CRS-17 presence. In addition, he explained that the remaining issues indicated that the inmates were not really interested in prison reform but were intent on keeping the "stage" to voice revolutionary rhetoric; and, if he went to Attica the next thing the inmates would want would be that 51/ he show up in the yard. The Governor concluded from this conversa tion that: ...their position was one where, failing the ability As the observers relate this conversation, they impressed upon the Governor their belief that a massacre was about to take place. They felt that his presence would be a symbolic gesture that would establish "greater credibility with the inmates." They stressed that they only requested that he meet with them and would not expect him to go into the prison yard as the inmates had apparently requested by that time. Congressman Badillo added that he told the Governor that an attack on Sunday afternoon would be wiúci, capoocd iinough lei-.ivi...... might lead to widespread violence in urban areas throughout the 541 country. 53/ As a result of this conversation, the Governor did say that if it was time that was of particular concern to them he would see that they had it. In a later conversation with Mr. Douglass on Sunday, the Governor directed that no further plans be made for any police assault on Sunday. He additionally expressed his wish that the negotiations 55/ return to the hands of the Commissioner. CRS-18 Shortly thereafter, the Governor's press release was issued which in essence said that he did not intend to come to Attica and that the remaining demands were not negotiable. Congressman Badillo pointed out that the release implied that the Governor was not coming to "meet with the inmates" but did not convey that he was asked to meet with the 56/ observers. The observers in turn sent a telegram to the Governor again urging his presence as well as a public appeal urging citizens to "implore the governor of this state to come to Attica to consult with the Observer Committce, so that we can spend time and not lives in an attempt to solve the issues before us." The message also conveyed the feeling of the group 571 that a "massacre" was about to take place. In the meantime, Commissioner Oswald prepared a statement that was sent to the prisoners about 2:15 p.m. It summarized the concessions that were made by the State, called for the release of the hostages and the acceptance of the 28 demands "recommended" by the committee of observers and approved by him. The Observer Committee had not seen this statement and were furious that Oswald had implied that the 28 points were their "recommendations." The points represented only that which they felt the inmates could get, and by calling them their recommenda58/ tions Oswald had destroyed their credibility with the inmates. Despite the Governor's desire that there be no more meetings with the observers and the inmates, Oswald did allow a few observers into the yard one last time late Sunday. Apparently, during this visit CRS-19 several of the hostages were filmed on television with appeals to 59/ Governor Rockefeller to come to the scene. The observers additionally made it clear to the inmates that an assault appeared imminent. The Governor testified that late Sunday night after no gain had been made from Oswald's statement, his aides suggested a modified proposal that would call for the release of hostages and the return of the inmates to their cells and then the Governor would come to negotiate the details of the 28 demands which were already acceptable to the State. The Governor said that if the demands had been turned down flat by the inmates, there wasn't much point in his going to Attica to negotiate them. Oswald had suggested that even if this was true, it might put the Governor in a better position that he had offered to come to Attica. The Governor stated: I wasn't trying to put myself in a good public relations position. I was trying to do the best I could to save the hostages, save the prisoners, restore order, and preserve our system wihout undertaking actions which could set a penandnar which could on nernes this country like wildfire.60/ In this conversation, Oswald said he would give the inmates one more appeal to accept the points and release the hostages, early Monday morning. Oswald issued the appeal at 7:00 a.m. giving the inmates until 9:00 to accept or reject it. At 9:00 the inmates paraded the hostages blindfolded into the middle of the yard and held knives at their throats. 61/ Shortly thereafter, the assault ensued. CRS-20 The Governor stated that he was constantly in touch with authorities at Attica Monday morning. He explained that in earlier conversations relating to a possible assault that he wanted the State police to be the assault force, not the prison guards who were naturally emotionally involved and might be involved in reprisals. He reiterated that he had great faith in the abilities of the State police due to their handling of the Rochester riot and the work they had done in the initial retaking of some of the cellblocks at Attica "with no firepower but with gas and 62/ batons:" - So I had made that provision. They had agreed to it, The assault was led by the State police but corrections officers were also included in the armed attack force. National Guard helicopters released gas over the prison yard while the ground troops commenced firing high-powered rifles into the yard in an attempt to shoot rebels threatening the hostages. In the aftermath, 10 hostages and 29 inmates were dead, and over 85 were injured. Although reports were first confused over who was responsible for these casualties, it was subsequently learned that all mortalities were caused by gunshot wounds. Since the inmates had no guns, these were all a result of the police assault. 641 CRS-21 The Controversy The aftermath of Attica dramatically illustrated the profound impact of the decisions of public officials. The casualties from the assault gave rise to considerable criticism of the choices made by New York authorities involved, especially those of Governor Rockefeller. Criticism of the Governor's position stemmed from his refusal to go to Attica and assess the situation first hand before the ultimate decision was reached to storm the prison. The Observer Committee had warned the Governor that it was their impression that there would be a "massacre" in retaking the prison and that with the influence of his presence there might remain a chance that some agreement could be reached to preclude this from happening. Others felt that with the imminent commitment of the State's armed forces, the Governor should have been on the scene to satisfy himself no other alternative existed; and, in this case, that all care would be taken to use minimum force. In its statement on riots and disturbances, the American Correctional Association feels that in uprisings where there are hostages: Demands of inmates that they be permitted to According to his testimony before the McKay Commission, Commissioner Oswald had urged the Governor to appear three times in the last 12 hours |