manner, that, having served under him at the opening of the war, he would ask nothing better than to continue doing so until the very end.

Meanwhile, on the 27th, General Beauregard received the following telegram from Colonel William Porcher Miles:

"Have appealed to President in vain for the two 7-inch guns. Says they belong to navy, and must go to Mobile, for floating-battery just finished and waiting for guns. Secretary of War did all he could for us."

General Beauregard was astonished, for the President knew— or believed, which amounted to the same thing-that Charleston was on the eve of an attack. On the other hand, he should have been aware that no real danger threatened Mobile at that time; and yet, in spite of repeated entreaties, he preferred acceding to the request of General Forney, as though (even admitting that both cities were equally menaced) Charleston were not of more importance than Mobile to the safety of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Delay of the Federal Attack on Charleston.-General Beauregard makes Arrangements for Concentration of Troops by Rail.-His Letter to General Ripley. His Desire to Test the Merits of the two Ironclad Rams.-Commodore Ingraham Adopts his Suggestion.—The Federal Fleet is Attacked on the 11th.-The Palmetto State Disables the Mercedita, and gives Chase to two other Steamers.-The Chicora Sets Fire to a Propeller, Cripples the Quaker City, and Disables the Keystone State.-The whole Blockading Fleet Retires. — The Blockade of Charleston Harbor undoubtedly Raised.-General Pemberton's Error in Abandoning the Defences of the Stono.-Federal Gunboats run up the Stono.-General Beauregard Plans the Capture of the Isaac Smith.-Colonel Yates's Report.-Attack upon Genesis Point Battery.-Federal Monitor Crippled and Forced to Withdraw.-General Beauregard's Letter to General Ripley.-His Dread of a Night Attack on Sumter.-Second Attack on Fort McAllister.-Small Force in General Beauregard's Department.-He Demands Additional State Troops from Governor Bonham.-Preparation Made for the Impending Attack on Charleston.

"CHRISTMAS WEEK" and the "holidays" had come, were gone, and the Federal attack on Charleston had not taken place. The rumors circulated were generally well-founded, but the preparations necessary for the accomplishment of so formidable a project consumed more time than had been anticipated. The delay was of advantage to General Beauregard, as it gave him additional time for the completion of his various arrangements.

Foreseeing the eventual necessity of a rapid concentration of troops by rail at any threatened points, in or out of his Department, he caused an earnest request to be sent to the President of the Northeastern Railroad, for the adoption of more efficient measures on the line from Charleston to Wilmington; he drew attention to the necessity of accumulating wood at various stations, and of increasing the personnel required for swift and unencumbered running, under any emergency.

The Georgia troops sent back to Savannah were ordered to Charleston, so as to be ready, if necessary, to go again to Wilming ton, where, it was reported on the 6th, the enemy might make

his first attempt. General Bonham, who had succeeded the Honorable F. W. Pickens as Governor of South Carolina, was urged to make all timely preparations for the impending Federal expedition, should Charleston, and not Wilmington and Weldon, become the point of attack.

General Beauregard had long studied the problem of how best to deal with the Federal monitors, in the event of their forcing a passage into the harbor of Charleston. The following letter gives one of the conclusions at which he had arrived:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT, S. C., GA., AND FLA., CHARLESTON, S. C., Jan. 15th, 1863. "Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military Dist., etc.:

“General,―The Commanding General wishes you to organize and train at least six boarding boat parties, with a view to attacking, at night, any of the enemy's ironclads that may succeed in penetrating the harbor. The men should be armed with revolvers, if practicable, and provided with blankets, with which to close all apertures; also with iron wedges and sledges, to stop the tower from revolving; with bottles of burning-fluid, to throw into the tower; with leather bags of powder, to throw into the smoke-stack; and with ladders of about ten feet in length, to storm the tower in case of need. The boats should be provided with muffled oars, with water-tight casks secured under the seats, to give buoyancy, in case of injury to the boats from any cause. The men should each, likewise, be furnished with a life-preserver.

66

'For such a service it will be best to call for volunteers.

"Respectfully,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.”

The plan proposed and the details given for its execution might not have been successfully carried out, but the object in view was well worth the experiment. General Beauregard was of opinion that, in besieged places and while awaiting an attack, it is always judicious to keep the troops busy with or interested in some work or project, even should neither be of real importance. A spirit of cheerfulness is thus maintained, and no uneasiness or disaffection is allowed to grow among the men.

Another project upon which he was very much bent was, to induce Commodore Ingraham to test the efficiency of his two ironclad gunboat-rams, the Palmetto State and the Chicora, the first under Captain Rutledge, the second under Captain Tucker. There were also three small harbor steamers, the Governor Clinch, the Ettiwan, and the Chesterfield, which could be used as tenders in co-operation with the two former vessels. General Beauregard

advised a night attack by the Confederate rams against the wooden fleet of the enemy, and felt sure that the blockade might be raised, or, at any rate, that considerable damage could thus be effected.

Commodore Ingraham adopted the suggestion, and, having made all necessary preparations, on the 30th of January, at 11.30 P. M., left his anchorage on board the Palmetto State, in company with the Chicora, and steamed down to the bar; both vessels crossing it at about 4.30 A. M. on the 31st. The sea was smooth, the weather propitious; and the Federal fleet, resting, as usual, in complete security, it realized the danger threatening only when the two Confederate rams were already in its midst. The Palmetto State boldly gave out her name, and, making for a steamer immediately ahead-the Mercedita-struck and fired into her before she well knew what had befallen her. Disabled, and reported to be in a sinking condition, she called for relief, and instantly surrendered. A second and a third steamer were successively chased by the Palmetto State, but, taking advantage of their superior speed, steered to the southward, and soon ran out of range. Meanwhile, the Chicora, after setting fire to a schooner-rigged propeller, and engaging and crippling the Quaker City, ran into and fired a steamer supposed to be the Keystone State, forcing her to strike her flag. Say what the Federal reports may, it is none the less a fact that, before dawn of that day, the stampede of the blockaders was complete, and that, in the space of less than two hours' time, not a sail of the entire Federal fleet was nearer than seven miles from its usual anchorage off the Charleston Harbor. After thus scattering and driving off their enemy, the two Confederate vessels quietly steamed towards the entrance of Beach Channel, where they finally anchored at 8.45 A. M. They remained there fully seven hours, waiting for the tide; and it must have been at least 3.30 P. M. when they recrossed the bar on their return to the city. Up to that time not a blockader-still less the entire fleet-had given sign of an intention to venture back to its former position. And this continued to be the case during the whole day and night of January 31st.

This easy dispersion of the blockading squadron and the mate

* Commodore Ingraham's report to Mr. Mallory, February 2d, 1863.

rial injury inflicted upon it show how wise was General Beauregard's advice, and what might have been accomplished had a still bolder course and a less generous one been pursued by the flagofficer commanding. It would not be fair, however, to detract from the merits of an enterprise which, so far as it went, reflected honor on the officers and men engaged in it. It should not be forgotten that Commodore Ingraham had many serious obstacles to contend with: first, the weakness of the machinery of the two boats; second, their very heavy and objectionable draught; and, third, the fact that neither could be looked upon as altogether seaworthy. But, whatever may have been the causes that prevented a more brilliant result, the official statement, as made by General Beauregard, Commodore Ingraham, and the foreign consuls then on the spot, was true: the blockade of the port of Charleston, for the time being, had been raised, and the hostile fleet guarding its outer harbor had been unquestionably dispersed.

The reader is aware that the outer works planned, commenced, and partially completed, in 1861, by General Beauregard, at the entrance of the Stono, had been abandoned by General Pemberton for inner defences believed by him to afford better protection. He removed from Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, eleven guns of large calibre which had protected the entrance. The river was immediately entered, and a permanent lodgment of Federal troops was made on the southeast end of James Island. This proved to be a serious error upon General Pemberton's part. The enemy's gunboats, now unhindered, went up the Stono as near Fort Pemberton as safety permitted, and were thus enabled to fire their long-range rifled guns upon our camps on James and John's islands, thereby causing much annoyance to our troops, and occasionally killing a few men.

It had been ascertained that one of these Federal gunboatsthe Isaac Smith, carrying nine heavy guns-was the most enterprising of them all; that she approached nearest to the fort, and, under the shelter of a high bluff, with banked fires, often remained there the whole night, unconcerned as if afloat on Federal waters.

While the naval attack just described was being prepared General Beauregard determined to put a stop to the annoying and, thus far, unimpeded incursions of the Isaac Smith. He called the Commander of the First Military District to a conference at De