So too, many see the present hybrid system (party primaries, state conventions, as well as the national conventions) for nominating a president as too gruelling for the candidates, and too chaotic

for many of the citizenry to understand or respect. But as the eminent scholar of American federalism, Morton Grodzins, has said, "Decentralization by mild chaos is more desirable than centralization by order." This is a persuasive argument for the view that the present role of the states, in presidential election and nominating processes, be taken as a datum of American federalism which should not easily be tampered with. Herbert Wechsler puts it concisely: "the President must be . . . the main repository of the 'national spirit' in the central government. But both the mode of his selection and the future of his party require that he also be responsive to local values that have large support within the

Perhaps a new constitutional scheme for the selection of the President and Vice-President is in order, but whatever reform is adopted must clearly recognize that the politics of the American federal system is at least complex and that real damage to American federal principles could result if parties and candidates, by virtue of the electoral process, become unconcerned with state interests.

NOTES

1 Wallace S. Sayre and Judith H. Parris, Voting for President: The Electoral College and the American Political System (Washington, D.C.,: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 6-18.

2 American Bar Association, Electing the President: Report of the Commission on Electoral College Reform (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1967), pp. 3-4.

A fourth plan, the so-called automatic plan, would eliminate the office of elector and thereby preclude "elector discretion." Since elector discretion has not posed a serious problem, the automatic plan is excluded from our consideration. Those interested in a detailed look at the automatic plan should see the comprehensive analysis of Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, The Politics of Electoral College Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 43-49.

4 For another analysis which adopts this classification of electoral

college reform proposals, see Richard C. Welty, "Who Really Elects Our Presidents," The Midwest Quarterly: A Journal of Contemporary Thought, Vol. II (Autumn 1960), 21-34.

5 For proof see John E. Banzhaf, III, "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," Villanova Law Review, XIII (Winter, 1968), 320.

* See James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: FourParty Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

'On this point see Alexander M. Bickel, The New Age of Political Reform (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p. 9.

8 Lawrence D. Longley and John H. Yunker, "The Biases of the Electoral College: Who is Really Advantaged?" Paper presented at the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 7-11, 1971, p. 14. (Italics are mine.) For other limitations of the proportional plan, see Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 111-127. Wilmerding is especially fearful that the proportional plan would facilitate demands for proportional representation in the Congress.

Sayre and Parris, op. cit., pp. 73-76.

10 Ibid., p. 76.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 74.

13 Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government," in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), Federalism: Mature and Emergent (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 98.

14 Ibid., p. 100.

15 Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 2.

16 See the confirming argument of Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 24.

17 On this point see Francis H. Heller, The Presidency: A Modern