But this has no devastating effect to the prosecution for the eyewitness accounts of Manamtam and Clarino as well as the selfdefense set up, make up for the exclusion of Maria's testimony.

Noel while admitting that he stabbed Emil, disclaims any responsibility for his death which he imputes rather on his old age and hypertension. This disclaimer is based on the medical finding that Emil suffered only a "stab wound rt. lateral chest non penetrating" and death followed

GOVERNING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING HIM.

We disregard outright the testimony of Maria who appears to have been a witness planted to augment the charge and insure the conviction of her father's admitted assailant. While the investigation and preparation of the affidavits of the eyewitness were taken just two (2) days after the incident or on March 16, 1999, Maria came out with her version only on April 11, 1999. This is not explained away by her claim that she was belated because she was scared. The glaring fact is that the admitted eyewitnesses Manamtam and Clarino in their affidavits made no mention of her presence during the incident, and in their testimonies asserted albeit obliquely that she was not even there at all (vide: Manamtam, tsn, Aug. 16, 2000, pp. 18-19; Clarino, tsn Sept. 8, 2000, p. 13). Then there is the matter of her testimony as to the number and location of the wounds inflicted on her father which she said were two (2), one on the back and one at the side. These do not jibe with the physical facts for Emil had a lone wound and it was on the chest. By clear indications, Maria was just a false

therefore argued that the stab wound he inflicted was not the proximate cause of Emil's death. He is wrong for an accused is responsible for all the natural Consequences of his criminal act. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application and lies at the foundation of all criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts (People vs. Song, G.R. No. 73747, Nov. 21, 1991).

So much for that fallacious argument. Noel also set up self-defense. But once an accused admits having slain the victim, he takes it upon himself to satisfactory prove that he is nonetheless not guilty of a felony and thus cannot be made to suffer its penal and civil consequences. For one who invokes self-defense admits the responsibility for the killing and perforce the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in selfdefense. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of selfdefense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense (People vs. Delmindo G.R. No. 146810, May 27, 2004).

Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element of self-defense. Of the

three requisites, it is the most important. Without it, the justifying circumstances cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to attack, positively showing the intent of the aggressor to cause injury. It presupposes not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils one's life or limb. Thus, when there is no peril, there is no unlawful aggression (Cabuslay vs. People, G.R. No. 129876, Sept. 30, 2005).

To prove Emil's aggression, Noel said that he was boxed on the eye. When he recovered, he attempted to punch back but Emil then stabbed him on the chin. Emil then held him by his shirt's collar and made further lunges but Noel was able to hold him off as they grappled until they fell on the ground. This scuffle claimed by Noel, if true would have taken some time and raised some noise. But the eyewitnesses said it happened within seconds after Noel passed them, and there was no ruckus. What called their attention was a moan according to Manamtam, and tugging sounds said Clarino. The furious attack described by Noel does not conform with the accounts of these policeman and kagawad, eyewitness who are credible and have no reason at all to prevaricate.

Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It was incumbent

upon Noel in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing." However Noel failed to present the required clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. It having been proven and even admitted that he stabbed dead his brother, and he having failed to prove his defense

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

So ORDERED.

Guariña II and Ranada, JJ., concur.

Appeal denied and the judgment affirmed.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

(SGD.) ROBERTO A. BARRIOS Associate Justice Chairman, Fifth Division

1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION; WHEN A CORPORATION IS PLACED UNDER REHABILITATION RECEIVERSHIP, ALL ACTIONS OR CLAIMS AGAINST IT ARE DEEMED SUSPENDED; PURPOSE.Jurisprudence is indeed replete with rulings where the Supreme Court held that when a corporation is placed under rehabilitation receivership, all actions or claims against it are deemed suspended (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 97178, January 10, 1994). The purpose of the suspension is to prevent the irreversible collapse of the corporation and give the management committee or receiver the absolute tranquility to study the viability of the corporation. The law creates a wall around the distressed corporation against all claims. In the cases of BF Homes, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 76879, October 3, 1990) and Roa vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 77143, October 3, 1990), the Supreme Court clarified that when a corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all creditors should stand on an equal footing; not anyone of them should be given any preference by paying one or some of them ahead of the others.

OF OF

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS JURISDICTION, NOT ERRORS JUDGMENT.-In fine, certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction - it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. Certiorari will not be issued to

cure errors by the trial court or quasi-judicial body in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law (Suyat, Jr. vs. Torres, 441 SCRA 265). Truly, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.

3. ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DEFINED.-By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion

as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary

Court of Appeals Reports Annotated, Vol. 41.

or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004).

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Foria & Ureta Law Offices for petitioner.

Law Firm of Tanjutco & Partners for respondents.

AREVALO-ZENAROSA, M., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure seeking to set aside and reverse the Order dated September 24, 2002 issued by public respondent Honorable Briccio C. Ygaña, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 11, 2002 filed by petitioner.

The facts are as follow:

Petitioner Investors Financial Services Corporation (IFSC for brevity), formerly, CIPI Leasing and Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of private respondent Corporate Investments Philippines, Incorporated (CIPI for brevity), instituted a petition for the declaration of suspension of payments before the Securities and Exchange Commission and was docketed therein as SEC Case No. 07-00-6698.1 Thereafter, the SEC issued a Stay Order dated July 26, 2000, suspending all actions for claims against petitioner. In view of the transfer of jurisdiction over said petition from the SEC to the appropriate Regional Trial Court under Sec. 5.2 of R.A. 8799, the case was brought to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, for raffle.

1 Rollo pp. 26-33

On August 31, 2000, IFSC's petition for declaration of suspension of payment was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge. On December 4, 2000, petitioner moved that its petition be treated as one for petition for rehabilitation2 and simultaneously submitted its supplement to the petition with proposed rehabilitation plan. Said motion was granted by the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 153 and on January 12, 2001, the lower court issued an Order approving the rehabilitation plan submitted by petitioner as well as the appointment of Mr. Ernesto C. Enriquez as rehabilitation receiver.3

Later, the rehabilitation receiver recommended that some modifications be made on the approved rehabilitation plan alleging that petitioner !FSC received a notice as a creditor in connection with the petition for suspension of payments instituted by private respondent CIPI before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158; that petitioner filed its comment stating that IFSC owes CIPI Php69.9 million while CIPI owes IFSC, in turn, Php176 million and proposed three causes of action insofar as its payables to and receivable from CIPI are concerned; that the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 158 later dismissed CIPI's petition for suspension of payment in its Order dated April 16, 2001 and declared that said private respondent's creditors may pursue whatever remedies they may avail against it under the law. Mr. Enriquez claimed that his proposed modifications are necessary to avert adverse effects resulting from the actions of CIPI's other creditors and to safeguard the interests of IFSC's own creditors.

On June 20, 2001, respondent judge issued an Order approving the following modifications proposed by the rehabilitation receiver, to wit:

1. That the petitioner IFCS be allowed to Immediately offset on a one to one basis all its payables to CIPI against its receivable from CIPI.

2. That the remaining receivable balance be paid by CIPI as follows:

2 Rollo pp. 39-47 'Rollo pp. 46-47

a.) Allow petitioner IFCS to redeem the Php 20 million IFCS preferred shares Series A held by CIPI and immediately apply proceeds thereof as payment of remaining receivable balance on a one to one basis.

b.) Allow petitioner IFCS to re-acquire the Php 7 million IFCS common stock held by CIPI and immediately apply proceeds thereof as payment of remaining receivable balance on a one to one basis.

3. That any remaining receivable balance be paid by whatever valueble assets that petitioner IFCS may be able to get hold of from CIPI by way of attachment.^

Thereafter, petitioner sent a letter dated July 6, 2001 to private respondent seeking for the immediate implementation of the above Order.5 In its letter-reply dated July 23, 2001, CIPI informed IFSC that it could not act on the latter's request due its filing of a petition for rehabilitation together with a rehabilitation plan, which was raffled to the RTC of Pasig, Branch 158. CIPI assured IFSC that said plan has reflected the adjustments on the valuation of CIPI's preferred shares and common shares in IFSC and contained the proposed offsetting of CIPI's equity investment with its obligation with IFSC. CIPI further explained that granting IFSC's request could preempt any action which the lower court would take on its rehabilitation plan. On August 2, 2001, the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 158 issued a Stay Order in favor of private respondent CIPI.

On August 13, 2001, petitioner secured a certificate of finality from Atty. Teodoro Carbonera, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Pasig City, Branch 153 stating that the June 20, 2001 Order has become final and executory.' IFCS then notified CIPI through a letter dated August 24, 2001 that it implemented the Order dated June 20, 2001 and that the same was already reflected in its books claiming that said Order is not only immediately executory under Section 5, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation but had also reached finality.

• Rollo pp. 48-50

5 Rollo pp. 51-53

• Rollo pp. 54-55

7 Rollo p. 56

• Rollo pp. 57-59

On August 18, 2001, private respondent CIPI filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Implementation of the Order dated June 20, 2001 before the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 153 maintaining that to do otherwise could contravene the August 2, 2001 Stay Order issued by the RTC, Branch 158 and would in effect, be giving preference to one creditor over the others since IFSC's alleged claim against CIPI's assets will be satisfied ahead, above and over all its other creditors. In its Comment, petitioner prayed that CIPI's motion be denied contending that the June 20, 2001 Order is not only immediately executory but was already final. IFSC posited that the Stay Order dated August 2, 2001 has no legal effect whatsoever on the June 20, 2001 Order because it was issued much later than the subject order. 10

On January 11, 2002, public respondent issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent motion of Corporate Investments Philippines, Inc. (CIPI) to hold in abeyance the implementation of the order dated June 20, 2001 is GRANTED. 3311

On February 14, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order. 12 Thereafter, petitioner filed a manifestation informing the lower court that CIPI's petition for rehabilitation was dismissed by the RTC, Pasig, Branch 158. IFSC theorized that in view of said dismissal, the August 2, 2001 Stay Order was automatically lifted and was rendered without force and effect and thus, the motion to suspend the implementation of the June 20, 2001 Order has been rendered moot and academic. In its Comment/Opposition thereto, CIPI averred that the enforcement of the June 20, 2001 Order should still be held in abeyance despite the dismissal of its petition for rehabilitation on February 11, 2002 in view of its filing of a petition for voluntary insolvency on February 26, 2002, which was raffled this time to the sala of respondent judge, RTC, Pasig City, Branch

• Rollo pp. 60-62 10 Rollo pp. 63-66

11 Rollo p. 78

12 Rollo pp. 79-84

153, CIPI asserted that on March 8, 2002 Judge Danilo S. Cruz, pairing judge of RTC Branch 153, issued an Order declaring CIPI insolvent and prohibited it from receiving and making payments to its creditors until an assignee has been appointed by its creditors. CIPI prayed that in the light of this development, IFSC's motion should be denied due course. 13

On September 24, 2002, respondent judge issued the assailed Order holding that no new issues were raised by petitioner to warrant a modification much less a reversal of January 11, 2002 Order. Further, respondent judge ruled that the issuance of the March 8, 2002 Order declaring CIP insolvent had rendered IFSC's motion for reconsideration moot and academic. The decretal portion of the said Order reads:

"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 3314

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari base on the following grounds:

1. Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Order dated September 24, 2002 which denied petitioner IFSC's motion for reconsideration of the earlier Order dated January 11, 2002, as he disregarded the factual and legal grounds relied upon therein;

2. Whether the alleged reasons for the issuance of the assailed order of respondent Judge are factually and legally correct, to wit: (1) that petitioner IFSC's motion for reconsideration did not raise new issues therein; and (2) that it was rendered moot and academic by the filing of private respondent CIPI of a petition for voluntary insolvency; and

3. Whether respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not ruling that the implementation of the Order dated June 20, 2001 can no longer be suspended as the same was already implemented and has in fact reached finality. 13 Rollo pp. 96-97 14 Rollo pp. 22-25