Mr. Chairman, earlier this week, Mr. Rockefeller asked this body to judge him on his record and his integrity. We would ask no different or more exacting standard, for judged on these criteria and these alone, it can be amply demonstrated that he is unfit for and undeserving of the high public office he now seeks.

Unlike our fellow Americans in the other 49 States, we, as New Yorkers, have already lived under his governance and experienced firsthand his mismanagement and abuse of power.

It is not our function, nor in the small amount of time allotted to us would it be possible, to detail his misfeasance, malfeasance and non feasance in office. We will leave to others better versed in the areas of taxation, public welfare, and narcotics control the task of detailing for you his record of public disservice in these areas.

We ask simply that you now focus upon his handling of the Attica Prison rebellion of 1971 as a prime example of his unfitness to govern, his unsuitability for public trust.

This week, Mr. Rockefeller has expressed, somewhat belatedly his "regret" for the events at Attica. Well he might, for he is responsible for a human tragedy that ranks in the annals of national disgrace with My Lai and the massacres of the native American people in the 19th century.

As chief executive of the State, Rockefeller held full responsibility for the conditions in Attica Prison prior to the rebellion there in September of 1971.

As chief executive of the State, he was responsible for the handling of that uprising.

His refusal to go to Attica State Prison, coupled with his order for the State military assault on the unarmed men inside, cost the lives of 43 people.

Nelson A. Rockefeller, instead of exhausting every available avenue for a peaceful settlement of prisoners' justified grievances, sent an all white assault force armed with automatic weapons, deer rifles, and ammunition that violated the Geneva Convention to gun down the largely black and Puerto Rican inmate population penned inside. Prior to his statement to this committee on Tuesday, September 24, 1974, that "assault without weapons is the best procedure," for dealing with prison rebellions of this kind, Mr. Rockefeller had continually taken another position, attempting to excuse or justify his handling of the Attica situation by disclaiming any military expertise and indicating that he thought it best to defer to his military or paramilitary subordinates on these matters.

Such an approach reflects a seriously misguided notion of the proper functioning of a person in executive authority in a democratic system. Abdication of civilian review and control over this type of State power should be not be tolerated.

If we are to credit this aspect of Mr. Rockefeller's version, the consequences at Attica are a matter of history. The dangers of such an attitude must be self-evident when we are discussing excentive authority and military might on a national and international level. At the most charitable, Rockefeller's handling of Attica must be characterized as incompetent.

As an example of his ability to discharge executive authority under stress in a crisis, it shows him to be, at best, inadequate.

Rockefeller's wrongful exercise or his failure to exercise executive authority in the handling of Attica has been further compounded by his massive attempt in the last 3 years at a coverup, designed to shield those in officialdom responsible for the murderous assault that claimed the lives of inmates, guards, and civilian employees.

Though every official investigation since September 1971 has documented the wide-scale governmental lawlessness in connection with the handling of the Attica rebellion, Rockefeller has engaged in continuous efforts to justify the assault over which he presided and to whitewash the serious breaches of law and faith committed by himself and his agents.

Through his appointment of a special prosecutor and through the illegal use of the Statewide Organized Crime Task Force, Rockefeller has mounted and maintained a set of prosecutions against the primary victims of the Attica tragedy-the Attica inmates.

His special prosecutor has obtained not a single indictment against a State official in connection with Attica, while 62 Attica brothers have been charged in some 42 indictments. These Rockefeller prosecutions have been tainted throughout with serious illegalities and are being continued today despite the racially exclusive, biased nature of the grand jury that returned these indictments, despite the willful withholding by the prosecution of information necessary for the defense, despite the gross unfairness of appropriating millions of tax dollars for the prosecution while providing not one dime for the defense.

These Rockefeller instigated and funded prosecutions are part of the continuing tragedy of Attica for the persons who managed to escape "D" yard with their lives. They are also a further indication of the extent which the Vice Presidential designee will go in using governmental power for his own ends.

Especially in these troubled times, when the American people are to be governed by a nonelected President and a nonelected Vice President, close scrutiny must be given to the personal qualities of the persons put forward for these positions. The integrity of the individuals involved should be unimpeachable.

Unfortunately, Mr. Rockefeller, when weighed in this balance, is again found wanting.

His public statements and actions in connection with the Attica events show him to be something a great deal less than candid.

In the wake of the lies originally told on inmates concerning castrations and throat slittings resulting in death propagated by his agents-lies which were later admitted to be lies-Mr. Rockefeller has engaged in his own series of distortions and misrepresentations of the truth in connection with the Attica events, culminating in his recent untrue statement that inmates held guns to the heads of hostages-the only persons with guns were Mr. Rockefeller's troops-and in his inaccurate and false description to this committee of the events involved in the handling of the Attica crisis, and that proceeds with regard to the nature of the attack and that proceeds with regard to the sentiments of observers who were there, citizen observers, including persons who were elected government officials.

I have undertaken, Mr. Chairman, to contact some of those observers, and I am informed that many of them would be willing to come and

40-185 O 74-28

testify to this committee with respect to what their sentiments were and as to how they were represented.

One is Irving Schwartz of the University Law School of New York; Reverend Scott, Rochester, N.Y.; William Gater, Community Leader in Buffalo; James Ingram, a journalist, Detroit, Mich.

All have told our organization they would make themselves available to this committee for that purpose.

Rockefeller has, as well, shown himself to be bereft of those human qualities of compassion and sensitivity that we should rightfully require of our leaders.

After the assault on the prison, he expressed his public sympathy only to the families of the slain correction officials, in callous and apparently calculated disregard for the widows, children, and parents of the dead inmates.

As recently as this week, before this committee he proclaimed his concern for racial justice-a concern that is belied by the record.

He ignored the inflamed racism of the all-white assault force he assigned to retake the prison, and when questioned about it before the McKay commission, made a flippant insensitive comment to that effect that the fact that the assault force was not integrated was irrelevant since they all wore gas masks.

His moral duplicity is perhaps best exemplified by his open support for the pardon of former President Richard Nixon, while rejecting consideration of amnesty for the Attica brothers.

He ignored pleas for such considerations in 1971, and he is ignoring them now, despite the awesome amount of suffering already endured by these men and the highly prejudicial widespread publicity adverse to them, to which he has contributed. The case for full and unconditional amnesty for the Attica brothers is as strong in every detail, as the reasons advanced for pardoning President Nixon.

Against the background of this behavior, the belated expression of "regret" and the admission that the rebellion was handled improperly has a hollow, counterfeit, opportunistic ring.

The misdeeds of the former Governor should not be laid to rest so easily. The constitutional imperative here demand that this committee in full discharge of its responsibilty to the American people and their Constitution undertake a full inquiry of the mishandling of the Attica rebellion-calling all necessary witnesses and obtaining all relevant documents to spread on the public record what has never been fully revealed before, the full truth of Nelson A. Rockefeller's role in the Attica massacre.

Mr. Chairman, I made a reference to specific statements, distortions or misrepresentations, prior inconsistent statements. I think it incumbent upon me to be specific.

In that regard I would like to draw this committee's attention to statements made by the former Governor before this committee, which we represent as being incorrect, inaccurate, or misleading.

I would like to address myself to three major areas.

In the first place, earlier this week, the Governor made a statement which suggested that it was his idea to go to Attica; that he, in fact, made the suggestion to Commissioner Oswald. He said words to the effect that I suggested that he, meaning Oswald, make another appeal personally by intercommunication with the prisoners, stating if they

laid down their handmade weapons and released the hostages, then we would set up a negotiating group with respect to the carrying out, and that I would be there to supervise after they had given surrender. That is a statement he made earlier this week.

If we look at the statement that he made before the McKay commission, which is the popular name for the official New York State Special Commission on Attica, we will see that he took a different position.

The official record, which was done under the direction of the chairmanship of Dean Robert McKay, New York University, School of Law, indicates that it was not the Governor's suggestion as he said to you that he would go there.

On page 322, the McKay commission report indicates, "Later Sunday evening, Oswald and the Governor's aides spoke to the Governor again, this time suggesting that he might agree to come and discuss the 28 points with the inmates, only after they had released the hostages and returned to their cells.

The Governor rejected that proposal. The exact colloquy is set out in the hearings before the Select Committee on Crime, the House of Representatives in Congress, under the chairmanship of Congressman Pepper of Florida.

There was in investigation made as to American prisons in turmoil and as part of their report they have a complete transcript of the testimony of Governor Rockefeller before the McKay commission.

So I would refer the committee to page 322 of the McKay commission report and 324, which indicates that the suggestion was not as the Governor indicated before you earlier this week.

Secondly

The CHAIRMAN. I might say that I have reviewed both of those and I do not find that the report specifically disputed that, either providing a point one way or the other.

It is quite clear that the quotes from the Governor, I think, are very much in line with the quotes that he gave to this committee the other day, and the statement he gave to the committee.

Mr. BURNS. Well, he had made the suggestion by the statement made before the McKay commission that Oswald made the suggestion. The McKay committee reports that the Governor rejected the proposal. Mr. Chairman, I do not think he would reject his own proposal. The CHAIRMAN. Well, when I questioned him as to what he would do, they said it was not negotiable. I did not know what the point of negotiating details of the 28 points were if they had already been turned down.

I think that is completely consistent. It seems that way to me.
Anyway, go ahead.

Senator GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

I would like to refer to Governor Rockefeller's testimony on Tuesday where he said, "After talking with members of the committee who requested that I come to the scene, I did not believe in negotiating with people who are holding hostages."

I do not know what the point is.

Mr. BURNS. Well, Senator, what I am making reference to is the statement made earlier.

I do not have the benefit of the transcript, as you know, but it is the statement that it was he who suggested this appeal. I think it is

significant that one of the major areas of criticism with respect to the Governor's handling was the refusal or failure to come to Attica.

As I understand the testimony earlier this week, it was to the effect that he made the suggestion that he should go there. What apparently was said before the McKay committee was Oswald made the suggestion, and the Governor rejected that proposal. The rejection to the proposal is a quote from the McKay's findings.

Senator GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman, if I can refer to another statement by Governor Rockefeller on the same page, page 197 of the transcript of his testimony on Tuesday, he said, "I asked the members of the committee who called and said that they thought I should come up, and I said do you agree that we can do nothing or do you think we can go beyond what has been agreed to. And they said no.

It seems to me twice in the same page he refers to the fact that the committee requested that he come to the scene.

Mr. BURNS. Senator, if I may.

Then perhaps there is even more inconsistency than I was aware of in the statement. I believe there was a statement that it was his suggestion.

Not to belabor that point, Senator, there was other references I did make which I think incumbent upon me to document. That is with respect to the observer sentiment, as I heard and understood the testimony. Earlier this week, it was indicated that the Governor had taken the point of view that the observers did not believe it would be useful for him to come because of the deadlock; that he felt that the request was at least in part an attempt on their part to transfer the burden, the blame, to get out from underneath the weight of negotiations. Í would just point out that the McKay commission and the statements made by people who were there, Clarence Jones, the publisher, Amsterdam News; Senator Dunn, all indicate that they certainly did not believe that it would have been useless for him to come. And they were not so deadlocked that it would not serve a useful purpose.

I refer to page 265 of the McKay commission report.

Finally, I think perhaps most important is the impression left with this committee and with the American people with respect to the way which force was used. The Governor made certain reference to the lieutenant and his agent which according to the Governor prompted the firing. He gave the impression that selective use of force and governmental restraint was the order of the day. I think that the record will show quite clearly that this was not the case, not the case with respect to how it started. It was not the case with respect to the kind of restraint that was involved in this military assault upon the people, in respect to what was going on in the area of armaments.

I refer you to page 353 in the McKay commission report where it indicates that the riflemen assigned the responsibility of protecting the troopers advancing the catwalks were to be equipped with the 260caliber rifle with unjacketed silver tip bullets with an unprotected soft lead nose. This type of bullet is known as the dum-dum bullet and is designed to mushroom a penetrating body.

American military forces do not use the kind of hunting ammunition described above as a result of international treaties embodying the principle of desire to less inherent evils of warfare and to cause unnecessary suffering.

The CHAIRMAN. I kind of lost you there.