allowed to stop for passengers at the intersection of streets until it had reached the further side of the street crossed, and that, when plaintiff undertook to alight, the car had only slackened its speed to await a signal from the flagman. Jackson v. Grand Ave. R. Co., 118 Mo. 199; 24 S. W. Rep. 192. Where a street car is stopped for a signal from the flagman before it reaches a crossing, and a passenger is about to alight, with the knowledge of the conductor, it is the latter's duty to give the passenger a reasonable opportunity to get off before starting the car. Ibid.
In an action by a passenger against a street railroad company for personal injuries, the court properly directed a verdict for defendant, where plaintiff was injured in attempting to get off a car while it was crossing a public street in violation of the rules of the company, none of the employees of the company having done anything to cause her to take the step. Calderwood v. North Birmingham St. R. Co., 96 Ala. 318; 11 South. Rep. 66.
A conductor was held not negligent in starting a street car so as to throw off a passenger who was about to alight, when the car had waited a reasonable length of time for passengers to alight, the passenger had delayed, and was not apparently in the act of leaving the car when the signal to start was given, and the conductor had no knowledge of the passenger's desire to alight. Gilbert v. West End St. R. Co., 160 Mass. 403; 36 N. E. Rep. 60.
3. Contributory negligence-failure to observe car passing in opposite direction.- Plaintiff's intestate stepped from an open car before it had stopped, and was struck and killed by an electric car coming from the opposite direction upon a parallel track. When he rose to leave the dashers of the two cars were opposite each other, the car which struck him was going at the rate of fifteen miles an hour, its gong was sounding, and there was nothing to prevent the intestate from seeing and hearing it. Before he left the car the conductor and a passenger both shouted to him to stop. Held, that a verdict was properly directed for defendant. Creamer v. West End Street R. Co., 156 Mass. 320; 31 N. E. Rep. 391.
4. Termination of relation of passenger.- A passenger on a street car, who steps from the car into a public street, ceases to be a passenger the moment he leaves the car. Creamer v. West End Street R. Co., 156 Mass. 320; 31 N. E. Rep. 391.
[Containing references to both the reported cases and the notes.]
See EMINENT DOMAIN; INJUNCTION; RAILROADS IN STREETS; STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.
1. An owner of land adjoining a public highway whose title extends to the center of the road, who has culti- vated shade trees thereon, has a prop-
3. Effect of bills of lading in hands of bona fide holder when issued for goods not received. 469 note.
See STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS.
erty interest in such trees, and the See RESTRAINTS OF TRADE, 40; STOCK right to their enjoyment, subject only to the convenience of public travel.
2. Where land is platted by the BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA- owner into lots, blocks, streets and al- leys, and lots are sold by him with reference to the plat, the purchasers acquire, as appurtenant to the lots, the right to have the adjoining streets and alleys kept clear of obstructions both on and above the ground. 707.
See EMINENT DOMAIN, 20-24.
1. A bill of lading does not partake of the character of negotiable paper, So as to transfer to the assignors thereof the rights of the holder of such paper. 463.
2. Where bills of lading were issued for cotton which, pursuant to agree- ment and the course of dealing be- tween the carrier and shipper. re- mained in the possession of a compress company, as agent of the shipper, to be compressed for the shipper's ac- count, and was destroyed by fire be- fore delivery to the carrier, the carrier was not liable for the loss, either to the shipper or to an assignee of the bills of lading, who received the same without notice of such an agreement and course of dealing. 463.
1. A member of a building and loan association, whose shares have not matured according to the mode of com- putation originally adopted by the association, and used by it for nearly thirty years, is not estopped from claiming that by another and juster method of computation his shares are matured. 512.
2. A provision in the constitution of a building and loan association that "where it shall be ascertained" that the value of each share of stock amounts to $200, a meeting of the shareholders shall be convened, at which time a division shall take place, etc., does not obligate a shareholder to abide by any particular mode of com- putation, or the mode adopted and used by the association in determining the value of his shares. 512.
3. The by-laws of a building asso- ciation allowed stockholders to with- draw their stock on giving the cor- poration sixty days' notice of their in- tention to do so. Held, that the mere giving notice of an intention to with- draw did not make the person giving it cease to be a stockholder. 519 note.
4. Knowingly and intentionally par- ticipating as a stockholder in stock- holders' meetings held six and ten months after giving such notice con-
vide each ticket agent with a certifi- cate of authority, and to redeem tickets which are wholly or partly unused, and forbidding persons not having such certificates to sell such tickets, is not unconstitutional as depriving any person of property without due pro- cess of law, or as impairing the obli- gation of contracts. 451.
11. The act is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution, as interfering with interstate commerce, though it applies to tickets entitling the holder to travel on any railroad or steamboat, "whether the same be situated, oper- ated or owned within or without the limits of this state." 451.
12. Nor is the act in conflict with that provision of the State Constitu- tion which prohibits the general as- sembly from "granting to any cor- poration, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immu- nity or franchise whatever." 451.
13. Validity of laws to regulate the
Limitation of liability — gratuitous pas-sale of tickets by common carriers and
4. One who accepts and uses a free pass, as a pure gratuity, on condition that he will assume all risk of personal injury, must be deemed to have ac- cepted it on that condition, whether he reads it or not. 332.
to prevent ticket brokerage or ticket scalping. 459 note.
state commissioners. 14. An act which declares that any railroad company which shall charge 5. A contract, exempting a carrier or receive more than a fair and reason- from liability to a gratuitous passen-able compensation shall be guilty of ger, is not prohibited by any rule of extortion, is not void for uncertainty public policy, and is effectual to exon-in defining the offense. 234. erate the carrier from liability for the negligence of his servants. 332.
15. The legislature may authorize commissioners to fix rates which shall be deemed prima facie fair and reason-
6. Effect of limitations on back of passage ticket - when void as amount-able. 234. ing to a mere notice. 346 note 4.
7. When stipulations on back of ticket in the form of a notice will be held valid as regulations, though limit- ing liability effect of failure to read condition. 346 note 5.
8. A contract by a carrier, limiting its liability for damage occasioned by its negligence, is governed by the lex loci contractus. 345 note 2.
9. Effect of contract between ex- press company and railroad company limiting liability of the latter to ex- press messenger for injuries by negli- gence. 345 note 3.
Regulating sale of tickets-laws against ticket scalping.
16. A provision making the com- missioners' schedule prima facie evi- dence of the reasonableness of their rates is not unconstitutional, as depriv- ing the carriers of their property with- out due process of law, or as infring- ing on the rights of trial by jury, since it simply prescribes a rule of evidence, and does not deprive the carriers of their right to a judicial determination of the reasonableness of the rates. 234.
17. How the reasonableness of rates is to be determined. 262 note 4.
18. When rates will be deemed un- reasonable. 263 note 5.
19. Whether the reasonableness of rates established directly by the legis- 10. An act of Illinois requiring own-lature is open to judicial investigation. ers of railroads and steamboats to pro- | 261 note 3.
20. Testing the reasonableness of for profit," public warehouses, and rates by comparison with rates in prescribing maximum rates of charges other states. 263 note 6. for storing and handling grain therein, is within the legitimate sphere of leg- islative power. 380.
21. Where the rates established for any particular traffic are such as to preclude net earnings with respect to such traffic, they are unreasonably low. 263 note 5.
22. A state may prescribe the rates for transportation within the state by a railroad corporation created by act of congress, in the absence of anything in the statute indicating an intent by congress to remove such corporation from state control. 261 note 1.
23. Extortion under statute and un- der common law are distinct causes of action. 234.
24. Where a declaration declares on the statutory liability of a railroad company for treble damages for extor- tionate freight charges, an amendment thereto claiming damages for violation of its common-law duty of making only reasonable charges, introduces a new cause of action. 234.
25. A charter which authorizes a railroad company to make such by- laws as may be expedient, provided they are not repugnant to the laws of the state, does not preclude the regu- lation of its rates and charges by the legislature, since such proviso includes laws thereafter passed. 234.
26. Validity of act prescribing max- imum rates which exempts from its operation roads built between specified
27. A special remedy provided for testing the reasonableness of rates es- tablished by a state legislature does not oust the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 264 note 7.
CHANGE OF GRADE. See EMINENT DOMAIN. CHANGE OF NAME. See CORPORATIONS, 24-29. CHARGES, REGULATION OF.
See CARRIERS, 14-27.
1. The Laws of North Dakota, de- claring all buildings, elevators or ware- houses in the state erected and operated "for the purpose of buying, selling, storing, shipping or handling grain VOL. X.-99
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