Imágenes de páginas

(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) witness.
years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the
following: P50,000.00 for the death of Emil; P1,000.00

But this has no devastating effect to the in actual damages; and P30,000.00 in moral damages. prosecution for the eyewitness accounts of

Manamtam and Clarino as well as the selfSO ORDERED.

defense set up, make up for the exclusion

of Maria's testimony. Noel appealed, and pointed out that the trial court committed these reversible errors: Noel while admitting that he stabbed

Emil, disclaims any responsibility for his 1

death which he imputes rather on his old


suffered only a "stab wound rt. lateral chest HOLDING HIM LIABLE TO PAY FOR DAMAGES non penetrating" and death followed CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE because of "cardio respiratory arrest”. He GOVERNING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE

therefore argued that the stab wound he MATTER INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING HIM.

inflicted was not the proximate cause of 11

Emil's death. He is wrong for an accused

is responsible for all the natural THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO HAD COMMITTED consequences of his criminal act. The REVERSIBLE ERROR ON APPEAL IN NOT principle on which this rule is founded is CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED

one of universal application and lies at the DURING THE BAIL HEARING BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT PARTICULARLY foundation of all criminal jurisprudence. It THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS FOR THE is, that every person is to be held to ACCUSED ARMANDO CORNELIO. (p. Appellant's contemplate and to be responsible for the Brief, p. 46, rollo)

natural consequences of his own acts (People We disregard outright the testimony of

vs. Song, G.R. No. 73747, Nov. 21, 1991). Maria who appears to have been a witness

So much for that fallacious argument. planted to augment the charge and insure

Noel also set up self-defense. But once an the conviction of her father's admitted

accused admits having slain the victim, he assailant. While the investigation and

takes it upon himself to satisfactory prove preparation of the affidavits of the

that he is nonetheless not guilty of a felony eyewitness were taken just two (2) days and thus cannot be made to suffer its penal after the incident or on March 16, 1999, and civil consequences. For one who Maria came out with her version only on

invokes self-defense admits the April 11, 1999. This is not explained away responsibility for the killing and perforce the by her claim that she was belated because

burden of proof shifts to the accused who she was scared. The glaring fact is that

must then prove the justifying circumstance. the admitted eyewitnesses Manamtam and

He must show by clear and convincing Clarino in their affidavits made no mention evidence that he indeed acted in selfof her presence during the incident, and in

defense With clear and convincing their testimonies asserted albeit obliquely evidence, all the following elements of selfthat she was not even there at all (vide: defense must be established: (1) unlawful Manamtam, tsn, Aug. 16, 2000, pp. 18-19; Clarino, tsn Sept. 8, 2000, p. 13). Then there is the aggression on the part of the victim; (2) matter of her testimony as to the number reasonable necessity of the means and location of the wounds inflicted on her employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack father which she said were two (2), one on

of sufficient provocation on the part of the the back and one at the side. These do person claiming self-defense (People vs.

Delmindo G.R. No. 146810, May 27, 2004). not jibe with the physical facts for Emil had a lone wound and it was on the chest. By

Unlawful aggression is the first and clear indications, Maria was just a false primordial element of self-defense. Of the three requisites, it is the most important. upon Noel in order to avoid criminal liability, Without it, the justifying circumstances to prove the justifying circumstance claimed cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful by him with clear, satisfactory and aggression, there is nothing to prevent or convincing evidence. He cannot rely on repel. Unlawful aggression refers to an the weakness of the prosecution but on the attack or a threat to attack, positively strength of his own evidence, “for even if showing the intent of the aggressor to cause the evidence of the prosecution were weak injury. It presupposes not merely a it could not be disbelieved after the accused threatening or an intimidating attitude, but himself had admitted the killing." However an actual, sudden and unexpected attack Noel failed to present the required clear and or an imminent danger thereof, which convincing evidence that the killing was imperils one's life or limb. Thus, when there justified, and that he incurred no criminal is no peril, there is no unlawful aggression liability therefor. It having been proven and (Cabuslay vs. People, G.R. No. 129876, Sept. 30, even admitted that he stabbed dead his 2005).

brother, and he having failed to prove his

defense To prove Emil's aggression, Noel said that he was boxed on the eye. When he WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the recovered, he attempted to punch back but appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. Emil then stabbed him on the chin. Emil then held him by his shirt's collar and made SO ORDERED. further lunges but Noel was able to hold him off as they grappled until they fell on Guariña ll and Ranada, JJ., concur. the ground. This scuffle claimed by Noel, if true would have taken some time and Appeal denied and the judgment affirmed. raised some noise. But the eyewitnesses said it happened within seconds after Noel

CERTIFICATION passed them, and there was no ruckus. What called their attention was a moan

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the according to Manamtam, and tugging Constitution, it is hereby certified that the sounds said Clarino. The furious attack conclusions in the above decision were described by Noel does not conform with reached in consultation before the case was the accounts of these policeman and assigned to the writer of the opinion of the kagawad, eyewitness who are credible and Court. have no reason at all to prevaricate.

(SGD.) ROBERTO A. BARRIOS Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which

Associate Justice can easily be concocted. It was incumbent

Chairman, Fifth Division

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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Foria & Ureta Law Offices for petitioner

Law Firm of Tanjutco & Partners for respondents.



CORPORATION IS PLACED UNDER REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP, ALL ACTIONS OR CLAIMS AGAINST IT ARE DEEMED SUSPENDED; PURPOSE.Jurisprudence is indeed replete with rulings where the Supreme Court held that when a corporation is placed under rehabilitation receivership, all actions or claims against it are deemed suspended (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97178, January 10, 1994). The purpose of the suspension is to prevent the irreversible collapse of the corporation and give the management committee or receiver the absolute tranquility to study the viability of the corporation. The law creates a wall around the distressed corporation against all claims. In the cases of BF Homes, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 76879, October 3, 1990) and Roa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 77143, October 3, 1990), the Supreme Court clarified that when a corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all creditors should stand on an equal footing; not anyone of them should be given any preference by paying one or some of them ahead of the others.

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure seeking to set aside and reverse the Order dated September 24, 2002 issued by public respondent Honorable Briccio C. Ygaña, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 11, 2002 filed by petitioner.

The facts are as follow:





OF JURISDICTION, NOT ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.-In fine, certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction - it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court or quasi-judicial body in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law (Suyat, Jr. vs. Torres, 441 SCRA 265). Truly, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, it is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.

Petitioner Investors Financial Services Corporation (IFSC for brevity), formerly, CIPI Leasing and Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of private respondent Corporate Investments Philippines, Incorporated (CIPI for brevity), instituted a petition for the declaration of suspension of payments before the Securities and Exchange Commission and was docketed therein as SEC Case No. 07-00-6698.1 Thereafter, the SEC issued a Stay Order dated July 26, 2000, suspending all actions for claims against petitioner. In view of the transfer of jurisdiction over said petition from the SEC to the appropriate Regional Trial Court under Sec. 5.2 of R.A. 8799, the case was brought to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, for raffle.


DEFINED.-By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary

Court of Appeals Reports Annotated, Vol. 41.

1 Rollo pp. 26-33

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On August 31, 2000, IFSC's petition for a.) Allow petitioner IFCS to redeem the Php declaration of suspension of payment was

20 million IFCS preferred shares Series A raffled to the sala of the respondent judge.

held by CIPI and immediately apply proceeds

thereof as payment of remaining receivable On December 4, 2000, petitioner moved that

balance on a one to one basis. its petition be treated as one for petition for rehabilitation? and simultaneously submitted b.) Allow petitioner IFCS to re-acquire the its supplement to the petition with proposed

Php 7 million IFCS common stock held by

CIPI and immediately apply proceeds thereof rehabilitation plan. Said motion was granted

as payment of remaining receivable balance by the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 153 and on

on a one to one basis. January 12, 2001, the lower court issued an Order approving the rehabilitation plan paid by whatever valueble assets that petitioner

3. That any remaining receivable balance be submitted by petitioner as well as the

IFCS may be able to get hold of from CIPI by way appointment of Mr. Ernesto C. Enriquez as of attachment." rehabilitation receiver.3

Thereafter, petitioner sent a letter dated Later, the rehabilitation receiver July 6, 2001 to private respondent seeking recommended that some modifications be for the immediate implementation of the made on the approved rehabilitation plan above Order. In its letter-reply dated July alleging that petitioner !FSC received a

23, 2001, CIPI informed IFSC that it could notice as a creditor in connection with the

not act on the latter's request due its filing petition for suspension of payments of a petition for rehabilitation together with instituted by private respondent CIPI before

a rehabilitation plan, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 158. CIPI assured Branch 158; that petitioner filed its comment IFSC that said plan has reflected the stating that IFSC owes CIPI Php69.9 million adjustments on the valuation of CIPI's while CIPI owes IFSC, in turn, Php176 preferred shares and common shares in million and proposed three causes of action iFSC and contained the proposed offsetting insofar as its payables to and receivable

of CIPI's equity investment with its obligation from CIPI are concerned; that the RTC, with IFSC. CIPI further explained that Pasig City, Branch 158 later dismissed granting IFSC's request could preempt any CIPI's petition for suspension of payment action which the lower court would take on in its Order dated April 16, 2001 and its rehabilitation plan. On August 2, 2001, declared that said private respondent's the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 158 issued a creditors may pursue whatever remedies Stay Order in favor of private respondent they may avail against it under the law. Mr.

CIPI. Enriquez claimed that his proposed modifications are necessary to avert

On August 13, 2001, petitioner secured adverse effects resulting from the actions a certificate of finality from Atty. Teodoro of CIPI's other creditors and to safeguard Carbonera, the Branch Clerk of Court of the interests of IFSC's own creditors. RTC, Pasig City, Branch 153 stating that

the June 20, 2001 Order has become final On June 20, 2001, respondent judge and executory.? IFCS then notified CIPI issued an Order approving the following through a letter dated August 24, 2001 that modifications proposed by the rehabilitation it implemented the Order dated June 20, receiver, to wit:

2001 and that the same was already

reflected in its books claiming that said 1. That the petitioner IFCS be allowed to Immediately offset on a one to one basis all its Order is not only immediately executory payables to CIPI against its receivable from CIPI. under Section 5, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules

of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation 2. That the remaining recelvable balance be paid by CIPI as follows:

but had also reached finality.


2 Rollo pp. 39-47

Rollo pp. 46-47


• Rollo pp. 48-50
5 Rollo pp. 51-53
& Rollo pp. 54-55
1 Rollo p. 56

Rollo pp. 57-59


On August 18, 2001, private respondent 153, CIPI asserted that on March 8, 2002 CIPL filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Judge Danilo S. Cruz, pairing judge of RTC Abeyance the implementation of the Order Branch 153, issued an Order declaring CIPI dated June 20, 2001 before the RTC, Pasig insolvent and prohibited it from receiving City, Branch 153 maintaining that to do and making payments to its creditors until otherwise could contravene the August 2, an assignee has been appointed by its 2001 Stay Order issued by the RTC, Branch creditors. CIPI prayed that in the light of 158 and would in effect, be giving this development, IFSC's motion should be preference to one creditor over the others denied due course. 13 since IFSC's alleged claim against CIPI's assets will be satisfied ahead, above and On September 24, 2002, respondent over all its other creditors. In its Comment, judge issued the assailed Order holding that petitioner prayed that CIPI's motion be no new issues were raised by petitioner to denied contending that the June 20, 2001 warrant a modification much less a reversal Order is not only immediately executory but of January 11, 2002 Order. Further. was already final. IFSC posited that the respondent judge ruled that the issuance of Stay Order dated August 2, 2001 has no the March 8, 2002 Order declaring CIP legal effect whatsoever on the June 20, insolvent had rendered IFSC's motion for 2001 Order because it was issued much reconsideration moot and academic. The later than the subject order. 10

decretal portion of the said Order reads:

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On January 11, 2002, public respondent "WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for issued an Order, the dispositive portion of

reconsideration is DENIED. which reads:

SO ORDERED. "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent motion of Corporate Investments Philippines, Inc. Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant (CIPI) to hold in abeyance the implementation of petition for certiorari base on the following the order dated June 20, 2001 is GRANTED.

grounds: On February 14, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing

1. Whether respondent Judge acted without or in

excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse Order.12 Thereafter, petitioner filed a of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction manifestation informing the lower court that in issuing the assailed Order dated September CIPI's petition for rehabilitation was

24, 2002 which denied petitioner IFSC's motion dismissed by the RTC, Pasig, Branch 158.

for reconsideration of the earlier Order dated

January 11, 2002, as he disregarded the factual IFSC theorized that in view of said

and legal grounds relied upon therein; dismissal, the August 2, 2001 Stay Order was automatically lifted and was rendered 2. Whether the alleged reasons for the issuance without force and effect and thus, the motion

of the assailed order of respondent Judge are

factually and legally correct, to wit: (1) that to suspend the implementation of the June

petitioner IFSC's motion for reconsideration did 20, 2001 Order has been rendered moot not raise new issues therein; and (2) that it was and academic. In its Comment/Opposition rendered moot and academic by the filing of thereto, CIPI averred that the enforcement

private respondent CIPI of a petition for

voluntary insolvency; and of the June 20, 2001 Order should still be held in abeyance despite the dismissal of

3. Whether respondent Judge acted without or in its petition for rehabilitation on February 11, excess of juris diction or committed grave abuse 2002 in view of its filing of a petition for of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction voluntary insolvency on February 26, 2002,

in not ruling that the implementation of the

Order dated June 20, 2001 can no longer be which was raffled this time to the sala of

suspended the

already respondent judge, RTC, Pasig City, Branch implemented and has in fact reached finality.




9 Rollo pp. 60-62
10 Rollo pp. 63-66
11 Rollo p. 78
12 Rollo pp. 79-84

13 Rollo pp. 96-97
14 Rollo pp. 22-25

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