RULE 73.-APPEAL TO A Court of APPEALS (a) When and how taken. When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a court of appeals the time within which an appeal may be taken shall be 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that in any action in which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party the time as to all parties shall be 60 days from such entry, and except that upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment the district court in any action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed. The running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: granting or denying a motion for judgment under Rule 50 (b); or granting or denying a motion under Rule 52 (b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; or granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal. Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such remedies as are specified in this rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. If an appeal has not been docketed, the parties, with the approval of the district court, may dismiss the appeal by stipulation, filed in that court, or that court may dismiss the appeal upon motion and notice by the appellant. (b) Notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken. Notification of the filing of the notice of appeal shall be given by the clerk by mailing copies thereof to all the parties to the judgment other than the party or parties taking the appeal, but his failure so to do does not affect the validity of the appeal. The notification to a party shall be given by mailing a copy of the notice of appeal to his attorney of record or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, then to the party at his last known address, and such notification is sufficient notwithstanding the death of the party or of his attorney prior to the giving of the notification. The clerk shall note in the civil docket the names of the parties to whom he mails the copies, with date of mailing. (c) Bond on appeal. Unless a party is exempted by law, a bond for costs on appeal shall be filed with the notice of appeal. The bond shall be in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, unless the court fixes a different amount or unless a supersedeas bond is filed, in which event no separate bond on appeal is required. The bond on appeal shall have sufficient surety and shall be conditioned to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the appellate court may award if the judgment is modified. If a bond on appeal in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars is given, no approval thereof is necessary. After a bond on appeal is filed an appellee may raise objections to the form of the bond or to the sufficiency of the surety for determination by the clerk. (d) Supersedeas bond. Whenever an appellant entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may present to the court for its approval a supersedeas bond which shall have such surety or sureties as the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the appellate court may adjudge and award. When the judgment is for the recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay, unless the court after notice and hearing and for good cause shown fixes a different amount or orders security other than the bond. When the judgment determines the disposition of the property in controversy as in real actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages or when such property is in the custody of the marshal or when the proceeds of such property or a bond for its value is in the custody or control of the court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at such sum only as will secure the amount recovered for the use and detention of the property, the costs of the action, costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay. (e) Failure to file or insufficiency of bond. If a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond is not filed within the time specified, or if the bond filed is found insufficient, and if the action is not yet docketed with the appellate court, a bond may be filed at such time before the action is so docketed as may be fixed by the district court. After the action is so docketed, application for leave to file a bond may be made only in the appellate court. (f) Judgment against surety. By entering into an appeal or supersedeas bond given pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d) of this rule, the surety submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the bond may be served. His liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forthwith mail copies to the surety if his address is known. (g) Docketing and record on appeal. The record on appeal as provided for in Rules 75 and 76 shall be filed with the appellate court and the appeal there docketed within 40 days from the date of filing the notice of appeal; except that, when more than one appeal is taken from the same judgment to the same appellate court, the district court may prescribe the time for filing and docketing, which in no event shall be less than 40 days from the date of filing the first notice of appeal. In all cases the district court in its discretion and with or without motion or notice may extend the time for filing the record on appeal and docketing the appeal, if its order for extension is made before the expiration of the period for filing and docketing as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; but the district court shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date of filing the first notice of appeal. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, effective Oct. 20, 1949. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 1. This rule prescribes the method of appeal from a district court to a circuit court of appeals. Compare the system of appeals in criminal cases, 292 U. S. 661, 662-663 (1934). To the extent to which the following statutes prescribe a different method for the taking of an appeal from the district courts to a circuit court of appeals, they are superseded: § 228a (Provisions relating to appellate procedure continued in force for circuit courts of appeals) § 867 (Citation on former writ of error) § 872 (Writs of error returnable to Supreme Court or circuit courts of appeals) Those statutes were modified by: U. S. C., Title 28, former: § 861a (Writ of error abolished; substitution of appeal) § 861b (Statutes governing writs of error to apply to appeals). 2. In the cases which come within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this rule governs the taking of an appeal from a district court to a circuit court of appeals, in the situations provided for by statute, such as U. S. C., Title 28, formerly § 225 (now §§ 1291-1294) (Appellate jurisdiction), Subsection (a) (Review of final decisions), Subsection (b) (Review of interlocutory orders or decrees of district courts), U. S. C., Title 28, former § 226 (Review of judgments of district courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction with Court of Claims or adjudicating claims against the United States), formerly § 227 (now § 1292) (Appeals in proceedings for injunctions and receivers), formerly § 227a (now §§ 1292, 2107) (Appeals in suits in equity for infringement of letters patent for inventions; stay of proceedings for accounting). See Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936), 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1303. 3. This rule continues in effect the statutes providing for the time for taking an appeal such as: U. S. C., Title 28 former: § 227 (Appeals in proceeding for injunctions and receivers). § 230 (Time for making application for appeal). Note to Subdivision (a). This supplants the petition for appeal, the order allowing an appeal, and the citation on appeal; and, in the cases to which this rule applies, supersedes U. S. C., Title 28, former § 862 (Removal of causes by former writs of error), former § 872 (Writs of error returnable to Supreme Court or to circuit courts of appeals), and former § 867 (Citation on former writ of error), all as modified by U. S. C., Title 28, former § 861a (see note preceding section 1 of this title) (Writ of error abolished; substitution of appeal), and former § 861b (now set out as note under section 1251 of this title) (Statutes governing writs of error to apply to appeals). It substitutes therefor the notice of appeal which is common in a great number of the code states, including Arizona, Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3663; Idaho, 1 Code Ann. (1932) § 11-202; Illinois, Rev. Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 259.33; Michigan, Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 56; Minnesota, 2 Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9492; Montana, 4 Codes Ann. (1935) § 9733; New York, C. P. A. (1937) § 562; Ohio, Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1936) § 12223-5; Washington, 4 Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1719; Wisconsin, Stat. (1935) § 306.02. See also former United States Supreme Court Rules for appeals in criminal cases, 292 U. S. 661, 662-663, Rule III. Note to Subdivision (b). No assignments of error need be filed in the district court, but see Rule 75 (d) (Statement of Points) for the service by the appellant of a statement of the points on which he intends to rely on the appeal. Compare the state provisions cited above. The provision regarding assignments of error contained in U. S. C., Title 28, former § 862 (Removal of causes by former writ of error) as modified by U. S. C., Title 28, former § 861a (see note preceding section 1 of this title) (Writ of error abolished; substitution of appeal) and former § 861b (now set out as a note under section 1251 of this title) (Statutes governing writs of error to apply to appeals) are superseded in so far as no assignments of error are required to be filed in the district court. Compare Rule 9 of the Supreme Court of the United States and the rules of the various circuit courts of appeals. Note to Subdivision (c). The first sentence leaves unaffected the bond provisions of U. S. C., Title 28, formerly § 832 (now § 1915) (Suits, and so forth, by poor persons; prepayment of fees and costs), former § 869 (Bond in error and on appeal), formerly § 870 (now § 2408) (Bond in error and on appeal; not required of United States). This rule does not affect the additional bond as a condition of appeal which may be required by U. S. C., Title 28, former § 227 (now § 1292) (Appeals in proceedings for injunctions and receivers). As to the amount of the bond, the rules of the circuit courts of appeals provide as follows: Second Circuit-$250, Rule 12; the other circuits leave the amount of the bond to be fixed by the district court. This rule supersedes all such provisions of circuit court rules in the cases to which it applies. U. S. C., Title 6, 6 (Surety companies as sureties) is modified in so far as it may require approval of a $250 bond on appeal. As to the method of accepting bonds, compare N. Y. C. P. A. (1937) § 566; 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9499. Note to Subdivision (d). This modifies U. S. C., Title 28, former § 874 (Supersedeas). Provisions have been here added for giving the district court power to ameliorate the possible harshness of the present rules in proper cases. Compare Rule 36 of the Supreme Court of the United States and the rules of the various circuit courts of appeals. Note to Subdivision (e). This is incorporated to make clear the extent of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain motions for failure to file or for insufficiency of a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond. Note to Subdivision (f). Compare U. S. C., Title 29, § 107 (Issuance of injunctions in labor disputes; undertakings) which is continued by this rule insofar as it is applicable to a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond. E This subdivision provides a remedy in addition to any other remedies against sureties, such as those provided in U. S. C., Title 6 (Official and Penal Bonds). U. S. C., Title 6 contains complete provisions for surety companies on federal bonds, providing for qualified surety companies, § 6 (Surety companies as sureties); for the appointment of process agents, § 7 (Appointment of agents; service of process); for conditions upon which the Secretary of the Treasury shall grant authority to do business, § 8 (Deposit of charter); for quarterly statements to be filed with Secretary of the Treasury. § 9 (Quarterly Statements); for jurisdiction of actions on bonds (Jurisdiction of suits on bonds); and various other provisions, §§ 11-15. Note to Subdivision (g). Compare the rules of the various circuit courts of appeals. The first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth circuits allow 30 days for the docketing of the case, while those of the fourth, eighth, and tenth circuits allow 40 days. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS TO RULES Note. Subdivision (a). The most important amendment of subdivision (a) is the change in the time within which an appeal may be taken. Under the existing law, U. S. C., Title 28, formerly § 230 (now § 2107), the general rule is that an appeal to the circuit court of appeals from a final judgment of the district court may be taken within three months after the date of the entry of judgment. Other statutes, such as U. S. C., Title 28, formerly § 227 (now § 1292), fix thirty days from the date of the entry of the judgment as the time within which an appeal may be taken from orders granting or denying injunctions, and certain orders in proceedings for receivers. In the District of Columbia, by special rule authorized by Act of Congress, the time for taking an appeal in an ordinary case was long fixed at twenty days from the date of the entry of the judgment. This time was eventually enlarged to thirty days. The existing Rules of Civil Procedure made no change in these statutory limits. In 1944, however, the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges adopted a resolution as follows: "That in all civil cases, except where a shorter period may be provided by law and except those wherein the United States is a party, appeals shall be within thirty days after judgment or order denying motions affecting the judgment; and that in cases wherein the United States is a party, the time shall be sixty days; and that this recommendation be addressed to the Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure appointed by the Supreme Court." Following this action by the Judicial Conference, the Advisory Committee considered the subject and, as a result, proposes a revision of Rule 73 (a). Subdivision (a) as amended will fix the time for appeal in all cases, including those from the District of Columbia, at thirty days from the date of the entry of the judgment, unless a shorter period is provided by Act of Congress, but in any case in which the United States, or an officer or agency thereof, is a party, sixty days is allowed from the date of entry of the judgment. The threemonths period now allowed by the statute in most cases is too long. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bedford's Estate, 1945, 325 U. S. 283, 65 S. Ct. 1157. The shortened appeal time is in line with developments in state appellate practice; indeed, some states prescribe even shorter periods. See Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 1941, 340-342. All that is necessary to take an appeal under the rules is the filing of a notice of appeal. Ample time is allowed thereafter for perfecting the appeal. In cases where the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, allowance of sixty days to the government, its officers and agents is well justified. For example, in a tax case the Bureau of Internal Revenue must first consider and decide whether it thinks an appeal should be taken. This recommendation goes to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Tax Division in the Department of Justice, who must examine the case and make a recommendation. The file then goes to the Solicitor General, who must take the time to go through the papers and reach a conclusion. If these departments are rushed, the result will be that an appeal is taken merely to preserve the right, or without adequate consideration, and once taken it is likely to go forward, as it is easier to refrain from an appeal than to dismiss it. Since it would be unjust to allow the United States, its officers or agencies extra time and yet deny it to other parties in the case, the rule gives all parties in the case 60 days. The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1945 recorded itself as in favor of extending the additional time of 60 days to all parties in any case where the United States or its officers or agencies were parties. The term "officer" is defined in amended Rule 81 (f). The existing law has provided that the time runs from the date of entry of the judgment and not from the date of notice, and this rule is preserved in the proposed amendments, except that some regard is given to the failure to receive notice of the entry of judgment by providing that an additional thirty days may be allowed if a party fails to appeal within the original thirty or sixty days as the case may be, because of excusable neglect based on his failure to learn of the entry of the judgment. In Rule 77 is a provision requiring the clerk to mail notice to all parties of the entry of an order or judgment. That rule is a reiteration of an old equity rule, and the service rendered by the clerk under that rule and the old equity rule was a mere accommodation service and not intended to affect the running of the time for appeal. Yet, in Hill v. Hawes, 1944, 320 U. S. 520, 64 S. Ct. 334, originating in the District of Columbia, when only twenty days from the entry of judgment was the period allowed for taking an appeal and the clerk failed to send this formal notice, the district judge relieved the party by vacating the judgment and reentering it, so that the time started anew from the reentry. This action was sustained by the Supreme Court. At a time when the court lost jurisdiction of the cause at the expiration of a term, the holding in Hill v. Hawes would have caused no difficulty, but since Rule 6 of these rules abolishes the old doctrine that the expiration of a term ends the court's jurisdiction, the effect of the decision in Hill v. Hawes seemed to be that at any time, even long after the entry of judgment, the court might vacate it for the purpose of reentering it and thus reviving the right of appeal. The proposed amendment of Rule 73 (a) allows the sort of relief that was brought about in Hill v. Hawes, but avoids the difculty of indefinite lack of finality of the judgment, by providing that the extension of the time for appeal, as the result of excusable neglect for failing to receive notice of it must be limited to an additional thirty days. The party in whose favor the judgment is rendered may, as provided in Rule 77, himself serve a formal notice on the defeated party of the entry of the judgment and thus avoid the possibility of any extension of time for appeal under the amendment of Rule 73 (a). As recommended by the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, proposed Rule 73 (a) contains a provision that where a shorter period than that prescribed in the rule is provided for by statute, the statutory period shall prevail. Research has disclosed but one such provision. Section 159 of U. S. C., Title 45, pertaining to a judgment of a district court upon an award of a board of arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, provides for an appeal time of 10 days from the decision of the district court. By virtue of Rule 81 (a) (3), the rules apply to U. S. C., Title 45, § 159, with respect to appeals. The second sentence of the first paragraph of amended Rule 73 (a) makes clear the effect upon appeal time of the granting or denying of a motion under Rules 50 (b), 52 (b), and 59 (e) or the denying of a motion under Rule 59 (b). See Leishman v. Associates Wholesale Electric Co., 1943, 318 U. S. 203, 63 S. Ct. 543; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 1944, 65 S. Ct. 254; Neely v. Merchants Trust Co., C. C. A. 3d, 1940, 110 F. 2d 525; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, C. C. A. 8th, 1940, 112 F. 2d 234; Hawley v. Hawley, App. D. C. 1940, 114 F. 2d 745; Gulf Refining Co. v. Mark C. Walker & Sons Co., C. C. A. 6th, 1942, 124 F. 2d 420, cert. den., 1942, 316 U. S. 682, 62 S. Ct. 1268; Steber v. Kohn, C. C. A. 7th, 1945, 149 F. 2d 4: Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L. J. 623, 688-690. In bankruptcy proceedings it is established that as the bankruptcy court has no terms it has the power at any time for good reason to revise its judgments or orders upon seasonable application and before rights have vested on the faith of its action. A motion so to do may be entertained even after the expiration of time for appeal, and such appeal time will start running anew upon the disposition of the motion. Wayne United Gas Co. v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., 1937, 300 U. S. 131, 57 S. Ct. 382; Bowman v. Loperena, 1940, 311 U. S. 262, 61 S. Ct. 201; Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 1942, 317 U. S. 144, 63 S. Ct. 133; Chapman v. Federal Land Bank, C. C. A. 6th 1941, 117 F. 2d 321; State of Missouri v. Todd, C. C. A. 8th, 1941, 122 F. 2d 804. In ordinary civil actions governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the better view is that when the time limits prescribed in the rules expire, the court loses its jurisdiction to entertain a motion, as for new trial or for a rehearing or to vacate or amend, as the case may be, and cannot thereafter entertain such a motion and thereby start the appeal time running anew. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, App. D. C. 1943, 136 F. 2d 771; Jusino v. Morales & Tio, C. C. A. 1st, 1944, 139 F. 2d 946; Nealon v. Hill, C. C. A. 9th, 1945, 149 F. 2d 883; Norris v. Camp, C. C. A. 10th, 1944, 144 F. 2d 1. It has been said that the bankruptcy rule, stated supra, is to be distinguished as based on the distinctive nature of bankruptcy proceedings; and that since the Federal Rules have abolished terms and substituted therefor various definite time limits, the same rule should be applied when such time limits expire as was applied formerly when terms were effective. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, supra. See also discussion of these distinctions in Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 1946, 20 J. of Nat'l Ass'n of Ref. 76, 80. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules the term of court played an all-important role in the district court's power over its final judgments at law and in equity. While during the term the district court had plenary power over such judgments, it was in general without power to reconsider its final judgments at law and in equity after the expiration of the term, unless (1) the proceeding seeking relief was begun within the term, or (2) the court, during the term, reserved control over the judgment and the proceeding seeking relief was begun within that extended period. See Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Rellstab, 1928, 276 U. S. 1, (law), 48 S. Ct. 203; In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 1910, 218 U. S. 312, 321 (equity), 31 S. Ct. 18; United States v. Mayer, 1914, 235 U. S. 55 (law-criminal), 35 S. Ct. 16; Zimmern v. United States, 1936, 298 U. S. 167 (equity), 56 S. Ct. 706. The exception to the general rule Just stated was the utilization, under certain circumstances, of the ancillary remedies of audita querela, coram nobis, coram vobis, bill of review and bill in the nature of review-remedies which grew up to give relief after term time in certain limited and defined situations. Under the proposed amendment to Rule 6 (b) the court may not enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 50 (b), 52 (b), 59 (b), (d) and (e), and 60 (b); and the time periods of these rules limit the court's power just as effectively as the term time, which they replace, formerly did. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 1946, 55 Yale L. J. 623, 627-630, 685-693. Rulings or dicta to the contrary, as in United States v. Schlotfeldt, C. C. A. 7th, 1943, 136 F. 2d 935; Babler v. United States, C. C. A. 8th, 1943, 137 F. 2d 98, dictum; Suggs v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, C. C. A. 10th, 1940, 115 F. 2d 80, dictum, are not acceptable in light of these considerations. The sentence added at the end of the second paragraph of the amended subdivision gives the district court express power to dismiss an appeal on stipulation or upon motion by the appellant after the notice of appeal has been filled but before the appeal is docketed. Such action avoids the useless formality and expense of docketing the appeal and then dismissing it in the appellate court, as where the parties have agreed to a settlement and wish to protect their rights. Heretofore, the general view has been that once the notice of appeal was filled the district court had no authority to proceed further in the matter. except in aid of the appeal or under Rule 60 (a), until it has received the mandate of the appellate court. Miller v. United States, C. C. A. 7th, 1940, 114 F. 2d 267; Fiske v. Wallace, C. C. A. 8th, 1940, 115 F. 2d 1003, cert, den., 1941, 314 U. S. 663, 62 S. Ct. 123; Schram v. Safety Investment Co., E. D. Mich. 1942, 45 F. Supp. 636; In re Chin Ben Shim, D. Mass. 1941, 2 F. R. D. 50, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 73a.42, Case 1. But cf. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., S. D. N. Y. 1942, 3 F. R. D. 162, 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 73a.42, Case 1. Subdivision (g). The insertion of the word "filing" cures an omission in the rule, since the use of the word "date" alone with respect to computation of the time limits prescribed is clearly inadvertent. The time from which the periods specified in Rule 73 (g) properly begins to run is the date of filling the notice of appeal. Thus Rule 75 (g)specifying the contents of the record on appeal-provides that the notice of appeal "with the date of filing" shall be included in the appellate record. No purpose is served, nor is it desirable, to have as the determinative time the mere date which is inserted on a notice of appeal. See also Matter of Guanajuato Reduction & Mines Co., D. N. J. 1939, 29 F. Supp. 789, 41 Am. B. R., N. S., 3; Bluford v. Canada, W. D. Mo. 1941, 1 F. R. D. 567, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 73g.13, Case 2; Ilsen and Hone, Federal Appellate Practice As Affected by the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 1939, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 45. "Appeal" is substituted for the less exact word "action." See also Note to Rule 6 (b). AMENDMENTS 1948-The amendment effective October 1949 struck out the word "circuit" before the words "court of appeals" in the title of the rule, and made a similar change near the beginning of the first sentence in subdivision (a). At the beginning of subdivision (c) the amendment inserted the words "Unless a party is exempted by law. a bond for costs on appeal" and struck out the words "Whenever a bond for costs on appeal is required by law, the bond". CROSS REFERENCES Agreed statement as record on appeal, see rule 76. Appeal from orders, see also rules of the various courts of appeals. Deposit of bonds or notes of United States in lieu of surety, see section 15 of Title 6, Official and Penal Bonds. Determination of appeal generally, see section 2106 of this title. Enlargement of time for taking appeal prohibited, see rule 6 (b). Entry of judgment, see rule 58. Final decisions of district courts reviewable by courts of appeals, see section 1291 of this title. Motion for Additional security on appeal and supersedeas bonds, see rule 75 (j). Stay pending appeal in appellate court, see rule 75 (1). Motion to dismiss appeal in appellate court on certified transmittal of portion of record below, see rule 75 (j). Notice of entry of judgment or order, see rule 77 (d). Record on appeal, generally, see rule 75. Security for damages or costs not required of the United States, see section 2408 of this title. Stay upon appeal, see rule 62 (d). Time for appeal to court of appeals, see section 2107 of this title. FORMS Notice of appeal, see form 27, Appendix of Forms. Docketing record on appeal, see rule 39 (c). RULES OF THE UNITED STATES Court of CLAIMS Federal Tort Claims Act civil actions, this rule with stated exceptions applicable on appeal from District Court to Court of Claims, see rule 92, this Appendix. RULE 74.-JOINT OR SEVERAL APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OR TO A COURT OF APPEALS; SUMMONS AND SEVERANCE ABOLISHED Parties interested jointly, severally, or otherwise in a judgment may join in an appeal therefrom; or, without summons and severance, any one or more of them may appeal separately or any two or more of them may join in an appeal. As amended Dec. 29, 1948, effective Oct. 20, 1949. NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES For the federal practice on summons and severance, see Masterson v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 416, 19 L. Ed. 953 (1870) and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169, 52 S. Ct. 354, 76 L. Ed. 685 (1932). The practice of summons and severance is not common in state procedures; see Doty v. Strong, 1 Pinney 165, 168 (Wis.. 1842). AMENDMENTS 1948-The amendment effective October 1949, merely deleted the word "circuit" from the title of the rule in order to conform to the official designation of a court of appeals in section 43 (a) of this title. CROSS REFERENCES Clerk to notify all other parties than appellant, see rule 73 (b). Notice of appeal to specify parties taking appeal, see rule 73 (b). RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS Federal Tort Claims Act civil actions, this rule applicable on appeal from District Court to Court of Claims, see rule 92, this Appendix. RULE 75.-RECORD ON APPEAL TO A COURT OF APPEALS (a) Designation of contents of record on appeal. Promptly after an appeal to a court of appeals is taken, the appellant shall serve upon the appellee and file with the district court a designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be contained in the record on appeal, unless the appellee has already served and filed a designation. Within 10 days after the service and filing of such a designation, any other party to the appeal may serve and file a designation of additional portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included. If the appellee files the original designation, the parties shall proceed under subdivision (b) of this rule as if the appellee were the appellant. (b) Transcript. If there be designated for inclusion any evidence or proceeding at a trial or hearing which was stenographically reported, the appellant shall file with his designation a copy of the reporter's transcript of the evidence or proceedings included in this designation. If the designation includes only part of the reporter's transcript, the appellant shall file a copy of such additional parts thereof as the appellee may need to enable him to designate and file the parts he desires to have added, and if the appellant fails to do so the court on motion may require him to furnish the additional parts needed. The copy so filed by the appellant shall be available for the use of the other parties. In the event that a copy of the reporter's transcript or of the necessary portions thereof is already on file, the appellant shall not be required to file an additional copy. When the rules of the court of appeals so require, the appellant shall furnish a second copy of the transcript for use in the appellate court. (c) Form of testimony. Testimony of witnesses designated for inclusion need not be in narrative form, but may be in question and answer form. A party may prepare and file with his designation a condensed statement in narrative form of all or part of the testimony, and any other party to the appeal, if dissatisfied with the narrative statement, may require testimony in question and answer form to be substituted for all or part thereof. (d) Statement of points. No assignment of errors is necessary. If the appellant does not designate for inclusion the complete record and all the proceedings and evidence in the action, he shall serve with his designation a concise statement of the points on which he intends to rely on the appeal. (e) Record to be abbreviated. All matter not essential to the decision of the questions presented by the appeal shall be omitted. Formal parts of all exhibits and more than one copy of any document shall be excluded. Documents shall be abridged by omitting all irrelevant and formal portions thereof. For any infraction of this rule or for the unnecessary substitution by one party of evidence in question and answer form for a fair narrative statement proposed by another, the appellate court may withhold or impose costs as the circumstances of the case and discouragement of like conduct in the future may require; and costs may be imposed upon offending attorneys or parties. (f) Stipulation as to record. Instead of serving designations as above provided, the parties by written stipulation filed with the clerk of the district court may designate the parts of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be included in the record on appeal. (g) Record to be prepared by clerk-Necessary parts. The clerk of the district court, under his hand and the seal of the court, shall transmit to the appellate court a true copy of the matter designated by the parties, but shall always include, whether or not designated, copies of the following: the material pleadings without unnecessary duplication; the verdict or the findings of fact and conclusions of law together with the direction for the entry of judgment thereon; in an action tried without a jury, the master's report, if any; the opinion; the judgment or part thereof appealed from; the notice of appeal with date of filing; the designations or stipulations of the parties as to matter to be included in the record; and any statement by the appellant of the points on which he intends to rely. The matter so certified and transmitted constitutes the record on appeal. The clerk shall transmit with the record on appeal a copy thereof when a copy is required by the rules of the court of appeals. The copy of the transcript filed as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule shall be certified by the clerk as a part of the record on appeal and the clerk may not require an additional copy as a requisite to certification. (h) Power of court to correct or modify record. It is not necessary for the record on appeal to be approved by the district court or judge thereof except as provided in subdivisions (m) and (n) of this rule and in Rule 76, but, if any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the district |