could suppose this was their charge. It has been clear that their task has been to get the Superport for Louisiana-by lobbying in Washington, by selling it to the people in the state, and by making just enough after-the-fact concessions to the environinentalists to avoid problems.

But the problems cannot be avoided. They are inherent in the very nature of the Superport proposals, which pose the single greatest threat to the integrity of the Gulf and of our wetlands. In my brief discussion of these my focus will be on Louisiana, but I would like to emphasize that the principles apply to all coastal regions. We are not just questioning a Superport for Louisiana, we are questioning whether any should be built at all. There is no such thing as "somebody else's environmental problem".

So we start with the supertankers steaming the oceans, and I know they are already with us. The decision that we would have them was not ours, nor did it emerge from even as representative a group as our Superport authority. It was made in corporate board rooms around the world and was purely economic-the so-called economies of scale. No doubt they are profitable for thse corporations, but the ecnomies and the profits have depended on letting the oceans absorb the environmental costs, which we shall all pay one day. The "boundless" oceans are very finite, and a recent survey by our Federal government disclosed a frightening level of pollution by oil, plastics, and chemicals down our entire east coast and into the Gulf. Marine biologists are genuinely concerned that we could pass a point of no return before we even realized what we had done.

Now move a major spill into the Gulf, or into Puget Sound, or near any coast. And let us be honest about this. With the numbers of tankers involved in any of the five cases projected in the Corps of Engineers report, there will be spills. We might also add the fact our own government continues to subsidize the construction of single-bottom tankers, instead of requiring the minimal safety feature of double bottoms. In an earlier report of January 8, 1973, the Corps has said that accidents involving as much as 2,250,000 barrels of oil could devestate the beaches of several states in the vicinity of the accident.

Then there is the impact of construction of offshore and onshore facilities. With even the most careful and environmentally concerned methods, there will be siltation, salt-water intrusion, and permanent loss of some of our rapidly disappearing wetlands.

But the initial facility is only the beginning, of course. All the economic dream-futures painted for us by the Superport proponents are predicated on immense industrial "spin-off" from the facility. At a minimum there would be a vast increase in refinery operations in the Baton-Rouge-New Orleansarea, up to more than a four-fold increase in Case IV of the Corps' current report. What would this mean? We can extrapolate from a quotation from the Corps, again in their January 8 report, dealing with a comparable situation in the North Atlantic region of our country.

"If the North Atlantic were to supply all of its projected growth for petroleum products for the year 2000, nearly ten times as much acreage would be required strictly for refineries, petrochemical plants, and storage facilities; the need for water supply would more than quadruple; biological oxygen demand produced by those plants would also quadruple and be equal to the raw sewage of more than 250,000 people, even assuming the refineries and petrochemical plants used the most advanced treatment techniques; and more than four times as many pounds per day of air pollutants would be emitted . . ."

Is the idea, perhaps, that Louisiana should absorb that kind of pollution, so the Northeast could get its oil without paying the environmental costs? But I would repeat my earlier statement- we all pay those costs.

Finally, when it is occasionally acknowledged that the petro-chemical industries are not labor-intensive, so that their proliferation would do little to solve the real employment needs of our population, we are offered the ultimate vision --a conversion of the lower Mississippi valley into the Ruhr of the United States.

At that point you can say goodbye to our wetlands-to the coastal marshes. the Atchafalaya basin, the proposed JeanLafitte Park. And what shall we have lost? We can start with a figure in the Corps report--that "in the period 1963-67 the average annual harvest of the major commercial fishes and shellfishes produced in Louisiana waters was 842 million pounds, with an average annual value of more than $43 million." This does not even mention recreational values, no the incalculable environmental values which constitute the real quality of life in Louisiana.

To engage in a debate over annual figures, however, would be to miss the main point. The benefits to be gained from our wetlands are there for all our

people and can be there for all future generations. They are self-renewing and non-polluting. Now we are being asked to jeapordize them for developments based on a finite resource the end of which is clearly in sight. (I might note that the power companies are particularly anxious to stress that the oil is running out when they press for rapid proliferatio nof nuclear plants.)

But what about the energy crisis? These cries would be more persuasive if our government, at any level, were showing the least attempt to deal realistically with the facts of a finite world. Our 6% of the world's population cannot continue to draw on all the resources of the world to sustain an exponential growth rate. To take just one shall example, 25% of our current energy use is for transportation, and the vast majority of that is for the private automobile, the most inefficient means we have for moving people in urban areas. Would you not suppose, then, that our representatives would be eager to support mass transit? But when recent legislation was introduced in Congress to allow urban areas to use their share of the Highway Trust Fund for mass transit, every member of the Louisiana congressional delegation voted against it. Energy crisis indeed.

Let us also remember that the energy being discussed is energy for Machines, presumably to do work to sustain and enhance human lives. The productivity of our marshlands and the viability of our oceans is a matter of energy for life itself. If our citizens face an energy crisis in the future, even the near future, we should notice that a majority of the people in the world already live with a protein crisis. Seafood is an essential source of high-quality protein, and it starts in the rich estuaries of the globe. There are very few of these, and we have one of the finest. Under these conditions, to ngage in a course of development which threatens these resources is humanly irresponsible.

It is always ominous and dramatic to be told that we may have to turn off the power-that we may not be able to run our eight cylinder monster at 70 m.p.h. as far as we wish, or to relax at 72 degrees no matter how hot it is outside. These things are no doubt pleasant, but we may look on them in a new light if we begin to pay their true environmental costs, instead of passing these on to another part of the world or another generation. Given any rational scale of values we may find that there are many things we can turn off rather than turning off a marsh, or the ocean, or life itself.

LOUISIANA SUPERPORT STUDIES, REPORT No. 1, PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS

(Center for Wetland Resources, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, La., August 1972.)

This work is a result of research sponsored in part by NOAA Office of Sea Grant, Department of Commerce, under Grant #2-35231. The U.S. Government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation that may appear hereon.

ENVIRONMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

The location, design, construction, operation, and future development of a proposed Superport facility along the Louisiana coast (Figure 1) depends on the best fit between social, economic, political and environmental considerations. In this preliminary evaluation we are concerned with identifying the most critical factors and organizing them in orler to facilitate further planning and analysis. This section of the report emphasizes environmental aspects of the problem. However, related land use and political and economical factors are also examined. Environmental problems must be considered in every phase of development--from site selection to facility operation. All probable stresses on natural and human environments, as well as constraints imposed on the project by environmental factors, must be evaluated.

Environmental stresses are defined as pressures on scenic and historic resources and on biological productivity of existing natural environments (i.e., drainage of a fisheries nursery area, destruction of an archeological site, or water pollution in an oyster growing area).

Environmental constraints are those factors related to existing environments which limit or preclude certain types of land use or development (i.e., flood prone areas or poor foundation conditions). The region also offers certain environmental opportunities. These are unique features of the coastal landscape which make it ideally suited fo ra specific kind of land use or development (i.e., natural levee ridges as highways right-of-ways, or barrier islands as recreation areas).

Our task then is to identify those stresses, constraints and opportunities relating to the proposed Superport and to show their disribution in the study area. In the analysis equal emphasis must also be given to those factors related to onshore support activities and transportation/utility links with onshore facilities.

Natural stresses associated with the offshore structure include: (1) dredging and other site preparation and construction activities, (2) maintenance dredging after the facility is in operation, (3) possible massive spills, and (4) possible operational leakages. Land links involving pipelines, utilities, and possible over-water highways introduce additional environmental problems. Social and cultural stresses associated with the offshore structure itself are probably limited to disruption of fishing activities. Primary constraints which enter into selection of the site are the (1) distance offshore to water depths of 100 feet, (2) sea-bottom foundation problems, and (3) vulnerability to storm generated surges and winds. Secondary constraints critical to facility design, contruction and operation are primarily intensity and temporal variation of fog, wind, currents, and waves. Density or spacing of existing offshore structures and the location of primary fishing grounds must also be considered in site selection. Secondary stresses imposed on onshore areas may well be more important than those associated with the offshore structure itself. For example, it is probable that support activities will require moving large numbers of people into flood-prone areas in the gulfward fringes of the coastal zone. Because land areas well-suited for urban and industrial development are extremely limited in this region, pressure to initiate wetland reclamation projects must be carefully monitored. Such projects encroach into areas of high biological productivity and very poor foundation conditions. Secondary onshore activities may thus produce stresses on the natural environment and social/economic burdens for people moving into the coastal zone. Social burdens include high risk to hurricane storm surge hazards, as well as drainage and foundation problems. Other stresses related to population increase in the gulfward fringes of the coastal zone include problems of sewage treatment, storm runoff removal, solid waste disposal, and a need for additional power-generating stations. Furthermore, the requirements for additional navigation channels to move cargo and supplies in an orderly fashion between the offshore structure and onshore support facilities may result in environmental damage. Routing of pipelines and utilities through estuarine areas between the offshore platform and onshore support facilities may also create major environmental problems.

II. MAJOR FACTORS RELATED TO SITE SELECTION

Bathymetry and Legal Jurisdictions

One of the most important constraints for locating a major offshore structure is the distance to deep water. Figure 2 (omitted this copy) depicts the bathymetry of the Louisiana continental margin and location of the 3-mile and 12mile lines, represening aspects of state and federal jurisdictions. From the map it is readily apparent that the most favorable locations for an offshore port are in southeastern Louisiana where deep water is reasonably close to the shore and where it lies within the legal jurisdiction of the United States. For this reason it seems that areas east of about 90° 15' W longitude should receive primary considerations.

Current and Circulation Patterns

Although currents and water circulation in the vicinity of the Louisiana coast are complex and have not been studied in detail, a map of the general pattern has been compiled from various published and unpublished sources. As shown in Figure 3, the circulation pattern presents both opportunities and constraints for various site locations. On the one hand the westward drift of the Mississippi River effluent plume would provide a natural flushing mechanism if a spill were to occur at some location immediately south or west of the delta. On the other hand, there would be a high risk to the Breton Sound seed oyster and estuary areas if the facility were located on the east side of the delta. Conditions would in general be unfavorable in the summer and autumn during coinciding low water stage and prevailing southeast winds. Slope and Foundation Conditions

26-400 O 74 pt. 2 10

From the standpoint of water depth, legal jurisdiction and proximity to inland waterways, the most logical location for the proposed Superport facility is in the lower delta near South or Southwest passes. Unfortunately, relatively steep sea bed slopes and very poor foundation conditions of this area present major engineering problems.

One indication of foundation instability is the occurrence of mudlumps in the vicinity of active Mississippi River distributary mouths (Figure 4). Detailed studies indicated that mudlumps are actually surface expressions of massive subsurface diapiric folds an dthrust faults resulting from deposition of thick localized masses of heavier bar sediments directly upon lighter, plastic clays. These mudlumps are found in the immediate vicinity of active distributary mouths where sediment deposition is rapid. Fold amplitudes of 500 feet and vertical displacement in excess of 350 feet have been documented at South Pass (Morgan et al., 1963). Areas of known mudlump occurrence define a 45 mile long arc extending from Pass a Loutre to Southwest Pass (Figure 4).

A second and related type of instability involves massive submarine slumping along the upper slope of the delta platform (Figure 5). Such sea floor slides, occurring in the poorly consolidated delta front an dprodelta clays, are believed initiated by wave generated vertical differential pressures acting on the bottom. As a result of this process a number of pipelines have been broken and drilling platforms toppled. The best documented cases occurred in South Pass Block 70 during the passage of Hurricane Camille. Storm waves initiated a massive seafloor slide and two platforms (in 320 and 325 feet of water) were toppled and displaced (Bea, 1971). A number of similar accidents have been reported in the lower delta. It thus appears that a zone of instability and very poor foundation conditions extends outward from the muclump area to water depths of about 400 feet. This area should not be completely ruled out as a possible port site; however, foundation conditions are generally very poor.

Possible Sites in the Vicinity of the Lower Delta