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Translated by Captain HENRY T. ALLEN, 2nd Cavalry.

N. ZABUDSKI.

SEA-COAST DEFENSES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR

SEA-COAST ARTILLERY FORCES.

DISCUSSION.

W. A. SIMPSON, First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, U. S. Army.Colonel Sanger's paper is an excellent and a timely one. Upon the necessity for sea-coast defenses and a larger force of artillery all are agreed. The former we are in the way of getting. There seems to be some chance of a slight increase also in the artillery personnel, but as Colonel Sanger truly says, "*** The army can never supply all the officers and men needed to man our seacoast fortifications. It will be necessary to supplement the army, and we should know in time of peace under what plan these additional men are to be enrolled and how they are to be trained".

The question is,-"How should this artillery force be organized"? Admitting that whatever amount of regular artillery force that may be allowed by Congress will be insufficient, it follows that the auxiliary forces must be state troops of some kind, and the most practical plan would seem to be the organization along the sea-board of heavy artillery batteries, forming a part of the national guard of the states in which they exist, having a proper proportion of field officers, with the chiefs of artillery of the states as their heads, and entirely independent of other state organizations. Instead of going to state camps these organizations should have a tour of duty at the nearest forts equipped with modern ordnance and appliances, and receive all the assistance possible from the regular garrisons. The War Department would undoubtedly do everything in its power to foster such auxiliary forces, but something more than that would be needed. As the harbor of New York, for instance, is improved at national expense, on the ground that it is for the benefit of the whole country, so is its proper defense for the benefit of the whole country, which should therefore contribute towards the expenses of these state sea-coast artillery organizations, at least to the extent of paying for ammunition expended in target practice, and for the expenses (pay and rations), such as are incurred for ordinary state troops at their state camps, while tours of duty at the forts are being performed.

Legislation by Congress would be needed, and legislation should also fix the conditions to be met by the states, in order to receive the aid provided by the general government. Uniformity in organization and control would thus be obtained, while the instruction would be patterned as far as practicable on that of the regular artillery. It would then rest with the states to pass the necessary laws to enable them to comply with federal require

ments.

I agree with Colonel Sanger on the advisability of the appointment of a commission, to make a comprehensive study of the whole question, and embody the results of their investigations in a report, to be used as the basis of a broad general federal law.

S. E. ALLEN, First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery, U. S. Army.-To comment upon so excellent a paper as Colonel Sanger's is difficult. Many statements of facts contained in Part I are familiar to all army officers, as the author states, but they gain in force by his presentation. His arguments are clear and convincing, and serve admirably not only to show the importance of the question of providing for the service of our coming armament, but to direct the mind at once to the fundamental principles upon which its solution must rest. His ideas are the more valuable to us in that they are conceived from a point of view different from our own, and are based upon intimate acquaintance with the National Guard, the substantial business element and the legislative body of our most influential state.

In the introduction, the headings, "Need of recognized authority to decide military questions", and "Need of concensus of opinion on military questions", and in Part II, "Need of one general plan for the organization of all our sea-coast artillery", clearly state the "needs" which thoughtful men appreciate now, and which the early future will certainly emphasize. In Part II, the "statement of the problem is very complete". In the "statement of the principles which should govern the organization of our sea-coast artillery forces', the author has adhered strictly to enunciation of principles without confusion of detail. Some of these need no comment besides his own. Others demand a careful consideration, which may result in marked differences of opinion.

The logical order of precedure would be for Congress to promulgate a set of principles to govern all military organization, supplementing it by such legislation as to detail as may be

Journal 48.

required. The military authorities, national and state, would complete the work enthusiastically.

It may be however that Congress will consider the situation sufficiently relieved by giving us a little of the detail without the principle. If so, to do ourselves justice, every energy must be bent to the immediate development of the new conditions as well as the remaining ones of the old, to perfect every detail of organization and training as far as the law will permit. Doubtless there will still be wanting important improvements in these, beyond our power to accomplish without additional legislation. It will be our duty then to investigate them and to urge well digested views upon Congress. Thus we may finally attain, by successive steps of a reversed process, the development of that homogeneous system of organization which in the beginning should have been outlined for us.

In the absence of progressive action by our law makers, artillery officers are not only free but are morally in duty bound to enter into the broadest field of investigation, to formulate a policy and work for its adoption.

Colonel Sanger has taken the initial step. His statement of principles is so complete as to merit repetition by quotation in full.

I.

The sea-coast artillery arm of the army must be increased.

2. Auxiliary sea-coast artillery formations must be organized, because the regular army will never have enough artillerymen to serve our sea-coast guns in time of war. These auxiliary forces should be created in two ways:

First, sea-coast artillery formations should be organized in the national guard or militia, as now constituted in the several states, whenever the states will undertake to do this.

Second, a new sea-coast artillery force should be created.

3. In order to secure uniformity of organization and harmonious action, there should be one plan or system for the organization of our sea-coast artillery forces, and all the different units of the several forces should be given their proper places in the system.

4. All our sea-coast artillery forces should be given a reserve of their own, by adopting the system of short service with the colors, followed by a period in the reserve.

5. The territorial or localization system should be adopted for our sea-coast artillery forces; the country should be divided into artillery districts, and the force in each should be recruited chiefly from men located in the district.

6. All the sea-coast artillery forces should be organized and trained with a view to suddenly calling into the forts enough men, sufficiently trained, to make the guns most effective against a foreign foe.

Omitting the first specification under the second principle as being more a matter of temporary expediency, most artillery officers will probably give endorsement to the entire statement.

Differences of opinion are to be expected however with regard to the details of the second and fourth. It is in these details and in the provision of a head for the entire artillery establishment that the question of the efficiency of our artillery forces must and will find its solution.

Lieutenant Best gave good expression to this idea when he said, referring to the report of the Artillery Council, "The great and crying need of the artillery was then and is now a direct head to arrange not only regarding the many important matters pertaining to a permanent artillery force but, equally important, to consider and plan for an efficient and prompt reinforcement of our sea-board defenses in the hour of need”.

Whatever be the organization most desirable for efficiency in time of war, that adopted must be one that can be maintained under the constitution in time of peace. The state militia system is certainly within these limitations, but many doubt. whether a national militia would be so. Colonel Sanger is evidently in favor of the former, and in his view will receive strong support, particularly from those occupying controling positions in state politics. To the army the possibility that the will of the government may be nullified by the failure of state authorities to enroll and train their proper complements of troops, is a condition most seriously to be feared.

In many other respects, apparent without further explanation, the state militia system of auxiliary troops would be the best.

The question is of such vital importance that it is worthy of the special consideration of Congress, even to the extent of authorizing the appointment of a special mixed commission of experts to investigate it and to outline anew a national policy, consistent with our institutions and sufficient for our military requirements.

As to the need of a chief, not to mention a corps organization, there is no question. Work is now waiting for his guiding hand and no one else is in position to do it. Boards of officers are from time to time being appointed to take up by piece-meal the more urgent matters which should be directed under his supervision. The results are good, and mark a long step of progress, but they are not complete, and do not bear that relation to each other that is desirable. The instruction of officers and troops at posts cannot be conducted according to a comprehensive plan for the greatest good to the service.

"Wanted: a Fitting Artillery Organization", Journal of the Military Service Institution, November, 1895.

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