[G. R. No. 170022. January 09, 2013]

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

of the Ruling of the Court

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; ELUCIDATED. -Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEXUAL INFIDELITY AND ABANDONMENT OF CONJUGAL DWELLING DO NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. - Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPERSONAL PROBLEMS WITH CO-WORKERS NOT EQUATED WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.-Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems with coworkers, to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/ work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that Lolita's refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SANCTITY THEREOF, EMPHASIZED.-Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

OPINION OF THE COURT

decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which declared the marriage of respondent Cesar Encelan to Lolita CastilloEncelan null and void on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity.

The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolitas and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's psychological incapacity. 8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be

an associated in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9

5 Id. at 6.

6 Id. at 7-8.

7 Id. at 2 and 73 Also stated as "1989" and "1990" in other parts of the record and the TSN; rollo, pp. 44 and 92; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 36; records, p. 119.

8

Records, pp. 1-4.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness[,]13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; 14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with coworkers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions"15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship". 16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision, 17 the RTC declared Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally 18 set aside the RTC's verdict, finding that Lolita's abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/ psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration 19 of the CA's decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its amended decision, 20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita's serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita's willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital

obligations"; 21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita's psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, 24 as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, 25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. 26 To constitute

21 Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011, 657 SCRA 822, 836-837.

22 Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519, 538; Toring v. Toring G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 405; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195, 205; Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824,

August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81, 106; Republic of the Phils. v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 502 (2005); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997).

23 Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 21, at 823; Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 544; Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 154, 161-162; Republic v. CabantugBaguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 711, 725; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999); and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 676.

psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. 27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems with co-workers, 29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was - at the time of her marriage - psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/ work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that Lolita's refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a

27 Toring v. Toring, supra note 22, at 406.

28 Supra note 13.

29 Supra note 15.

30 Supra note 16.

reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, WE GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

(Sgd.) ΑΝΤΟΝΙΟ Τ. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

(Sgd.) MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

31 Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429, 439; and Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 464.

32 Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. No.167459, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517, 524; Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, supra note 23, at 727; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 676.

[G.R. No. 199612. January 22, 2013]

EN BANC

RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR and OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

of the Ruling of the Court

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 8678; SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATES IN CASE OF DEATH, DISQUALIFICATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF ANOTHER; THE SUBSTITUTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO WITHDREW MAY FILE HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR THE OFFICE PROVIDED NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER 14, 2009, WHILE THE SUBSTITUTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO DIED OR IS DISQUALIFIED FOR ANY CAUSE MAY FILE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY UP TO MID-DAY OF ELECTION DAY; RATIONALE.-Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides: SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate. The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009. The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. ***. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009. The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a

candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted. When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The party actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.

2. ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION 8889 DECLARED VOID, THUS, CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A VALID SOURCE OF ANY RIGHT SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO BE VOTED FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. -Federico asserts that Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to the COC of Edna, as gubernatorial candidate; and his COC, as mayoralty candidate, was valid as the Comelec passed upon all matters and issues laid before it in the case. ***. As far as Maligaya is concerned, the resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as Federico's substitution was invalid, his COC having been filed only on May 5, 2010, or after December 14, 2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. No reason was mentioned in the resolution why his COC was given due course except that the withdrawal "merely caused a vacuum in mayoralty contest." *. To stress, the vacancy in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was due to the withdrawal of Edna as mayoralty candidate, not due to the death of Armando Sanchez. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as it was in contravention of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right, like the right to be voted for public office. Indeed, a void judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time. "Where a proclamation is null and void, the

**