[SP No. 92664. October 30, 2006]* DURANO & Co., INC., petitioner vs. RESIDENTS/ HOMEOWNERS OF SAN JOSE VILLAGE, respondents. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; WHILE PROCEDURAL RULES MAYBE LITERALLY INTERPRETED AND THEIR APPLICATION MAY BE RELAXED FROM TIME TO TIME, THE SAME APPLIES "ONLY IN PROPER CASES OF DEMONSTRABLE MERIT AND UNDER JUSTIFIABLE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES."-At the outset, it must be emphasized that while procedural rules may be liberally interpreted and their application may be relaxed from time to time, the same applies "only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice." (Norris v. Parentela, et al., G.R. No. 143216, 27 February 2003). 2. ID.; ID.; MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION ARE NOT GRANTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE; THEIR CONCESSION LIES IN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES.-Further, in Diman v. Alumbres (G.R. No. 131466, 27 November 1998), it was ruled that “ *** no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame." 3. ID.; COURTS: THE RULE ON FINALITY OF DECISIONS, ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS OF A JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE BODY IS "NOT A QUESTION OF TECHNICALITY BUT OF SUBSTANCE AND MERIT," THE UNDERLYING CONSIDERATION THEREFORE, BEING THE PROTECTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE WINNING PARTY.-As a final note, the Supreme Court has consistently held that "the rule on finality • Court of Appeals Reports Annotated, Vol. 41. 4. ID.; of decision, orders or resolutions of a judicial, APPEAL; THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS NEITHER A NATURAL RIGHT NOR A PART OF DUE PROCESS, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS GRANTED BY STATUTE IN WHICH CASE IT SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW.-It bears stressing that "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more important that a case be settled than it be settled right." (Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006) PETITION FOR REVIEW of the Orders and Decision of the Office of the President. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Lim and Ocampo for petitioner. J.L. Jorvina, Jr. for respondents. AREVALO-ZENAROSA, M., J.: Before Us is a Petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the Orders and Decision of the Office of the President dated 8 June 4. 2005', 18 August 20052 and 24 November 20053, respectively. The antecedent facts are: The present case originated from a class suit filed by the Residents/Homeowners of San Jose Village (hereinafter referred to as "respondents") against Durano & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "petitioner) and Lydia B. Durano-Rodriguez in the Housing. and Land Use Eegulatory Board (HLURB) Expanded National Capital Region Field Office. It appears that the respondent were sustained in said case, prompting the petitioner to appeal the Decision therein to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, but to no avail. Note, however, that copies of the aforesaid HLURB Decisions do not appear in Our records. By reason of such denial, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Office of the President (OP). In an Order dated 19 January 2005, the OP directed the parties thus: "1. Respondent-Appellant, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, remit the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) as appeal fee, payable to the 'Cashier, Office of the President', showing proof of compliance therewith and the fact that the appeal was filed on time and submit its appeal memorandum, copy furnished complainants-appellees and other respondent-appellant; otherwise, this Office shall dismiss the case without further notice; 2. 3. Complainants-Appellees, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of appellant's memorandum, submit their reply memorandum, copy furnished respondents-appellants; otherwise, this Office shall decide the case on the basis of available records; The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, forward to this Office the complete records of this case with each page consecutively numbered and initialed by the custodian of records, together with the summary of proceedings pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 123 dated February 8, 1991, and its Comment, if any, on the appeal; and 1 Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 30-33 2 Annex "B," Rollo, pp. 34-36 3 Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 37-38 4 The subject of the class suit filed by the private respondents in the HLURB is not indicated in Our records. 5 Annex "D," Rollo, pp. 39-40 In addition to their memoranda, both parties shall submit simultaneously with their memoranda, the drafts of the decision that they seek from this Office, stating distincly and clearly the facts and law upon which they are based. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, Jan. 19, 2005" A Very Urgent Motion (for extension of time to comply with Jan. 19 Order)6 dated 11 February 2005 was filed by herein petitioner, alleging that it is remitting the appeal fee to the Cashier of the OP through a postal money order, and that it is, at the same time, seeking a fifteen-day extension of time to comply with the 19 January 2005 Order of the OP "due to the heavy volume of equally important cases that he [petitioner's former counsel] is handling presently. Consequently, on 7 March 2005, the OP issued an Order granting the extension prayed for, giving the petitioner until 15 March 2005 within which to comply with the 19 January 2005 Order. Later, a Very Urgent Motion (for last extension to comply with Jan. 19 Order) dated 15 March 2005 was filed by petitioner, stating that: "2. Due to sheer volume of equally important cases being handled by undersigned counsel and the fact that he still has to go to Cebu City this Thursday, March 17, 2005 in order to locate some records of respondent-appellant Durano & Co., Inc., which is now holding offices at Cebu City and which records are necessary in the preparation of the required: 1) appeal memorandum and 2) draft decision, the said pleadings could not be filed TODAY so that he needs another extension of fifteen days or until March 30, 2005 within which to file the same.”10 In an Order11 dated 28 March 2005, the OP, once more, granted the extension of time prayed for by the petitioner, "provided that no further extension shall be allowed."12 Meanwhile, in another Very Urgent Motion (for final extension to comply with Jan. 19 Order) 13 dated 30 March 2005, the petitioner, through counsel, filed out of time, and insists that the same yet again prayed for a fifteen-day was perfected within the reglementary extension of time to file the required period, arguing thus: memorandum and draft decision, reiterating the same reason in its earlier motion, to wit: "2. Due to sheer volume of equally important cases being handled by the undersigned counsel and the fact that he still has to go back to Cebu City this April 6, 2005 yet in order to locate some records of respondentappellant Durano & Co., Inc., which is now holding offices at Cebu City and which records are necessary in the preparation of the required: 1) appeal memorandum and 2) draft decision, the said pleadings could not be filed TODAY so that he needs another extension of TEN days or until April 11, 2005 within which to file the same. 3914 On 8 June 2005, the first assailed Order15 of the OP was issued. The dispositive portion thereof reads: "Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for having been filed out of time. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to HLURB for proper disposition. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, 08 Jun 2005" Apparently, petitioner's motion 16 dated 30 March 2005 was received by the OP only on 5 April 2005, eight (8) days after the issuance of its 28 March 2006 Order17. By reason thereof, the OP no longer acted upon the same, in view of the fact that it was explicitly stated in its latest Order18 that "no further extension shall be allowed."19 Soon thereafter, on 20 April 2005, the OP received the petitioner's Appeal Memorandum and Draft Decision20 dated 11 April 2005. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. With respect to the filing of the Appeal Memorandum and the Draft Decision, appellant however, was granted several extensions to file them and as prayed for by the appellant in its latest motion dated March 30, 2005, it was finally able to file the said Appeal Memorandum and Draft Decision on April 11, 2005; The aforesaid Order of this Honorable Office, dated March 28, 2005 to the effect that: 'no further extension shall be allowed' was received by undersigned counsel only in the afternoon of April 11, 2005, while the said Appeal Memorandum and Draft Decision were filed early in the morning of the same date. In other words, the aforesaid warning was received by the undersigned counsel after he had already filed earlier the said Appeal Memorandum and Draft Decision. It could not be said therefore that the Appeal Memorandum and the Draft Decision were filed out of time. At any rate, what matters most is the fact that the said appeal memorandum and draft decision were eventually filed, so that it would be the height of injustice to dismiss the instant appeal merely and just because the appeal memorandum and the draft decision were filed beyond the extended period granted by this Office. Respondents filed their Comment/ Opposition 23 to the said motion for reconsideration, saying that "compliance with the Order of this Honorable Office dated 28 March 2005 for purposes of perfecting 23 Annex "L," Rollo, pp. 59-61 25 San Jose Home Owners Association Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580; 15 June 2005 In its present Petition31. Petitioner posits the following issues, viz.: 1. Whether or not the filing of the appeal memorandum and draft decision is jurisdictional; and 2. Whether or not the filing of the second motion for reconsideration, with leave, is an exceptionally meritorious case.3 Anent these issues, petitioner argues that the payment of the appeal fee settles the jurisdictional question involved herein, without necessarily considering the filing of the appeal memorandum and draft decision, as the OP even granted, on several occasions, its motions for extension to file the same. Moreover, petitioner insists that since it only received the 28 March Order33 of the OP on 11 April 2005, it had no way of being apprised sooner about the warning found therein. It further contends that the case should be decided on the merits, without much adherence to technicalities. ISSUE Whether or not the Office of the President should reinstate and give due course the petitioner's appeal. RULING We rule in the negative. The instant petition must fail. At the outset, it must be emphasized that while procedural rules may be liberally interpreted and their application may be relaxed from time to time, the same applies "only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice."34 31 Rollo, pp. 14-29 32 Ibid, p. 20 33 Supra, Note 10 34 Norris v. Parentela, et al., G.R. No. 143216; 27 February 2003 In the case at bar, it is apparent that petitioner's former counsel filed on several occasions, motions for extension of time to file the required memorandum and draft decision with the OP. We observe that the first motion was dated and filed on the last day of the period for filing memorandum and draft decision, Then, the subsequent motions were again dated and filed on the last day of the period of extension prayed for, whether or not such extension has been granted by the OP. In the case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals 35, the Supreme Court held that "Lawyers should not presumed that the courts would grant their motion for extension Let this serve as warning among the members of the Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no credit to their standing in the profession. More so when they do not file the required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. *** They should file their briefs or pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed." Further, in Diman v. Alumbres36, it was ruled that "*** no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame." 35 G.R. No. L-76549; 10 December 1987 36 G.R. No. 131466; 27 November 1998 Petitioner's argument that it received a copy of the 28 March 2005 Order37 only on 11 April 2005 is of no moment, for its is incumbent upon it, or its counsel, to inquire with the OP as regards the status of the case. It was error for it to presume that each and every motion for extension it filed with the OP would be granted, or at least be acted upon. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyer's to "not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes." "38 In this case, the multiple motions filed by petitioner's counsel are hereby deemed as mere dilatory tactics in order to prolong the proceedings, if not to stay the execution of the adverse Decision of the HLURB. "A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."39 Worthy of mention is the fact that on 15 June 2005, petitioner's former counsel was disbarred by the Supreme Court for representing conflicting interest between the same parties herein.40 This notwithstanding, said counsel still filed. In behalf of petitioner, a motion for reconsideration41 dated 29 June 2005. Clearly, he no longer had any authority to represent, much less file said motion on said date given that he was already disbarred. Thus, the aforesaid motion did not merit any consideration from the OP as it should have been regarded as not filed at all. Consequently, the prescriptive period to file said motion has not been tolled, hence, upon the lapse thereof, the assailed Order42 has already reached its finality. It bears stressing that "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is 37 Supra, Note 10 38 Rule 12.04 39 Rule 10.03, Code of Professional Responsibility 40 Supra, Note 24 41 Supra, Note 21 42 Supra, Note 1 |