posed drawers. If they chose to accept without making the inquiry, I think they must be considered as undertaking to pay to the signature of the person who actually drew the bills. PARKE, J., concurred. Rule discharged. An accester,does 1:st quarantee!!: ALLPORT and Another v. MEEK. ignature 3/3 AT NISI PRIUS, CORAM Tindal, C. J., FEBRUARY 24, 1880. doreas [Reported in 4 Carrington & Payne, 207.] though he doi S ASSUMPSIT on a bill of exchange drawn by one Williams on and accepted by the defendant, and indorsed by Williams to the plaintiffs. The witness who was called to prove the handwriting of Williams and both said that neither the drawing nor the indorsement was written by purports him, and that he did not know by whom they were written. Wilde, Serjt., for the plaintiffs, then proved that the defendant had acknowledged that the acceptance was his; and submitted to his Lordship that, as the acceptance admitted the drawing to be correct, the jury might look at the indorsement to see whether it was of the same handwriting as the drawing. The reason why a witness is not allowed to speak to handwriting by comparison is that it is the province of the jury; and it has been decided that the jury may judge by comparison. TINDAL, C. J. I think you must call some witness to lay some evidence before the jury on which they may decide. Wilde, Serjt., admitted that he could not carry the case any further, and the plaintiffs were Nonsuited. ASSUMPSIT by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, for the sum of £45, dated 29th of November, 1838. Plea: that before the said bill of exchange became due and payal le according to the tenor and effect thereof, to wit, on the 1st day of 1 Littledale, J., had gone to Chambers. 2 Macferson v. Thoytes, Peake, 20, accord. Whitney v. Bunnell, 8 La. An. 429; Williams v. Drexel, 14 Md. 566, contra. तर November, 1838, the same bill was altered, to wit, by the said John Smith (the drawer), in a material part thereof, in this, to wit, that whereas the same bill, when the same was made by the said John Smith as in the declaration mentioned, bore date on a certain day therein in that behalf mentioned, to wit, on the 29th day of October, 1838, the same date was, whilst the same bill was in full force and effect as aforesaid, to wit, on the day and year in this plea first mentioned, altered, to wit, by the said John Smith, to another and different and much later date, to wit, to the said 29th day of November, 1838, whereby the same bill then became and was and is void in law. Verification. Special demurrer, assigning for causes that the plea is an argumentative traverse of the allegation that the defendant accepted the bill, and that it should simply have traversed that allegation; that the plea does not allege that the alteration was made by Smith after the defendant had accepted or become a party to the bill; and that the allegation that the alteration was made "whilst the said bill was in full force and effect," as in the plea mentioned, is ambiguous in its meaning whether the alteration was whilst the bill was in full force and effect as in the plea mentioned, or as in the declaration mentioned; and that the plea does not state that the defendant was not a consenting party to the alteration, and does not state that the alteration was without his consent or knowledge, and that it does not show how the bill was void. Joinder in demurrer. Chandless, in support of the demurrer. The plea is clearly bad. The alteration is not stated to be made after the bill was accepted. In order to make the alteration available as a defence, it must be shown that the date of the bill was altered after it was accepted by the defendant. The allegation that the bill was altered whilst the bill was in full force and effect is uncertain and ambiguous. [LORD ABINGER, C. B. How could it be in force unless it was in circulation, and when an action could have been brought upon it ?] It may not be in force until it imposes some legal obligation, but such obligation may arise before the bill is accepted; it may have been drawn and indorsed over, so as to be binding upon some other party, before acceptance. If the date was altered after acceptance, the plea ought to have averred that fact. Calvert v. Baker 1 is an authority to show that this defence is admissible under a plea that the defendant did not accept the bill modo et forma [PARKE, B. That is no authority for saying that the alteration of a bill may not be pleaded as a defence in this form.] 14 M. & W. 417. The court were of opinion that the plea could not be sustained, and J. Henderson, who appeared in support of it, prayed leave to amend. PER CURIAM. You may have liberty to amend by stating the alteration to have been made after acceptance. Leave to amend accordingly. MORLEY v. CULVERWELL. A bill poid before dure is good if it c Into the b IN THE EXCHEQUER, MICHAELMAS TERM, 1840. [Reported in 7 Meeson & Welsby, 174.] ASSUMPSIT by indorsee against drawer of a bill of exchange for £100, dated 7th of March, 1840, drawn by the defendant on and accepted by Thomas G. C. Riley, payable to the order of the defendant three months after date; indorsed by the defendant to John Short, and by Short to the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded nine pleas, of which, however, the seventh and ninth only are material to this report. The seventh plea stated that, after the drawing and accepting of the bill of exchange in the declaration mentioned, and before the delivery of the same to the said T. G. C. Riley, before the same became due and payable, and before the commencement of this suit, and while the defendant, as such drawer as aforesaid, was the holder thereof, and entitled to sue upon the same, to wit, on the 20th of April, 1840, it was agreed between the defendant and Riley that he, Riley, should execute a certain indenture, and thereby assign by way of mortgage certain leasehold premises to the defendant, to secure the payment of a large sum of money, to wit, £853, part of which, to wit, the sum of £703, was theretofore lent and advanced by the defendant to Riley, and for part of which Riley, before the said 20th of April, 1840, gave to the defendant certain bills of exchange, drawn by the defendant on Riley, and accepted by him [stating four bills of exchange, one of which was the bill mentioned in the declaration]; and that the defendant should deliver up to Riley the said four bills of exchange, that is to say, the three bills of exchange in this plea mentioned, and the said bill of exchange in the declaration mentioned, as discharged and fully satisfied by the said T. G. C. Riley. 1 Taylor v. Mosely, 6 C. & P. 278; Ward v. Allen, 2 Met. 53, accord. Averment, that, in pursuance of the said agreement, the said mortgage was executed by Riley, and accepted and received by the defendant in discharge and satisfaction of the said four bills of exchange, and, thereupon, the said bills respectively were given up and delivered to Riley, as paid and fully satisfied by him, Riley, the acceptor thereof, and not for the purpose of being transferred, indorsed, or otherwise negotiated; that the said bill in the declaration mentioned was indorsed and delivered by Riley to Short, without any consideration or value for the same, and without any authority or sanction from the defendant, as drawer thereof, and that Short indorsed and delivered it to the plaintiff, without any consideration or value for the same, and the plaintiff now holds the same, without having given any considera tion or value for the same. Verification. The ninth plea stated that the said bill of exchange was and is an instrument or bill liable to the charges and duty imposed by the statute in such case made and provided, and that the said bill afterwards, and after the drawing and accepting thereof, and before the same became due, to wit, on, &c., was fully paid and satisfied by the said T. G. C. Riley, and was then, to wit, on, &c., and after the said bill had been so fully paid and satisfied by Riley, according to the statutes in such case made and provided, without any new stamp, or the payment of any rate or duty chargeable thereon, reissued by the said T. G. C. Riley. Verification. To each of these pleas the plaintiff replied de injuria, on which issue was joined. At the trial before Lord Abinger, C. B., at the last assizes for the county of Surrey, the delivery up of the bills by the defendant to Riley, the acceptor, on his executing a mortgage, was proved as stated in the seventh plea: it appeared also that Riley, before the bill in question became due, indorsed it to Short for a valuable consideration, 1 who also, before it became due, indorsed it for a valuable consideration to the plaintiff. It was not proved that the plaintiff had any knowl-¦ edge of the circumstances under which the bill had been negotiated by Riley. The learned Chief Baron thought that the seventh an ninth pleas were proved in substance, and directed a verdict on those issues for the defendant, leave being reserved to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for him, with £102 damages. Platt having obtained a rule nisi accordingly, Thesiger and Petersdorff showed cause. The question upon this rule is, not whether the pleas are or are not good in point of law, but whether they were proved in fact. The whole agreement stated in the seventh plea was proved, and that was sufficient to prevent the plaintiff from recovering. Here the acceptor, during the running of the bill, discharged and satisfied it by agreement with the drawer; and it could not afterwards be negotiated by the acceptor, so as to give a valid title to an indorsee. There is a distinction between the payment of a bill of exchange by a party primarily liable upon it, and payınent of it by any other party. If it be paid by the acceptor, it cannot afterwards be negotiated at all: if by another party to it, and if by negotiating it he would make subsequent parties liable upon it, he cannot negotiate it; otherwise he may. The agreement of the indorsers of a bill is that the acceptor shall pay it, or that they in his default shall do so. By his payment of it, that contract is fulfilled. There is no rule of law which says that it is to be paid by the acceptor at the precise moment when it becomes due. It is in that respect like a bond. Most of the cases on this subject were devided before, or without reference being made to the Stamp Act, 55 Geo. III. c. 184, § 19, which enacts that "all promissory notes, bills of exchange, drafts, or orders for money, not hereby allowed to be reissued, shall, upon the payment thereof, be deemed and taken respectively to be thereupon wholly discharged, vacated, and satisfied, and shall be no longer negotiable or available for any purpose whatever." In Burbridge v. Manners, it was held that a note which, before it became due, was paid and taken away from the banker's where it lay, and was indorsed, also before it became due, for valuable consideration to the plaintiff, might be recovered upon against the payee. The facts of that case, however, do not appear to be very intelligibly stated; and it was before the Stat. 55 Geo. III. c. 184. [ROLFE, B. The Stamp Act of the 48 Geo. III. c. 149, was then in operation; and the 55 Geo. III. c. 184, § 19, is in terms a re-enactment of the fourteenth section of that statute.] The true rule is laid down in Beck v. Robley and Callow v. Lawrence that a bill cannot be indorsed or negotiated after it has been paid, if such indorsement or negotiation would throw a liability on any of the parties who would otherwise be discharged. [LORD ABINGER, C. B. Those were cases where the bill was negotiated after it was due. PARKE, B. A bill may be negotiated ever after it is due, if no other person be made liable than before.] Here, however, it is clear that the transaction amounted to payment by the acceptor. He is not bound to wait until the bill becomes due before he pays it. Can he then afterwards negotiate it, so as to make the drawer liable? [PARKE, B. The condition of an indorser of a bill payable after date is this, that he is a surety for the payment of it by the acceptor at a particular time and place, on presentment for payment. If the acceptor pays the bill before it is due to a wrong party, he is not discharged. It has been so held in the case of a banker's check payable to beare: if the banker pays it before it is |