CONTENTS. PAGE Outlines of Psychology and Logical Data: Subject and Object-Division of Subject-Sensations-Thought-Phy- GENERAL PHYSIOLOGY; OR, PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORY OF COSMOS. INTRODUCTION TO PHYSIOLOGICAL Outlines of Psychology and logical data necessary as a condensed guide to follow physiological studies—§ 1. Subject and Object—§ 2. Nominal divisions of the Mental Subject-§ 3. Sensations and their classification-§ 4. Thought and perception as its leading factor-§ 5. Origin and character of physiological knowledge—§ 6. Process of reasoning in physiological inquiries-§ 7. Validity of hypotheses in Physiological Theory-§ 8. Brief criticism of Realism, Eclecticism, Scepticism and Empiricism-§ 9. Brief criticism of Monism, Pantheism, Idealism, and Materialism-§ 10. Province of General Physiology. § 1. SUBJECT AND OBJECT. WE must commence the study of mental activity by fixing the meaning of the terms subject and object, because they are frequently used by authors not only with impropriety, but also in an equivocal manner. The word subject is commonly employed in three different significations: in the grammatical sense it means that of which something is affirmed; in the ontological sense it represents the supposed universal ། B substance-substratum-which is illusively considered as the common basis of all things; and in the psychological sense it is assigned and admitted (by Kant and Fichte) as the knowing principle. But some psychologists have employed the words. subject and object in a signification contrary to that given by Kant and Fichte, calling object the capacity of knowing instead of representing what is extrinsically known. The confusion has become still greater because some authors, after having defined subject as the sentient individual with capacity for sensation and thought, containing in himself the principle of activity, add that “the subject can be an object also." Of course, by such a contradiction, they do not mean to convey the idea that the mind can be observed by the senses as a true cosmical object; they only wish to express that it can be studied by the thoughts which it produces. But the mind is not susceptible of any division, as in the activity of thought we know only the ideas which it produces, and, consequently, if some authors consider thought as an object, it can be only as a mere mental abstraction from an illusory substratum of substantial thought. Sensation and thought are never perceived separately outside of one's own personality, in the same manner, for example, as colour or movement cannot really exist apart from objects. Accordingly, there is an inextricable confusion in the philosophical use of the word subject and of its opposite, object; nevertheless we will adopt them always, employing the word subject, however, as a synonym of the mind which must be recognized and admitted as an activity different from that which is manifested through the senses, i.e. matter. Hence we admit the distinction between spiritual and material created beings in harmony with two different kinds of knowledge. Our knowledge of the spirit, subject or mind, is purely intellectual; the data of intrinsic intuition cannot be acquired by the senses, nor be submitted to any direct experimental proof; while our knowledge of matter, object or nature, is based in sensual acquisitions and proofs. Hence the changes manifested in Cosmos, which, as we shall see, are determined by acts of vitality, are only known by objective states of consciousness, which are the effects of manifested changes called also phenomena. From phenomena we form the concept of matter-object or non ego, in opposition to the mental unity-subject or ego. The conception of spirit is acquired by the perception of qualities which constitute our conscious activity, and which are perceived only in the consciousness itself, for each subject perceives only his own sensations and not those of others, that is to say, the states of self-perception can never be felt by another than one's self, and for this reason the intrinsic perceptions are not "phenomena," but purely "noumena" from subjective perceptions (emotions and thoughts). Accordingly, the nature of mental reaction depends on both on the mental or subjective, and on the material or objective activity. We do not know what the first is; we shall see that the second is movement, Mental activity cannot be explained by movement, on the contrary, the differences among simple states of consciousness are qualitative, while movement can differ only in quantity. The organic activity of the brain is, of course, material; it is the propagation of movement by the nervous element that constitutes the encephalic mass, and nothing else. These two kinds of knowledge referred to-spiritual |