this discussion should be confined to questions which concern the sea-coast artillery, so we must not here consider those who with our field guns, or in the saddle, or with their rifles, will be unnecessarily sacrificed if the organization and training of our military forces is not better in our next war than it was in 1861.

I have divided this article into two parts: in the first I have repeated much that is well known to many readers of the Journal regarding the need of adequate coast defenses; and in the second I have considered the questions which relate to the organization of the force which is to do duty at the sea-coast

guns.

The presentation of facts bearing upon both of these questions has lengthened the paper, but it has been so subdivided that the reader can easily limit his attention to those subjects in which he is expressly interested.

In these pages I have re-produced almost entirely an official report which I submitted in 1894 to the Adjutant General of the State of New York, and I have made extended extracts from previous articles which I have written on this subject, some of which have appeared in the Journal of the Military Service Institution.

PART I.

The Need of Adequate Coast Defenses.

A BRIEF RETROSPECT.

There has never been any considerable proportion of the American people who have advocated ignoring entirely the material means for defending our shores, but ignorance, misunderstanding and indifference regarding the subject of coast. defenses have been so common that the country during the last twenty-five years has pursued a halting, vacillating policy, entirely without justification from any standpoint.

It should be clearly understood that there are but two courses open to the people of our country: either they should refrain entirely from preparing the means of defense, or they should provide for a defense so strong as to be effective against any foe that might attack us. There would be at least consistency in leaving our coast entirely undefended, trusting exclusively to diplomatic negotiation and to arbitration for the settlement of international misunderstandings; but if we are not prepared to adopt this plan the only other consistent course is to make adequate preparation to protect ourselves if attacked or forced into a war with some foreign power. Any middle course is not merely foolish, it is wrong, and cannot be defended upon any

ground. To send officers and men into forts which are known to be unable to withstand the attacks of modern naval guns, to order them to serve guns which are known to be useless against modern armor, is but to order them to certain destruction, and while officers and men stand ready to obey such orders to-day, it would be little to the credit of the nation to demand such an unnecessary and useless sacrifice of life. Inadequate, obsolete and inefficient coast defenses are worse than none at all, and no argument can be made in their favor. Our action in building a new navy, and in beginning the work of carrying out the recommendations of the Fortifications Board, has committed the nation to the alternative of making its defenses adequate; but money has been so grudgingly appropriated by Congress that the work of completing our harbor fortifications is progressing with lamentable slowness. A thorough understanding of the question by the people is all that is needed to secure the quisite appropriations by Congress, and to insure the popular approval of some wisely devised plan for organizing the force necessary to make the forts and guns effective. I have therefore thought it proper, before taking up the problems of organization, to repeat some of the well known arguments which prove the wisdom and economy of adequate defenses; for although questions concerning the organization of our sea-coast forces are, in one sense, distinct from those which concern the building of forts and guns, their discussion in the same article is entirely fitting; and especially is this the case when it is hoped that the article will be read by some of our citizens who have not given the subject of our coast defenses careful study or attention.

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Time and again officers of great ability and sound practical judgment have described our defenseless condition, and have exhaustively and convincingly shown the wisdom and necessity of having adequate coast defenses; but time and again the peo ple have ignored the facts and arguments. The wisest prophets have, Cassandra-like, recounted the possibilities of the future only to find that incredulous or indifferent listeners had turned deaf ears. I cannot expect to present any new facts, but I am not without hope that if plain truths are told often enough their importance may eventually be realized by the people whose interests are most vitally concerned.

At the outbreak of the civil war, the fortifications and armament of the sea-coast of the United States were among the best in the world, and at the close of the war the United States had become, as Gen. Schofield had said, "the most formidable in

every respect of the great nations of the world." But the succeeding years saw a complete change. Gen. Schofield, while commanding the Division of the Atlantic, in a report of great interest, stated that although the country "had increased very greatly in population and immensely in wealth, it had become by far the feeblest in a military sense, of all the nations called great."

While this change was taking place no reason was ever given why we should thus reverse our hitherto unbroken policy of keeping our coast defenses in good condition. As a matter of fact the neglect of our defenses was not the result of deliberate judgment; it was entirely the result of indifference. Amid the multiplicity of commercial and industrial problems which engrossed the attention of the entire nation at the close of the civil war, the question of coast defenses was simply ignored. THE APPOINTMENT OF "THE ENDICOTT OR FORTIFICATIONS BOARD.” At last the repeated warnings and protests of officers of the army and navy, and civilians whose opinions were entitled to so much weight that they could not be entirely ignored, induced Congress to consider the situation, and in 1885 they directed the President to appoint a board to report what fortifications or other defenses were most urgently needed, and in 1886 this board, which has been called the "Endicott or Fortifications Board," submitted its report, which contained the most authoritative and comprehensive discussion of our sea-coast defenses that has ever been submitted to the public. Among other things the Board says: "It is of no advantage to conceal the fact that the ports along our coast-a length of about 4,000 miles not including Alaska,-invite naval attack, nor that our richest ports, from their greater depth of water and capacity to admit the largest and most formidable ships, are, of all, the most defenseless."

"The property at stake exposed to easy capture and destruction would amount to billions of dollars, and the contributions which could be levied by a hostile fleet upon our sea-ports should be reckoned at hundreds of millions,"

The "Fortifications Board," recognizing the peril of the situation, made most careful estimates of the number and character of guns and mortars, as well as of the location and character of the fortifications needed. The accuracy of their conclusions and the wisdom of their recommendations have never been questioned.

The estimate for the necessary land defenses and arma

ment of New York state, including floating batteries, sub-marine mines and torpedo boats, was $23,000,000; the grand total for the country was $125,000,000, and the annual appropriation recommended to be made until the work should be accomplished was $9,000,000. The Board says: "After mature consideration, and with all the information before it, the Board is of opinion and recommends that the above amounts should be appropriated by Congress without delay for the purposes mentioned;" and it further states that "nothing less will suffice even for a beginning."

In the year following the submission of this report, Congress manifested its appreciation of the existing conditions by making no appropriation whatever for land defenses or armament; in 1888 $100,000 was appropriated for the "preservation and repair" of existing fortifications, and in the seven years which followed 1888 Congress appropriated for "plans," "sites," and "guns" and "mortars," $4,700,000, or a trifle over one-half the sum recommended as the smallest which would suffice for an annual appropriation in order to make "even a beginning."

In the report from which I have quoted, the Secretary of War addressing himself to the President says: "In your annual message transmitted to Congress in December, 1886, attention was directed to the urgent necessity for seacoast defense in these words: The defenseless condition of our seacoast and lake frontier is perfectly palpable; the examinations made must convince us all that certain of our cities should be fortified and that work on the most important of these fortifications should be commenced at once. The absolute necessity, judged by all standards of prudence and foresight, of our preparation for an effectual resistance against the armored ships and steel guns and mortars of modern construction which may threaten the cities on our coast is so apparent, that I hope effective steps will be taken in that direction immediately.'"

The Secretary then continues: "Since that time the condition of these defenses has been under grave consideration by the people and by this Department. Its inadequacy and impotency have been so evident that the intelligence of the country long since ceased to discuss the humiliating phase of the subject, but has addressed itself to the more practical undertaking of urging more rapid progress in the execution of the plan of defense devised by the Endicott Board in 1886, with subsequent slight modifications.

"That plan contemplated a system of fortifications at 27 ports.

(to which Puget Sound was subsequently added), requiring 677 guns and 824 mortars of modern construction, at a cost of $97,782,800, excluding $28,595,000 for floating batteries. By an immediate appropriation at that time of $21,500,000 and an annual appropriation of $9,000,000 thereafter, as then recommended, the system of land defenses could have been completed. in 1895.

"The original plan contemplated an expenditure of $97,782,800 by the end of the present year. The actual expenditures and appropriations for armament and emplacements have, however, been but $10,631,000. The first appropriation for guns was made only seven years ago, and the first appropriation for emplacements was made only five years ago. The average annual appropriations for these two objects has been less than $1,500,000. The work has therefore been conducted at about one-seventh the rate proposed..

"If future appropriations for the manufacture of guns, mortars, and carriages be no larger than the average authorized for the purpose since 1888, it will require twenty-two years more to supply the armament of the eighteen important ports for which complete projects are approved.

"If the appropriations for the engineer work are to continue at the rate of the annual appropriations since 1890, it will require seventy years to complete the emplacements and platforms for this armament for the ports referred to.

"It rests with Congress to determine by its appropriations the period which shall elapse before our coasts shall be put in a satisfactory condition of defense. The amount required for the 18 ports is about $82,000,000, and the entire work can be completed within ten years. The rate of progress will be slower in proportion as appropriations are kept below the amount which can be advantageously expended."

LACK OF PREPARATION FOR WAR ENTAILS WASTE OF LIFE AND

TREASURE.

There is a certain sad consistency in this action, for it seems to be our national policy not to be prepared for war when it comes, and then cheerfully to sacrifice life and money with the reckless prodigality of the spendthrift.

While the ominous mutterings of the approaching storm of civil war forced our wisest statesmen to recognize the coming of

Journal 2.