IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH, EASTER TERM, 1705. [Reported in 6 Modern Reports, 138.] PER CURIAM. Interest upon a bill of exchange commences from 1 Murray v. East India Co., 5 B. & Al. 204; In re Herefordshire Co., L. R. 4 Eq. Francis v. Castleman, 4 Bibb, 282; Ash See also Kenner v. Peck, 2 La. An. 938; Conrad v. City Bank, 7 La. An. 4; Miller . Bank of Orleans, 5 Whart. 503; North Pa. R. R. v. Adams, 54 Pa. 94. ANONYMOUS. IN THE COMMON PLEAS, EASTER TERM, 1738. [Reported in Practical Register, 858.] ACTION on a promissory note by the indorsee against the drawer: the defendant demurred, and showed for cause that no notice was alleged to be given to the drawer of the indorsement. Belfield, for the defendant. 1 Holmes v. Twist, Henning's Case, Lilly's Entries, 43, 44, 45, 73; Clift's Entries, 913, 914; Salk. 457; Lawrence v. Jacob. CURIAM. This book is false, for the judgment was affirmed in B. R. There is no need of notice. Judicium pro querente. BARBER v. BACKHOUSE AND OTHERS. AT NISI PRIUS, CORAM LORD KENYON, C. J., SITTINGS AFTER EASTER TERM, 1791. [Reported in Peake, 61.] ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange. Brown, one of the defendants, had suffered judgment by default: the other defendants had paid £5 98. into court. As to the remainder of the money contained in the bill, they contended they were not liable. The case was as follows: the £5 98. paid into court was the amount of the plaintiff's bill for business done as an attorney for all the defendants; the remainder of the money was for business done for Brown only. The bill was drawn by Brown on the partnership, and accepted by him unknown to the other defendants. Law, for the plaintiff, contended that the £5 98. paid into court could not be applied to any other count but that on the bill of exchange, for there was no count on an attorney's bill; and, if the bill was good for part,' it was good for the whole. 1 Hob. 51. 2 Cro. Jac. 432. 8 8 Mod. 48. Lawrence v. Jacob, 8 Mod. 43; Skip v. Hook, Com. 563; Heald v. Johnson, 2 Smith, 44; Reynolds v. Davies, 1 B. & P. 625; Skelton v. Halstead, 2 Dowl. N. s. 69, accord.-Ed. LORD KENYON declared himself to be clearly of a contrary opinion, and on this opinion a verdict was given for the defendant. Law said he would look into the cases, and take the opinion of the court upon the case, if he found them favorable to him. He never moved the court for a new trial; but, upon Lord Kenyon in the next term mentioning this case in the course of argument, Mr. Law said he was perfectly satisfied with the decision.1 IN CHANCERY, BEFORE SIR RICHARD PEPPER ARDEN, M. R., FEBRUARY 23, MARCH 2, 4, 1801. [Reported in 5 Vesey, 801.] A THIRD question was upon the rate of interest upon a promissory note, payable on demand. The Master had allowed only 4 per cent. MASTER OF THE ROLLS. As to the question upon the interest of the promissory note, it ought to be 5 per cent. Nothing is more clear than that, where there is a written instrument promising to pay at a given day, interest is given at law by way of damages; or, where it is payable on demand, from the day of the demand. In a case 3 that was before me, I spoke to Lord Kenyon, and found it was so at law; and it would be ridiculous to have a different rule in this court. Therefore, 5 per cent must be allowed on this note from the time of the demand.1 8 1 It is a familiar principle of the law of partnership that one who receives a partnership security for a private debt of one of the partners must prove at his peril that the security was given by the authority, express or implied, of all the members of the firm. Leverson v. Lane, 13 C. B. N. s. 278; Kendal v. Wood, L. R. 6 Ex. 243; 1 Lindley, Part. (3 ed.) 345; Story, Part. (6 ed.) § 133. In accordance with this principle, it may be doubted whether the defendants in Barber v. Backhouse, supra, could have been held liable for any thing in an action upon the bill itself, had they chosen to resist payment. But see Ellston v. Deacon, L. R. 2 C. P. 20. — Ed. 2 Only so much of the case is given as relates to this question. 3 Parker v. Hutchinson, 3 Ves. Jr. 133. 4 Cotten v. Horsemanden, Pract. Reg. 357; Blaney v. Hendricks, 2 W. Bl. 761 (semble); Lowndes v. Collens, 17 Ves. 27; In re Herefordshire Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 250; Vaughan v. Goode, Minor, 417; Ring v. Biscoe, 13 Ark. 583; Ziel v. Dukes, 12 Cai. 479; Dillon v. Dudley, 1 A. K. Marsh. 66; Patrick v. Clay, 4 Bibb, 246; Nelson v. Cartmel, 6 Dana, 7; Bank of Kentucky v. Thornsberry, 3 B. Mon. 519; Dodge v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 868, 386 (semble); Etheridge v. Binney, 9 Pick. 272, 279 (semble); Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 496, 499 (semble); Scudder v. Morris, 2 Penningt. 318; Rogers v. Colt, 1 Zab. 19; Larason v. Lambert, 7 Halst. 254; Bank Commissioners e. Lafayette Bank, 4 Edw. Ch. 287; Rensselaer Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587 (semble); AT NISI PRIUS, CORAM LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., JUNE 23, 1809. [Reported in 2 Campbell, 185.] ACTION by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The bill was drawn by one Hunt, and accepted for his accommo dation by the defendant. The plaintiff gave value for it; but had notice of the circumstances of its original formation. When it be came due, he received part payment from Hunt, and gave him time to pay the remainder, without the concurrence of the defendant. N. G. Clarke, for the plaintiff, contended that the defendant was still liable for such part of the sum mentioned in the bill as remained unpaid. Although the drawer might be discharged by the holder's giving time to the acceptor, it had been decided that nothing would discharge the acceptor but satisfaction of the bill or an absolute renunciation of all claim upon him in respect of it. LORD ELLENBOROUGH. This being an accommodation bill within the knowledge of all the parties, the acceptor can only be considered a surety for the drawer; and, in the case of simple contracts, the surety is discharged by time being given, without his concurrence, to the principal. The defendant's remedy over is materially affected by the new agreement into which the plaintiff entered with the drawer after the bill was due. The case is exactly the same as if the bill had been drawn by the defendant, and accepted by Hunt in consideration of a debt due. According to many authorities, the defendant, upon that supposition, would have been discharged, by the time given to Hunt; Stowits v. Troy Bank, 21 Wend. 186 (semble); Purdy v. Philips, 11 N. Y. 406 (semble); Bishop v. Sniffen, 1 Daly, 155; Scovil v. Scovil, 45 Barb. 517; Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581, 596; Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Hayw. (N. Ca.), 32; Atwood v Bank of Chillicothe, 10 Oh. 526 (semble); Jacobs v. Adams, 1 Dall. 52; Breyfogle &. Beckley, 16 S. & R. 264; Estate of Bank of Pa., 60 Pa. 471; Cannon v. Beggs, 1 McC. 370; Schmidt v. Limehouse, 2 Bail. 276, accord. In In re Herefordshire Co., supra, Lord Romilly, M. R., said, p. 253: "The only question is, whether at common law, when a banking company stops payment, you are entitled to claim interest according to the legal rate on the notes of the bank from the moment that it closes its doors, without making any demand for payment. I am of opinion you are not, and that you must present them in some way before interest can begin to run. It is quite clear that, in the case of a bill of exchange, you must do something equivalent to making a claim before you are entitled to any interest upon it. I am of opinion you must also do so in the case of a promissory note. These notes are payable on demand, and therefore you must demand pay. ment of them." Conf. Taylor v. Mather, 67 N. Y. 87. — ED. and the principle of these authorities applies with equal strength to the facts actually given in evidence. Plaintiff nonsuited.1 SANDERSON v. BOWES AND OTHERS. IN THE KING'S BENCH, NOVEMBER 12, 1811. [Reported in 14 East, 500.] THE plaintiff declared in assumpsit upon a promissory note, as bearer thereof, against the defendants as the makers; and stated in his first count that whereas M. F. (one of the defendants), for himself and the other defendants, heretofore, to wit, on the 1st of September, 1808, at Workington, in the county of Cumberland, to wit, at London, &c., according to the form of the statute, made a certain note in writing, commonly called a promissory note, and thereby on demand promised to pay at the banking-house there, to wit, at Workington aforesaid, to one R. Nelson or bearer, the sum of £1 1s. value received; and the plaintiff afterwards, to wit, on the same day and year aforesaid, at London, &c., duly became, and before and at the time of the exhib. iting of this bill was, and still is, the bearer of the said note; whereof 1 Collott v. Haigh, 3 Camp. 281; Ex parte Glendinning, 1 Buck, 517; Lacy v. Lofton, 26 Ind. 324 (overruling Gordon v. Southern Bank, 19 Ind. 192); Adle v. Metoyer, 1 La. An. 254; Parks v. Ingram, 22 N. H. 283, accord. In Ex parte Glendinning, Lord Eldon said, p. 518: "I perfectly remember when it was for the first time laid down in the courts of law that, where there was an acceptor without effects, notice of the dishonor of the bill need not be given to the drawer. This rule being once established, there naturally sprang out of it a new doctrine as to the respective liabilities of the drawer and acceptor in cases where the indorsee had notice that the acceptance was given merely for the purpose of accommodating the drawer. And the cases go the full length of determining that, as between the drawer and acceptor and indorsee, with notice, the drawer should be considered as the principal; and, if the indorsee give time to the drawer, that shall discharge the acceptor. These cases were shaken by the authority of Sir James Mansfield, which in this and in every other court is entitled to be received with the greatest respect. But I observe, in the printed report of the case, that not one of the numerous decisions of this court were called to that judge's attention. Now the practice is quite familiar in this court, where the indorsee, with notice of the accommodation transaction, has recovered upon the acceptance, to allow the acceptor to prove for the amount under the drawer's commission. I think this equity naturally grew out of the doctrine of not requiring notice to be given when the acceptor had no effects. Although no man more than myself laments the introduction of that doctrine, yet I cannot overturn what has been for many years acknowledged and acted upon as part of the general mercantile law of the country." See Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B. 431, 443. - ED. |