February, 1806, Jefferson signed a San Domingo bill which stopped all trade for a year with every port in San Domingo which was not in the hands of the French. Nor can the disgrace of the bill be laid at the door of the administration alone. Jefferson transmitted Napoleon's command to Congress, so that when the House of Representatives and the Senate passed it, they knew that they were obeying the commands of Napoleon.

To a temper less sanguine than Jefferson's, such experiences would have seemed ominous of the disaster that was to overtake his foreign policy. But had he not in four years brought the party of Washington, and Hamilton, and John Adams to his feet? Had he not in the face of all the experience of the past, shown that Democracy was a practicable form of government? In the sunshine of such popularity, with such a consciousness of power, it is hardly to be wondered at that he felt that he could prove a match for Napoleon in the end, and that he could humor, without loss of dignity, Napoleon's passion for command for the sake of the great objects at which he aimed. Although the United States was defied by Spain, bullied by France, insulted and robbed by England, Jefferson had no thought of war, but had just as little thought of giving up West Florida. Jefferson and Madison did not indeed continue to humiliate the nation by submitting to the new outrages of the British government in silence, or with a mildness of protest that was not much better. But the change was not due to a stronger

determination to cause Great Britain to respect the rights of the United States, but to the fact that Jefferson and Madison had come to believe that they could get West Florida without England's help.

Shortly after the meeting of the cabinet in which it was decided to attempt to get West Florida through the influence of France, a dispatch was received from Armstrong indicating that France was will

Armstrong's dispatch.

ing to act the part which the United States wished to assign her. The dispatch narrated that an unofficial agent had brought an unsigned memorandum from Talleyrand to the American minister, advising him to write another note to Spain, warning her of the consequences of persisting in her course, and encouraging her to join with the United States in referring the matters in dispute to Napoleon. "The more you refer to the decision of the Emperor, the more sure and easy will be the settlement." If Spain would consent to part with the Floridas, as she doubtless would at the Emperor's request, France proposed that the United States should pay Spain ten million dollars-finally reduced to seven, less the three million dollars worth of claims, which the United States had against Spain for spoliations upon American commerce.*

It is amusing to see how quickly the British minister (Anthony Merry) was made to feel the effect of this dis

*Armstrong to Madison, Sept. 10, 1805.

patch upon the government. It was received about the middle of November. December 2, he wrote to his government: "I am sorry to add that those public prints which are considered as the organs of the government (of the United States) have of late lost sight of their complaints against Spain, with a view, as may be suspected, to excite and direct the whole national indig nation against Great Britian." One can hardly help suspecting that those "public prints" had been losing sight of their complaints against Spain for just about two weeks! "I have been sorry," he continued, "to find in my recent conversations with Mr. Madison that he has treated the subject in a much more serious light than he had at first represented it to me." The "more serious light" of course, was the effect of Armstrong's dispatch. That dispatch seemed to Jefferson and Madison to bring the goal of their hopes in sight. The prize so eagerly coveted, for the sake of which they had smiled upon England while she was robbing American ships and impressing American seamen, and held out their hands to France while she was upholding Spain in her insulting defiance was at last, as they thought, within their grasp. Jefferson wished to make sure of it by sending to Armstrong on the spot, without waiting for the action of Congress, instructions authorizing the payment of the first installment of two million of dollars. But he was overruled. The money which was to "induce" France to "coerce Spain" to sell to the United States prop

erty which the United States claimed to have bought, had to be voted. But as the Republicans had an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress, Jefferson had no doubt that Congress would vote the money without hesitation.

messages.

But the method which he chose to use in bringing his policy before Congress was precisely the one which was best calculated to arouse the antagonism of men who were unwilling to be moved here or there, as the will of another might direct, like so many men on a chessboard. He recommended two policies, Jefferson's two an "ostensible" and a "real" one. The ostensible" policy, the object of which was to correct the impression in Europe that "our government was on Quaker principles," ready to turn the left cheek when it had been smitten on the right, was stated in his annual message; the real one, in a separate message communicated to Congress three days later. The passage in the annual message relating to the foreign relations of the United States stated the wrongs of the country in a very vigorous manner. "Since our last meeting," it read, "the aspect of our foreign relations has considerably changed. Our coasts have been infested and our harbors watched by private armed vessels, some of them without commissions, some with illegal commissions, others with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts beyond the authority of their commissions. *** The same system of hovering on our coasts and har

bors, under color of seeking enemies, has also been carried on by public armed ships, to the great annoyance and oppression of our commerce. New principles, too, have been interpolated into the law of nations, founded neither in justice nor in the usage or acknowledgment of nations. *** With Spain our negotiations for a settlement of differences have not had sat

isfactory issue. *** Inroads have recently been made into the territories of Orleans and the Mississippi; our citizens have been seized and their property plundered in the very parts of the former which had actually been delivered up by Spain, and this by the very officers and soldiers of that government. * * * We ought still to hope that time, and a more correct estimate of interest as well as of character, will produce the justice we are bound to expect; but should any nation deceive itself by false calculations, and disappoint that expectation, we must join in the unprofitable contest of trying which party can do the other the most harm." Right upon the heels of this warlike message came the secret message breathing an entirely different spirit. It recommended an entirely different course and without directly asking for money, it stated that "the course to be pursued will require the command of means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny."

If Jefferson's self confidence had permitted him to doubt that Congress would carry out his plans, he could hardly have seen with satisfaction that his secret mes