generally known, left the character and attainments of the author shrouded in a kind of mysterious obscurity. About a century ago, however, his Opus Majus was published' by Dr. S. Jebb, principally from a manuscript in the library of Trinity College, Dublin; and this contained most or all of the separate works which were previously known to the public, along with others still more peculiar and characteristic. We are thus able to judge of Roger Bacon's knowledge and of his views, and they are in every way well worthy our attention. "The Opus Majus is addressed to Pope Clement the Fourth, whom Bacon had known when he was legate in England as Cardinal-bishop of Sabina, and who admired the talents of the monk, and pitied him for the persecutions to which he was exposed. On his elevation to the papal chair, this account of Bacon's labors and views was sent, at the earnest request of the pontiff. Besides the Opus Majus, he wrote two others, the Opus Minus and Opus Tertium; which were also sent to the pope, as the author says, 'on account of the danger of roads, and the possible loss of the work.' These works still exist unpublished, in the Cottonian and other libraries. "The Opus Majus is a work equally wonderful with regard to its general scheme, and to the special treatises with which the outlines of the plan are filled up. The professed object of the work is to urge the necessity of a reform in the mode of philosophizing, to set forth the reasons why knowledge had not made a greater progress, to draw back attention to the sources of knowledge which had been unwisely neglected, to discover other sources which were yet almost untouched, and to animate men in the undertaking, by a prospect of the vast advantages which it offered. In the development of this plan, all the leading portions of science are expounded in the most complete shape which they had at that time assumed; and improvements of a very wide and striking kind are proposed in some of the principal of these departments. Even if the work had had no leading purpose, it would have been highly valuable as a treasure of the most solid knowledge and soundest speculations of the time; even if it had contained no such details, it would have been a work most remarkable for its general views and scope. It may be considered as, at the same time, the Encyclopedia and the Novum Organon of the thirteenth century. Fratris Rogeri Bacon Ordinis Minorum Opus Majus ad Clementem Quartum, Pontificem Romanum, ex MS. Codice Dubliniensi cum aliis quibusdam collato nunc primum edidit S. Jebb, M.D. Londini, 1733. 2 Opus Majus, Præf. "Since this work is thus so important in the history of Inductive Philosophy, I shall give, in a Note, a view3 of its divisions and contents. But I must now endeavor to point out more especially the way in which the various principles, which the reform of scientific method involved, are here brought into view. "One of the first points to be noticed for this purpose, is the resistance to authority; and at the stage of philosophical history with which we here have to do, this means resistance to the authority of Aristotle, as adopted and interpreted by the Doctors of the Schools. Bacon's work' is divided into Six Parts; and of these Parts, the First is, Of the four universal Causes of all Human Ignorance. The causes thus enumerated' are the force of unworthy authority;-traditionary habit;the imperfection of the undisciplined senses;-and the disposition to conceal our ignorance and to make an ostentatious show of our knowledge. These influences involve every man, occupy every condition. They prevent our obtaining the most useful and large and fair doctrines of wisdom, the secrets of all sciences and arts. He then proceeds to argue, from the testimony of philosophers themselves, that the authority of antiquity, and especially of Aristotle, is not infallible. We find their books full of doubts, obscurities, and perplexities. They * Contents of Roger Bacon's Opus Majus: Part I. On the four causes of human ignorance:-Authority, Custom, Popular Part II. On the source of perfect wisdom in the Sacred Scripture. (1.) The Necessity of Mathematics in Human Things (published separately as the Specula Mathematica). (2.) The Necessity of Mathematics in Divine Things.-10. This study has occupied holy men: 20. Geography; 8°. Chronology: 40. Cycles; the Golden Number, &c.: 5°. Natural Phenomena, as the Rainbow: 60. Arithmetic: 70. Music. (3.) The Necessity of Mathematics in Ecclesiastical Things. 10. The Certification of Faith: 2°. The Correction of the Calendar. (4.) The Necessity of Mathematics in the State.-10. Of Climates: 20. Hydrography: 3°. Geography: 4°. Astrology. Part V. On Perspective (published separately as Perspectiva). (1.) The organs of vision. (2.) Vision in straight lines. (8.) Vision reflected and refracted. (4.) De multiplicatione specierum (on the propagation of the impressions of light, heat, &c.) Part VI. On Experimental Science. • Op. Maj. p. 1. 5 Ib. p. 2. • Ib. p. 10. scarce agree with each other in one empty question or one worthless sophism, or one operation of science, as one man agrees with another in the practical operations of medicine, surgery, and the like arts of secular men. Indeed,' he adds, 'not only the philosophers, but the saints have fallen into errors which they have afterwards retracted,' and this he instances in Augustin, Jerome, and others. He gives an admirable sketch of the progress of philosophy from the Ionic School to Aristotle; of whom he speaks with great applause. 'Yet,' he adds," 'those who came after him corrected him in some things, and added many things to his works, and shall go on adding to the end of the world.' Aristotle, he adds, is now called peculiarly the Philosopher, 'yet there was a time when his philosophy was silent and unregarded, either on account of the rarity of copies of his works, or their difficulty, or from envy; till after the time of Mahomet, when Avicenna and Averroes, and others, recalled this philosophy into the full light of exposition. And although the Logic and some other works were translated by Boethius from the Greek, yet the philosophy of Aristotle first received a quick increase among the Latins at the time of Michael Scot; who, in the year of our Lord 1230, appeared, bringing with him portions of the books of Aristotle on Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. And yet a small part only of the works of this author is translated, and a still smaller part is in the hands of common students.' He adds further (in the Third Part of the Opus Majus, which is a Dissertation on Language), that the translations which are current of these writings, are very bad and imperfect. With these views, he is moved to express himself somewhat impatiently" respecting these works: 'If I had,' he says, 'power over the works of Aristotle, I would have them all burnt; for it is only a loss of time to study in them, and a course of error, and a multiplication of ignorance beyond expression." 'The common herd of students,' he says, 'with their heads, have no principle by which they can be excited to any worthy employment; and hence they mope and make asses of themselves over their bad translations, and lose their time, and trouble, and money.' Op. Maj. p. 46. Op. Maj. p. 86. 8 Autonomaticè, 10 See Pref. to Jebb's edition. The passages there quoted, however, are not extracts from the Opus Majus, but (apparently) from the Opus Minus (MS. Cott. Tib. c. 5). "Si haberem potestatem supra libros Aristotelis, ego facerem omnes cremari; quia non est nisi temporis amissio studere in illis, et causa erroris, et multiplicatio ignorantiæ ultra id quod valeat explicari. . . . Vulgus studentum cum capitibus suis non habet unde excitetur ad aliquid dignum, et ideo languet et asi ninat circa male translata, et tempus et studium amittit in omnibus et expensas." ... "The remedies which he recommends for these evils, are, in the first place, the study of that only perfect wisdom which is to be found in the Sacred Scripture;" in the next place, the study of mathematics and the use of experiment." By the aid of these methods, Bacon anticipates the most splendid progress for human knowledge. He takes up the strain of hope and confidence which we have noticed as so peculiar in the Roman writers; and quotes some of the passages of Seneca which we adduced in illustration of this:-that the attempts in science were at first rude and imperfect, and were afterwards improved; that the day will come, when what is still unknown shall be brought to light by the progress of time and the labors of a longer period ;—that one age does not suffice for inquiries so wide and various;—that the people of future times shall know many things unknown to us;-and that the time shall arrive when posterity will wonder that we overlooked what was so obvious. Bacon himself adds anticipations more peculiarly in the spirit of his own time. We have seen,' he says, at the end of the work, 'how Aristotle, by the ways which wisdom teaches, could give to Alexander the empire of the world. And this the Church ought to take into consideration against the infidels and rebels, that there may be a sparing of Christian blood, and especially on account of the troubles that shall come to pass in the days of Antichrist; which by the grace of God it would be easy to obviate, if prelates and princes would encourage study, and join in searching out the secrets of nature and art.' “It may not be improper to observe here that this belief in the appointed progress of knowledge, is not combined with any overweening belief in the unbounded and independent power of the human intellect. On the contrary, one of the lessons which Bacon draws from the state and prospects of knowledge, is the duty of faith and humility. 'To him,' he says," 13who denies the truth of the faith because he is unable to understand it, I will propose in reply the course of nature, and as we have seen it in examples.' And after giving some instances, he adds, 'These, and the like, ought to move men and to excite them to the reception of divine truths. For if, in the vilest objects of creation, truths are found, before which the inward pride of man must bow, and believe though it cannot understand, how much more should man humble his mind before the glorious truths of God!' He had before said:"Man is incapable of perfect wisdom in this life; it is hard for 11 Part ii. 12 Parts iv. v. and vi. 13 Op. Maj. p. 476. 14 Ib. p. 15. him to ascend towards perfection, easy to glide downwards to falsehoods and vanities: let him then not boast of his wisdom, or extol his knowledge. What he knows is little and worthless, in respect of that which he believes without knowing; and still less, in respect of that which he is ignorant of. He is mad who thinks highly of his wisdom; he most mad, who exhibits it as something to be wondered at.' He adds, as another reason for humility, that he has proved by trial, he could teach in one year, to a poor boy, the marrow of all that the most diligent person could acquire in forty years' laborious and expensive study. "To proceed somewhat more in detail with regard to Roger Bacon's views of a Reform in Scientific Inquiry, we may observe that by making Mathematics and Experiment the two great points of his recommendation, he directed his improvement to the two essential parts of all knowledge, Ideas and Facts, and thus took the course which the most enlightened philosophy would have suggested. He did not urge the prosecution of experiment, to the comparative neglect of the existing mathematical sciences and conceptions; a fault which there is some ground for ascribing to his great namesake and successor, Francis Bacon: still less did he content himself with a mere protest against the authority of the schools, and a vague demand for change, which was almost all that was done by those who put themselves forward as reformers in the intermediate time. Roger Bacon holds his way steadily between the two poles of human knowledge; which, as we have seen, it is far from easy to do. There are two modes of knowing,' says he;15 by argument, and by experiment. Argument concludes a question; but it does not make us feel certain, or acquiesce in the contemplation of truth, except the truth be also found to be so by experience.' It is not easy to express more decidedly the clearly seen union of exact conceptions with certain facts, which, as we have explained, constitutes real knowledge. "One large division of the Opus Majus is 'On the Usefulness of Mathematics,' which is shown by a copious enumeration of existing branches of knowledge, as Chronology, Geography, the Calendar, and (in a separate Part) Optics. There is a chapter," in which it is proved 15 Op. Maj. p. 445; see also p. 448. "Scientiæ aliæ sciunt sua principia invenire per experimenta, sed conclusiones per argumenta facta ex principiis inventis. Si vero debeant habere experientiam conclusionum suarum particularem et completam, tune oportet quod habeant per adjutorium istius scientiæ nobilis (experimentalis)." 16 Ib. p. 60. |