in execution of the contract, an act of formal renunciation of the crown of Spain, on the 2nd of June, 1660, before leaving Spain. In this act,-digested with such a prodigious luxuriance of protectional and prohibitive clauses, that we may believe that the art of the notaries exhausted in it all the resources of the style used on such occasions, we find the determining motive of the renunciation reproduced; for the common benefit of the kingdoms, subjects, and nassals of the two crowns; bearing in mind how it concerns the public state and their conservation, that being so great they should not happen to be joined, and that provision be made against the occasions which there might be to join them.*

The act of marriage of Louis XIV, and consequently the renunciation, as well as the political motive given for it, make an integral part of the treaty of the Pyrenees,† of the 7th of November 1659. But the marriage was celebrated at Bayonne, only on the 9th of June, 1660.

One circumstance is here particularly worthy of attention, namely, that the dower of 500,000 écus of gold was to be paid-one-third on the day of the celebration of the marriage, the second third a year after, and the last third in the six following months; but, as though Spain had intended to give authority to the insinuations made by Don Louis de Haro, in the isle of Faisans, she paid not a farthing of the dower, either on the day of the celebration, or in the next year, or at any other time. Thus Louis XIV and the Queen, who were expressly, according to the terms of the contract, to renew their solemn renunciation after the celebration of the marriage, abstained from doing it; and, as early as 1661, Louis XIV sent an ambassador extraordinary to Madrid to obtain of his father-in-law, king Philip IV, the formal revocation of the act of renunciation, considering himself as no longer bound

* See this piece, in extenso, in the Appendix, No. v.

† See Dumont, Corps diplomat. tom. vi. part 2, p. 284, and tom. viii. part 1, p. 16.

by it on account of the non-execution of the conditions attached to it.* A Spanish minister replied to the king's envoy that the renunciation was rather a style of contract than an obligation which carried any effect.

The negociation went on slowly on account of the respect which Louis XIV thought it necessary to show towards the court of Madrid; and it ended in an abortion, after the birth of a son, in whom Philip IV centred his affection and hopes; but Louis XIV never considered himself as bound by a renunciation which, in his opinion, wanted the complement of execution and formality which was necessary for the formation of a political and obligatory bond.

Things were in this posture, when Philip IV died, the 17th of September 1665, leaving as his heir a child of four years of age, whose feeble health did not give promise of a long existence. After the example of Charles V and of Philip III, Philip IV regulated the right of succession to the crown by his will, in which we find the following clause:

"In all past times and ages, an especial circumspection has been used in making marriages of the infantas of Spain with the kings of France, on account of the inconveniences which would result from the conjunction and union of those two crowns......to avoid which, and to facilitate marriages between the two crowns, for the utility of the reciprocal vassals, and of the states in general, their union has been hindered by a convention. To this effect, the infanta, my sister, was made to renounce for herself and her descendants the succession to my kingdoms.

.....

"Following this example.........the chapters 5 and 6 (produced above) were added to the treaties contracted by me and by the very Christian king Louis XIV......touching the peace and marriage contracted between the infanta Maria Theresa, my very dear daughter, and the said king......

"As father and natural master of my kingdoms ...... in order to avoid the damages which might result from the conjunction of the two crowns......I declare that the said infanta Maria Theresa, my daughter, and all her descendants by this marriage...shall be, shall remain, and are, excluded...from succeeding in my kingdoms...for ever, just as if they were not born."†

* See the work of M. Mignet already cited, tom. i. p. 71 et seqq. † See this act in Dumont, loc. cit. tom. viii. part 1, p. 25, 26.

A

The only heir male of the Spanish branch of Hapsburg having a health so precarious, and a vacancy in the succession being probably near, Louis XIV thought justly that the validity of its renunciation not being only a question of private right, between Spain and himself, but a high question of political equilibrium, which he ought to treat with Europe rather than with an infant king, he immediately opened negotiations with Austria, England, Holland, Bavaria, and Savoy. Despairing of obtaining the whole Spanish monarchy, he would at least be admitted to share in its possessions; aggrandize the territory of France, in default of obtaining a second crown for himself.

Austria had eventual claims to the crown of Spain, through Maria Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip III, and mother of the emperor Leopold. But these claims were preceded by those of Bavaria, which came through Margaret, younger sister of Maria Theresa, wife of the emperor Leopold and mother of Marie Antoinette, married to the elector of Bavaria. Spain and Europe were favourable to the house of Bavaria, which excited no umbrage. The dukes of Savoy had claims in a more distant degree, which they deduced through the infanta Catharine, sister of Philip III, duchess of Savoy, and from an open substitution in their favour by the will of Philip IV.

Holland and England had in the question only political and commercial interests. But these two interests were of a singular importance, and Louis XIV was desirous of satisfying them. In the political point of view, it was the interest and equilibrium of Europe which prepossessed the cabinets, and especially the maritime powers. This interest was compromised, if Austria or France obtained the vast domains of the Spanish monarchy, and the fruit of the war of thirty years was lost; the balance, so painfully established by the treaty of Westphalia, was destroyed.

In the point of view of private interest, England and Holland were equally threatened. England, the old ally of the house of Austria, had obtained a footing

through her in Spain. She feared to lose a market for the produce of her manufactures, by the establishment of a French prince in that country. Moreover, France possessed an imposing fleet; united with that of Spain, it might then shut up the Mediterranean, and annul the commerce of the other peoples of England with both Indies; and then, the occupation of the Spanish Low Countries by France closed upon the English the road of central Europe. Now the continental interest of England seemed, for more than a century, to have been concentrated in the Low Coun tries. Elizabeth had supported them in their insurrection against Philip II; Cromwell had aimed at pos sessing the coasts of those countries; and William of Nassau had strengthened the English influence there.

For Holland, the barrier of the Low Countries was a bulwark against France; and, in its turn, France had long coveted the Low Countries, which seemed to be a natural complement of its territory, in an age when every state was seeking natural boundaries. If she had to undergo the threat of the Pyrenees, she would at least have the protection of the Rhine. It was by the Low Countries that Spain weighed directly and heavily upon France, open to attack on that side of her frontiers. Thus, the question of the Low Countries was that which offered most difficulties in this affair, because the direct interests of three powers were implicated in it.

The impatience of Louis XIV had nearly compromised everything. He pretended first that the Belgic provinces, where the right of civil devolution was admitted by custom, belonged to the queen Maria Theresa, as daughter of Philip IV by his first marriage; transporting thus into political regulations a law of succession which had till then governed only domestic patrimony. A war followed, which was terminated, after a short duration, in 1668, by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; but it left in existence prepossessions and umbrages, for it discovered a too marked eagerness on the part of France, and a strong desire

of aggrandizement. It was, however, at this epoch that a secret treaty was made relating to the future partition of the Spanish states; in this treaty, Austria consented to the reunion of the Low Countries with France. It does not appear that Holland and England ever agreed to this concession, the offer of which was never renewed, nor the demand accepted. The emperor Leopold seemed then to acknowledge himself the invalidity of the renunciations of Maria Theresa.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1668, had left in the power of Louis XIV twelve strong towns of the Spanish Low Countries. He gave up Franche-Comté, but only to take it back shortly afterwards during the war with Holland: he retained possession of it by the treaty of Nimeguen in 1678; it was the anticipated dismembering of a declining monarchy. The war with Holland had been glorious for our arms, but it alarmed Germany, as the war of devolution had alarmed Holland; it ruined the French party in the United Provinces, and raised implacable resentments, of which Louis XIV felt subsequently the vexatious effects.

After the peace of Nimeguen, came the affair of the chambers of reunion; a bold enterprise, the object of which was again the territorial aggrandizement of France. Louis XIV had already lost the friendship of Holland and Germany; he now saw dissolved, by the league of Augsburg, French alliances which dated from the time of Henry IV, and soon the great league of 1689 joined England to the coalition. England had just made the revolution of 1688, and William III, the personal enemy of Louis XIV, directed its policy and forces.

The great league had the double aim of humbling the power of Louis XIV and of hindering a prince of France from ascending the throne of Spain. The question was now no longer a mere objection to the union of the crowns; it was determined to exclude the whole house of Bourbon from the Spanish throne, without regard to separation or union. The question had ceased to be one of equilibrium or of political