annually and which, in the early stages of the game, are always paid regularly.

The tipster in group one is a "guesser" who has not even the advantages possessed by a first-class brokerage house. He is as far removed from the avenues that lead to desirable information as he is from those which lead to Paradise.

It is, indeed, a great pity that New York City has not produced a district attorney of force sufficient to break up this trade and bring the offenders within reach of the criminal law.

Type two is a somewhat different proposition. Tipster bureaus (called news bureaus) must be differentiated from the two excellent news bureaus* which supply Wall Street with news. The most charitable thing that can be said about them is that they do the best they can; that is to say, if their owners, by diligent work, gain early knowledge of manipulation in stocks they do not fail to make it known to their subscribers. They are also employed at times by manipulators, through the distribution of "Puts" and "Calls" to "boom" certain stocks and freely delude their subscribers to the best of their limited ability. It can be concluded without fear of contradiction that such information-as is all stock market information-must be very dangerous to the buyer.

A successful broker, watching a customer reading the market letters of one of the tipsters, remarked: "Why do you read that stuff? Don't you know that to follow that fellow regularly a trader would go broke if he had the wealth of the Bank of England behind him ?"

*Dow, Jones & Co., and the New York News Bureau.

A Hebrew tipster, who has a considerable following, upon one occasion explained his business and his following in this way: "I occupy the same relation to the stock market that the doctor does to the patient. I diagnose the case, or in other words, with 20 years' experience and some knowledge of speculation, I investigate market conditions and draw conclusions. I try to obtain information whenever I can get it. I examine the fluctuations and volume of trading with care and govern myself accordingly. I am at my office early and late studying the market. It is true that I am almost always a bull. All my subscribers are bulls. I could not exist without them. I never predict declines unless we are on the verge of a panic or a bad break. If I think that a certain stock will decline I advise my clients to 'take profits.' Such advice sounds well. I rarely advise 'short' sales, for experience teaches me that my clients will not make them. I am always positive-more positive when I am in doubt than when I am reasonably certain. No man can succeed in my business unless he is positive. Men who play this game want to follow a leader. They wish to be told to do things. They know that they cannot rely upon their own judgment. In a 'bull' market I can do better for them than many of them can do themselves. Am I often wrong? Yes. But I overlook my errors of judgment, as do my clients in constantly directing their attention and gaze to my successful tips. If a man wants to speculate let him do so. If he wants to buy and has a fancy, advise him as he wishes to be advised. If he buys and loses he will forget and forgive; but, if you advise him not to

make the venture on which he had concentrated his mind, and the market movement favors his conception, then he will never forgive you for, in a majority of cases, he will hold you responsible for the loss of so much money. The stock speculative public is constantly changing. Novices to-day and veterans to-morrow. 'Flush' this year and 'broke' the next. The best we can do is to entertain them while they are here and try to give them a run for their money."

The cheerful humbug responsible for the above views disposes of his typewritten opinions for in round figures about $22,000 a year. That buyers are to be found for the product of the tipsters does not speak well for the intelligence of the buyers. Wall Street regards them with impatience and contempt and would suppress them if it could.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONCLUSIONS OF A SPECULATOR.

A close student* of speculation in all its forms as conducted on the exchanges of this country has arrived at the following conclusions, which, he says, in application to speculation are "universal laws." He divides his conclusions into two groups, laws absolute and laws conditional.

Laws absolute. Never overtrade. To take an interest larger than the capital justifies is to invite disaster. With such an interest, a flcutuation in the market unnerves the operator, and his judgment becomes worthless.

1. Never 'double up"; that is, never completely and at once reverse a position. Being "long," for instance, do not "sell out" and go as much "short." This may occasionally succeed, but is very hazardous, for should the market begin again to advance, the mind reverts to its original opinion and the speculator "covers up" and "goes long" again. Should this last change be wrong, complete demoralization ensues. The change in the original position should have been made moderately, cautiously, thus keeping the judgment clear and preserving the balance of mind.

2. "Run quick" or not at all; that is to say, act promptly at the first aproach of danger, but failing to do this

*Financial Record.

until others see the danger hold on or close out part of the "interest."

3. Another rule is, when doubtful reduce the amount of the interest; for either the mind is not satisfied with the position taken, or the interest is too large for safety. One man told another that he could not sleep on account of his position in the market; his friend judiciously and laconically replied: "Sell down to a sleeping point."

Rules conditional. These rules are subject to modification, according to the circumstances, individuality and temperament of the speculator.

1. It is better to "average up"* than to "average down." This opinion is contrary to the one commonly held and acted upon; it being the practice to buy and on a decline buy more. This reduces the average. Probably four times out of five this method will result in striking a reaction in the market that will prevent loss, but the fifth time, meeting with a permanently declining market, the operator loses his head and closes out, making a heavy loss a loss so great as to bring complete demoralization, often ruin.

But "buying up" is the reverse of the method just explained; that is to say, buying at first moderately and aş the market advances adding slowly and cautiously to the "line." This is a way of speculating that requires great care and watchfulness, for the market will often (probably four times out of five) react to the point of "average.” Here lies the danger. Failure to close out at the point of average destroys the safety of the whole operation. Occasionally (probably four times out of five) a permanently

*Pyramiding.