explanation in physiological synthesis as resultants of organic movements or vitality. We have explained terrestrial magnetism in the same way as gravity, planetary movements, and chemical metamorphoses, all of which may be comprehended under one denomination, as magnetism for instance, differentiating its modalities by prefixing certain words. In this manner magnetism should then mean all the states of ponderable matter directly produced by the transference of translatory movement of progene, and molecular magnetism may be substituted for the phrases atomic and molecular attractions. Cohesion and affinity have been explained in the theories of Heat and Chemistry by the intermotion of molecular gravity with progenic oscillation, and we now add that the result is a true molecular magnetism, which may be in a state of equilibrium or of movement, the former resulting when the centrifugal force of heat and the centripetal one of gravity are equal, and the latter when one of the two predominates.

Thus the harmony in the world is perfect; the progenic currents are the sole agent of magnetic phenomena; they move the molecules to their chemical metamorphoses, and are also the occult motor of the immense masses of the planetary systems. That is to say, planetary movements and those of molecules in chemical changes are produced in the same manner as the magnetic movements of the earth; all three result from the transference of the currents of progene into translatory movement of ponderable matter.

U

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCEPT OF THE UNIVERSE.

§ 56. Is the universe an organism or a mechanism ?—§ 57. All objects in the universe qualitatively identical-§ 58. Propagation of movement throughout the universe-§ 59. General criticism of the doctrines of evolution-§ 60. Additional argument against transformism-§ 61. The doctrine of Cosmogony is not physiologic—§ 62. Causal determination of the universe-§ 63. Recapitulation of the concept of the universe.

§ 56. IS THE UNIVERSE AN ORGANISM OR A

MECHANISM?

In the dispute regarding the question as to whether the universe is an organism or a mechanism, the terms are not set forth by the majority of writers exactly as they should be defined. Most authors, especially those circumscribed to Physiological Sciences, have no clear and complete idea of the concept of mechanism, as they affirm its exclusive existence, comprehending in it the whole cosmos; while most philosophers, speculators of the mind and of the divinity, proclaim the great truththe necessity of the organic conception of the universe, and therefore the existence of an organizer. The universe, properly interpreted, is in principle an organism, but such an affirmation does not exclude the real existence of mechanism, if this is limited to explain the

effects of physical cosmos, objective things or material nature. And for this reason great success has recently been experienced in Physiological Science upon the sole basis of mechanical theory, but such progress has been erroneously interpreted by most physicists, who have fallen into materialism, confounding what is purely phenomenal, that is, the description of the effected form of objects, with the cause itself, so identifying their ideas with positivism, protesting against the possibility of our intelligence acquiring any other knowledge than that given by phenomena and their laws, without admitting the existence of a Primordial Cause.

Su

Physiological Theory has demonstrated the essential necessity of unity in nature, and certainly a system cannot be constructed of independent parts without mutual relations of principle and aim; the whole universe cannot be explained by a caal sum or aggregation, but by causal union of the parts. Such a cause must necessarily be a supernatural, supreme intelligence which must be conscious; an unconscious intelligence is an impossibility, as the terms are in plain contradiction. The unconscious intelligences interposed as immediate agents of nature, like the vital principle or force admitted by vitalism, are fantastic, incomprehensible things, because our mind contains but two kinds of perceptible notions, that of our own consciousness and that of matter; by the first, whose data are qualitative perceptions intrinsic to the mind, we infer the knowledge of the immaterial or supernatural (soul and God), and by the material notion, whose data are quantitative perceptions extrinsic to the mind, we acquire the knowledge of physical nature -material object or mechanism, composed of ponderable and imponderable matter. The material concept

is different from but not opposed to the mental one, and our understanding excludes from reality, and considers as nothing, or simply as names of imaginary things, all which is not one of the two-either intelligent cause or mechanical effect. Furthermore, mechanism is determined in accordance with the supreme idea or law which, like its dictator, can only be good with absolute perfection, and then it must be one and invariable; this is confirmed by the uniformity or constant regularity of nature, and by the truth of the mechanical laws which, being derived from the divine idea by means of its engendering influence upon living bodies, are never capricious or irregular. Accordingly, Physiological Theory recognizes the mechanical laws acquired by rational experience, and yet, while it admits the truths of Mechanics, it also admits the existence of the True Cause, because, if mechanical ideas are considered independent of a cause, we should affirm the abstraction of effects without cause, and then we would be obliged to refer ourselves not to the complete system, but to the object of physiological science alone, that is, to the redistribution of matter in movement, and this does not embrace all which exists in the universe.

Our division of theoretical or philosophic sciences into Physiology and Metaphysics removes the traditional opposition between physicists and metaphysicians, each having a very well-defined province. Metaphysical explanations go beyond what nature offers to sensual experience, that is, what is not within the reach of our senses, and cannot be inferred from sensual data but by pure reason; this is the reference of things and changes to the Prime Cause interpreting the end of manifested activities. Physiological or physical expla

nations teach in what manner a definite state of things results from another state which is its antecedent in accordance with general laws, or, in other words, the properties of a compound depend on those of its components; but physical explanations must implicitly assume the total system, although expressly considering only its mechanical laws without any attempt to interpret them, or to inquire which is the beginning or which is the end. Therefore, if a mechanical law is taken as a basis of Physiology, it always implies the existence of the author of the law. The physicist must follow the advice of the metaphysician in order to correct his errors in the fundamental concepts of nature (matter and force, mass and movement, protoplasm and irritability, etc.), instead of denying or treating such advice with disdain, as most of them do; and, on the other hand, the metaphysician must gather physiological knowledge in order to guide his ideas by the natural facts which are the sensual fruit of the activity of the Creator.

All manifested changes have a common origin; organic generation is the causal determination of phenomena in all material aggregates, whether living or not, and this common character is discovered by our Physiological Theory. Starting from this fundamental distinction between living and non-living bodies, we affirm that in the connection with the Primordial Cause or Creating Activity only organic generation is under its direct and continuous influence, and so we can then understand the relative validity of mechanical laws in the universal system. Such laws are only a complement or contribution to the notion of the universe in which unity presides over the beginning and the end