the duke of Orleans applies to it exactly. Neither have we dwelt on the condition inserted in the renunciations relating to Austria; it is unconnected with the present discussion, and was the matter of a subsequent treaty.

It has been pretended that treaties posterior to the treaty of Utrecht contained restrictions still more positive than those already expressed in the renunciations of which we have just spoken. It will be sufficient to cast our eyes on the bare text of these treaties to be convinced that this is not the case. The only design of these treaties, is to corroborate the grand principle of the separation of the two crowns.

We read, in fact, in the treaty of the quadruple alliance of 1718:

"ART. 1. As it so happens that the only means that could be found to establish a lasting equilibrium in Europe, has appeared to be the establishment of a rule that the kingdoms of Spain and France shall not at any time be united on the head of one and the same person, nor joined together in one body under one and the same reigning line, and that those two monarchies shall rest perpetually separated; to confirm this rule so necessary to the public tranquillity, the princes to whom the prerogative of birth could give the right of succeeding in either kingdom have renounced one of the two orders of succession for themselves and their posterity, so that the separation of the two monarchies has passed into a fundamental law of the two states.

"His imperial majesty, wishing to give the last complement to a law so salutary and so necessary, and to take away all pretext of sinister suspicion on his part, declares that he accepts the articles arranged and agreed upon at Utrecht touching the order of succession to the thrones of Spain and France, and renounces, as well for himself as for his descendants and successors of either sex, all rights and claims universally, whatever he might have, on the provinces of the Spanish dominions, of which by the treaty of Utrecht the Catholic king has been recognised the legitimate sovereign and possessor; his imperial majesty promises in consequence to draw up an act of solemn renunciation, and to deliver a formal instrument of it as well to his Catholic majesty as to the contracting parties.

"ART. 2. In execution of the said renunciation, which his imperial majesty has made from attachment to the general security of Europe, and also in consideration of the circumstance that the duke of Orleans has renounced, for himself and his descendants, his rights and actions on the kingdom of Spain (JURIBUS ET RATIONIBUS suis), on condition that neither the emperor nor any of his descend

ants shall ever succeed in Spain; his imperial majesty recognizes as legitimate king of Spain, Philip V, and promises to him and to his descent male and female the peaceful possession of the Spanish monarchy.*

Thus, the condition under which these renunciations, as well of Philip V as of the French princes, had been made, found its accomplishment in this treaty. As long as this condition was not fulfilled, that is, the formal renunciation of Austria, the renunciations of the king of Spain and of the French princes were not complete. The known claims of the cabinet of Philip V, directed by Alberoni, were motived on the absence of the renunciation of Austria. The regent wished to take away this pretext, and this was the object of the treaty of the quadruple alliance. Thus, seven years after the peace of Utrecht, the character of this great act was confirmed by an additional treaty concluded between the very powers who had signed it.

The particular character of the renunciations is none the less clearly defined in it. The princes have renounced the right they had by their birth to succeed at once to the throne of the two kingdoms; they have made their choice of one or the other of the two successions, and have only renounced their rights to one or the other of the two crowns, for themselves and their posterity. It is thus exactly the execution of the will of Charles II. The renunciation of the duke of Orleans is retraced in terms the more precious, because, Regent of France, in 1718, he has himself explained the intention which he had had as duke of Orleans in 1713. He has only renounced the rights which belonged to him, his personal rights and claims, juribus et rationibus SUIS.

Nevertheless there still remained many difficulties of execution; a congress was appointed at Cambrai

* See Dumont, tom. vii. part 1, p. 531, and the Appendix No. XII.

† Ii principes quibus nativitatis prærogativa jus in utroque regno succedendi tribuere poterat, uni e duobus, pro se totaque posteritati solemniter renuntiaverunt.

for the year 1721, with the mission to resolve them. But different reasons caused a delay in the signature of a definite treaty between Spain and Austria. This treaty was concluded on the 30th of April 1725, at Vienna. We read in it; art. 1,-That the basis of the peace is the treaty of London of the 2nd August 1718. And, in fact, in articles 2 and 3 are reproduced, literally and textually, without changing a single word, articles 2 and 3 of the treaty of 1718.*

Here then is a second and authentic confirmation of the interpretation which forms the basis of our conclusions; an English minister has therefore interpreted the treaty of Utrecht in an erroneous sense, when, in a dispatch which has been communicated to our two chambers, he advances that the main and real object of the treaty, besides the restoration of peace between the contracting parties, was that, for which the preceding war had been undertaken, and it is truly set forth in the second article of the treaty between Great Britain and Spain, which recites that the war had been undertaken......on account of the imminent danger with which the liberty and safety of all Europe had been threatened by THE TOO CLOSE UNION (l'union trop étroite) of the kingdoms of Spain and France.†

The author of the assertion cites but a fragment, and, instead of citing the original text, which is Latin, he gives it in French.

We will produce the text itself, with the excuse for citing Latin; but it may be seen that the conjunctio arcta, which the English minister translates by a union étroite, was, in the evident intention and even in the letter of the treaty, the union of the crowns on one head, which is a different thing from too close union of the kingdoms of France and Spain.

"Quando quidem vero bellum cui finis pace hac feliciter a Deo

* See Dumont, tom. viii. part 2, p. 106.

† Dispatch of Lord Palmerston of the 31st October, 1846. Documents communiqués aux Chambres, p. 71.

impositus est, ab initio susceptum et tot per annos, si summa immensis sumptibus et occisione prope infinita gestum fuerit, propter ingens periculum quod libertati salutique totius Europæ ex nimis arcta regnorum Hispaniæ Galliæque conjunctione impenderet. Quumque ad evellendam ex animis hominum sollicitudinem omnem, suspicionemque de istiusmodi conjunctione et ad firmandam stabiliendamque pacem ac tranquillitatem Christiani orbis, justo potentiæ æquilibrio (quod optimum et maxime solidum mutuæ amicitiæ, et duraturæ undequaque concordiæ fundamentum est) tam rex Catholicus, quam rex Christianissimus, satis justis cautelis provisum esse voluerint, ne regna Hispaniæ et Galliæ unquam sub eodem imperio veniant et uniantur, nec unquam unus et idem utriusque Regni rex fiat; atque eum in finem majestas sua Catholica, pro se, hæredibus et successoribus suis, juri, titulo, pretentionique omnimodæ ad coronam Galliæ solennissime renunciaverit."

If, in spite of the preceding observations, any doubt should still remain, as to the primitive and principal aim of the treaties of Utrecht, it is only necessary to cite art. 6 of the treaty concluded between France and England, which is thus expressed :—

THAT THE WAR WHICH THE PRESENT PEACE IS TO EXTINGUISH, WAS EXCITED PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THE SAFETY AND LIBERTY OF EUROPE COULD NOT ABSOLUTELY SUFFER THAT THE CROWNS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN SHOULD BE UNITED ON ONE AND THE SAME HEAD.

END.