and desirous to get so important a want supplied, joining with earnest desires the diligent use of proper endeavours.

In considering the exercise of the common good affections, so often mentioned, it is needful to distinguish between the good tendency of these affections, considered in themselves, and the bad tendency of that self-flattery, which makes men mistake these attainments for true holiness. People, who want true holiness, are well employed, when endeavouring to have deep impressions of the motives to it.

When

they mistake every good impression of that kind, for holiness itself, their mistake is of dangerous tendency. But such attainments do not become wholly useless, because they are over-valued. Partial reformation is much over-valued, when it is mistaken for universal obedience. But, notwithstanding of this, it is in itself, so far as it goes, good and desirable. It is unspeakably. preferable to the enormity of a dissolute practice.

Sincere good affections towards God or men, ought not to be called artificial, because men are active and diligent in exciting them. That name, when applied to affections, implies an odious meaning, and denotes something very different from commendable activity, in the use of proper endeavours. It implies dissimulation or corrupt intention.

There are some good affections in human nature, in the lively exercise of which, in some cases, men can scarcely be said to be active. Thus, the sorrow of a tender parent for the loss of a favourite child, does not need endeavour to excite it, but rather for restraining

It springs naturally from a strong affection, rooted in his heart, meeting with a disaster that robs it of the object of its tenderness. These good affections, the exciting of which, does not require so much endeavour, as the duc moderating of them does, are things, which, however good, and useful of themselves, are common to very bad men. All the good dispositions, which distinguish good men from others, are of such a nature as to need active endeavours for strengthening and confirming them. They ought not,

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on that account, to be called artificial. If one who has a sincere love to his country, is careful to excite the vigorous exercise of that good affection, especially when employed in difficult service, his being so active in exciting that affection, does not make it the less amiable. If his weakness made him need such endeavours, his endeavours ought not to be discommended, because they were necessary. If it is a laudable thing, to be active in exciting and strengthening all such good affections, as are far from being too strong already; it is highly unreasonable to think of the Deity, as the only object whom men should not labour and endeavour to love.

What has been said concerning the influence of attentive consideration, in exciting mens' devout affections, serves to give light to the influence of other natural causes, formerly hinted at; which, though not so necessary for exciting just and reasonable affections, as attention to motives, are subordinate helps, naturally subservient to it. Of this number, as was observed above, is pathetic discourse, and the force of example, between which there is a manifest affinity. Pathetic or affectionate style, properly speaking, is that manner of expression, which is the natural effect of the actual vigorous exercise of the affections ; though like various other natural things, it may be artificially imitated. Experience shews, that when men are under the actual influence of strong and lively af fections, good or bad, they have a natural effect on the turn of mens' thoughts, and expressions. The turn of thought and style, which is the natural effect of strong affections in one person, is a natural mean of exciting the like affections in others. Its influence that way, is far from being irresistible; nor is it at all so considerable in itself, as the intrinsic force of proper motives, whatever way expressed. It is ofttimes abused, as the best things are, to bad purposes; but notwithstanding all this, it is of importance to observe, that it is far from being in itself entirely useless or inconsiderable.

The laws of nature which relate to our make and

frame, are not merely caculated in a subserviency to the union of soul and body, but also to the union of men to one another, in society. This is evidently the end of mens' natural power, of communicating their thoughts. It is also the end of their natural power of communicating their affections. It is a property of human nature, resulting from the union of soul and body, that the affections of the soul, have a manifold influence on the body. They have, in a special manner, a natural influence on the voice, which is the chief means of communicating our thoughts; and on the aspect, which is a sort of mysterious glass, giving some discovery of our affections; such as our joys or sorrows, and the like. The discovery, which such outward signs give of our inward affections, is indeed only general; and it is of importance it should be so. Thus, for instance, if the natural signs of mens' devout joys, or sorrow's, could discover, whether these things proceeded from sincere divine love, or only from some inferior affection; this would make the chief things in one man's heart, transparent in a manner, to the bodily senses of others. There are obvious wise reasons, why it should be otherwise. Mean time, the differences between divine love and all other affections, which come short of it, are of the greatest importance, as was proved above at some length. But outward signs do not admit of so great diversity, as mens' inward affections, nor is it fit they should.

The various things in the frame of our nature, which are subservient to the communication of affections, are good arguments for the importance of good affections, and for mens' mutual subserviency to one another, in promoting and strengthening them. We should judge of mens' natural power, of communicating their affections, as we do of other natural powers, and particularly of mens' power of communicating their thoughts. The abuse of good powers, is no just objection against their intrinsic worth and usefulness. The more there is of evident contrivance in our frame and make, subservient to the exercise of any power; the more evident is the importance of that power, considered in

itself; and, consequently, the more excellent and advantageous, is the due improvement of it, and the more dangerous is the abuse of it. The manifold contrivance and mechanism of several parts of the body, in subserviency to the faculty of speech, or the power of communicating thoughts; shews the importance of that faculty in itself; how unnatural it would be if men should neglect it; and how culpable they are, when they abuse it. In like manner, the manifold subserviency, of the laws of union between soul and body, to the communication of affection, is a proof that that power is capable of being improved to valuable purposes, and that men should be careful neither to abuse it, nor to neglect it.

What was formerly observed, about mens' power of exciting their affections, is applicable to their power, both of communicating their thoughts and affections.

The true use and tendency of these powers, as the effects of supreme wisdom and goodness, is the communication of such thoughts and affections, as are good and useful. These good powers are much abused to the contrary bad purposes; but this is not peculiar to them. It is common to them with all the other faculties, even the most valuable faculties of human nature. This does not make these faculties in themselves contemptible. It shews the necessity of all proper precautions against the abuses, to which the best things are liable. For that end, it is needful to know these abuses, and to be deeply affected with them. They who love devout affections, should consider the bad effects of the communication of affections, that are not founded on truth and righteousness. These hurtful passions, or corrupt and irregular affections, spread and strengthened by sympathy, and communication in society, have had lamentable effects in various ages.— These things shew the vast importance, of having our judgments well informed about the things, that should be the objects of our chief and strongest affections: but they contain no better argument against all devout affections in general, or all communication of them, than if men should argue against the faculty of communicat

ing our thoughts; or against our other best faculties, because of the many terrible effects, which have been so frequently produced by the abuse of them.

The power that men have of communicating their thoughts and their affections, does not make other men masters, either of our judgment or of our inclinations. It does not put it in their power to force our assent to what is false, or our inclination to what is unjust. We have a power of examining all persuasives that may be proposed to us; and our affections should be founded on a due information of our judgments. Yet, as there are various ways, of informing our judgments, about these things, that should be the chief objects of our affections; and of reminding us of our chief obligations. to love God with our whole heart, and to love our neighbours as ourselves; the cold and indifferent way of doing this, is far from being the most reasonable or most safe. If it is a dangerous thing, when affections that are corrupt are strong and vigorous, it is also dangerous, when the best affections are wholly wanting, or weak and feeble. The safety of the mind requires freedom from these strong affections, that are perverse and irregular. Bat the best preservative against these evils, is the strength and vigour of such affections, as are of an opposite nature and tendency. If we prefer the cold and lifeless way of persuasion to the pathetic way, this implies, that when men propose the most just motives, to excite or strengthen the best affections in others, they should endeavour to be void of these affections themselves. This is far from being reasonable, or according to nature. If men have at heart, the success of their best persuasives on others, they should endeavour, first of all, to be penetrated with just impressions of these things themselves. And though men may be very active in exciting their affections, as well as in fixing and in expressing their thoughts, yet, it is otherwise, as to the influence of inward emotions on all the outward natural signs of them. Where mens' affections are at once vigorous and sincere, and affectation does not interpose, these natural signs do not wholly depend on the will, though