Game Theory

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MIT Press, 1991 - 579 páginas

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory--including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information--in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

 

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Contenido

Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
3
Strategies
9
Iterated Strict Dominance Rationalizability
45
ExtensiveForm Games
67
Applications of MultiStage Games with Observed
107
Repeated Games
145
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
243
Bayesian Equilibrium
345
Reputation Effects
367
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
397
Stability Forward
437
Advanced Topics in StrategicForm Games
479
PayoffRelevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
Common Knowledge and Games
541
Index
573

Perfect Bayesian
321

Términos y frases comunes

Acerca del autor (1991)

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

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