in contemplation of a sale of goods to be afterwards made; and it is a The promise written undertaking, that if the plaintiff will supply the goods "or- to pay for a dered," the defendant will pay for them. It is a memorandum off future trans guarantee for the sale of goods, not a promissory note, and requires an u no stamp. PARKE, B. I am of the same opinion. If the memorandum contained only a promise to pay £6 4s. for goods already supplied, it would be a promissory note, and would require a stamp; but the introduction of the word "ordered " makes all the difference, as it shows that it is a promise to pay for goods, if supplied, but which were not then delivered. We are therefore enabled to collect, from the instrument itself, that the consideration for the promise was not an executed consideration, but the future delivery of goods already ordered. No objection has been made that the contract varies from that declared upon; and the only questions are: first, is this a promis sory note? I think it is not, for the reasons I have already stated; and secondly, if not a promissory note, is it a binding guarantee? The rule is now perfectly settled, that the consideration must appear upon the face of the instrument itself, either in express terms or by necessary implication. I think in this case the consideration may be collected by necessary inference, and therefore that the instrument is a binding guarantee. The other Barons concurred. Rule discharged.1 SHENTON v. JAMES. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH, Nov. 11, 1843. [Reported in 5 Queen's Bench Reports, 199.] ASSUMPSIT. The declaration stated that defendant made his promissory note, and delivered the same to plaintiff, and thereby promised to pay plaintiff £50 on demand. Plea: that defendant did not make the said promissory note, in manner and form, &c. Issue thereon. On the trial before Williams, J., at the last summer assizes at Stafford, the instrument declared upon appeared to be as follows: "DEC. 17, 1843. On demand, I promise to pay to W. Shenton the sum of £50 in consideration of foregoing and forbearing an action at law in the 1 Drury v. Macaulay, 16 M. & W. 146; Ellis v. Ellis, Gow, 216; Hodges v. Hall, Ga. 163; Drawn v. Cherry, 14 La. An. 694; Fletcher v. Thompson, 55 N. H. 308 Considerant v. Brisbane, 14 How. Pr. 487, accord. - ED. Court of Queen's Bench for damages ascertained by consent to A verdict was found for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to move to enter a nonsuit on the point after stated. R. V. Richards in this term1 moved accordingly. This was only an agreement. It was not a promissory note, because the engagement to pay was not absolute: it was an agreement to pay, in consideration of the plaintiff's "foregoing," not of his having foregone, the action. Clarke v. Percival 2 and Horne v. Redfearn show that such an instrument is not a note within Stat. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, § 1. Cur, adv. vult. LORD DENMAN, C. J., now delivered judgment as follows:We think it clear that this was a promissory note on an executed and completed consideration, "foregoing and forbearing an action at law," ," "for damages ascertained by consent " to amount to £50, "by reason of the injury sustained," &c. All here is past; something has been done for which the damages are ascertained; and the note is given in consideration of foregoing an action. Littledale, J., said of the note in Clarke v. Percival,2 " On the face of it, it is clear that it is not payable at all events." Here the note clearly is so. Three at least of the judges, in that case, appear to have thought that the words did not amount to a promise at all. Here a distinct promise is given. Rule refused. RICHARDSON v. MARTYR. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH, APRIL 18, 1855. [Reported in 25 Law Times, 64.] 1 ACTION on a promissory note by the payee against the maker. 1 November 3d. Before Lord Denman, C. J., Williams, Coleridge, and Wight- 2 2 B. & Ad. 660. 8 Burchell v. Slɔcock, 2 Ld. Ray. 1545; Griffin v. Weatherby, L. R. 3 Q. B. 758 Dixon v. Nuttall, 6 C. & P. 320; 1 C. M. & R. 307, s. c.; Wilson v. Smith, Mor. Dict. Decis. 1402; Evans v. Bell, 20 Ala. 509 (semble); U. S. Bank v. United States, 2 How. 711; Wells v. Brigham, 6 Cush. 6; Beardslee v. Horton, 3 Mich. 560; Goshen Co. v. Hurtin, Johns. 217; Dutchess Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 238; Wallace v. Dyson, 1 Speers, 127. t Richardson, or order, of £2,000, for value received. And there was an indorsement on the back, dated Nov. 1, 1851: "In the event of my death, the within-mentioned amount of £2,000 is not to be demanded of the maker; but the same is to remain at interest, and ultimately to be divided among the children of Mrs. Malcolm, my daughter." Plea: denial of the making of the note. At the trial before Erle, J., the defendant had the verdict; leave being given to the plaintiff to move to set it aside, and enter it for him. Mrs. Richardson was the mother-in-law of the defendant, and had advanced moneys to the amount of £1500 to the defendant, for which I O U's had been given,—and had also become surety for him for £500, and out of this amount had been compelled to pay £350. Pressing for further security from defendant, this note was given, and the indorsement made on it at the time, by Mrs. Richardson's solicitor. Lush moved, pursuant to leave. The question is, What is the effect of the indorsement? Does it prevent the instrument operating as a promissory note? It is submitted that it does not, and that its bayables effect is not to defeat the instrument as a promissory note, but to provide, in the way of a testamentary disposition, that, if the note remained in Mrs. R.'s hands at the time of her death, then the proceeds were to be distributed among the children. This indorsement is a mere testamentary disposition, and therefore void; but, if not, it is revocable from its very nature. LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. It is quite clear that the payee could only be entitled to payment of the note on demand during her lifetime. This is, therefore, not an absolute undertaking to pay. If the demand is not made in her lifetime, the defendant ceases to be liable on the note. That makes it conditional; and the instrument, therefore, is not a promissory note. CROMPTON, J. On the contingency of her death, the note is not payable. The note, therefore, is not payable at all events, and not a promissory note. Rule refused. JURY v. BARKER. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH, MAY 28, 1858. [Reported in Ellis, Blackburn, & Ellis, 459.] ACTION by the indorsee of a promissory note against the maker. promissory note in that count mentioned was and is in the words and figures following, that is to say:— "LONDON, 29th Oct. 1857. "I promise to pay to Mr. J. C. Saunders or his order, at three months after date, the sum of one hundred pounds, as per memorandum of agreement. HENRY JOHN BARKER. "Payable at 105 Upper Thames Street, London." Demurrer. Joinder. O'Malley, for the plaintiff. The defendant contends that the words "as per memorandum of agreement" destroy the negotiability of the instrument as a promissory note under Stat. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9. But that is not so: those words do not limit the absolute promise in writing, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum to a certain person at a certain time; and that is all that the statute requires. The note here shows the existence of a prior agreement, and earmarks, as it were, the promissory note, so as to prevent the supposition that the payment is to be in respect of any other matter than the sum of money due under that agreement. But the note is still an absolute and unconditional promissory note. [LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. The plea, to be good, should have set out the agreement, and shown that such agreement made the note conditional.] Raymond, for the defendant. The instrument is not a promissory note within either the law of merchants or Stat. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9. It is not, upon the face of it, an unconditional promise to pay: the words "as per memorandum of agreement" are, at least, ambiguous, and might refer to some arrangement which would render the note valueless to indorsees. [ERLE, J. The words might mean only “as I agreed to do."] But they might have another meaning, and one which would render the promise to pay conditional. The note must, on the face of it, be an absolute promise to pay. LORD CAMPBELL, C. J. The note here is an absolute and unconditional promise, as to the payer, the payee, the amount, and the date. If the addition of the words in question make the promise conditional, it is on the defendant to show that; and he has not done so. COLERIDGE J., and ERLE, J., concurred. Judgment for the plaintiff. 1 Byram v. Hunter, 36 Me. 217; Littlefield v. Hodge, 6 Mich. 326, accord. Conf. Jenkins v. Caddo, 7 La. An. 559, where the following instrument was held not to be a note: "On demand, please pay to the order of W. J. the sum of $7,000, according to a donation made by the Shreveport Town Company to the parish, the same to be in accordance with a resolution of the police jury, passed Oct. 6, 1840.” --ED. SECTION IV. They must be for the Payment of Money. MORRIS v. LEE. IN THE KING'S BENCH, TRINITY TERM, 1725. [Reported in 1 Strange, 629.] THE plaintiff declares that the defendant made a promissory note under his hand, whereby he promised to be accountable to the plaintiff or order for £100, value received, and counts upon the statute. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest of judgment accounte that this was not within the statute, and that the distinction had dec, not mis always held between negotiable and accountable notes; that no note Sed per Curiam. There are no precise words requisite to make a payment telemen འ ཀྭ ་་་ ་་ ཡ order appras REX v. WILCOX. CROWN CASES RESERVED, EAster, 1808. [Reported in Bayley, Bills (6 Ed.), 11.] INDICTMENT for forging and uttering a promissory note: the note was to "pay the bearer on demand one guinea in cash or Bank of England notes." A case was reserved for the consideration of the twelve judges, on the question, whether this was a note within the statute. A majority of them held it was not; and, upon a representation to the crown, the prisoner was pardoned.2 1 Barker v. Seaman, 61 N. Y. 648, accord.-ED. Ex parte Imeson, 2 Rose, 225 (Bank of England notes); Ex parte Davison, 1 |