HYMN.

Written for the Christmas Festival of the Oaklands' School on St. Helena Island, S. C.

BY JOHN G. WHITTIER.

Он, none were ever glad before
In all the world as we!
We're free on Carolina's shore,

We're all at home and free!

Come, Helper of the weak and poor!
Who suffered for our sake,
To open every prison door

And every yoke to break!

Bend low Thy gentle face and mild

And help us sing and pray;
Thy hand that blessed the little child
Upon our foreheads lay.

Draw near and give us as we need
Thy truth that maketh free,
And bless us while we learn to read
The Book that tells of Thee.

We hear no more the driver's horn,
No more the whip we fear;
This blessed day that saw Thee born
Was never half so dear.

The very oaks are greener clad,
The waters brighter smile;
Oh, never shone a day so glad
On sweet St. Helen's Isle !

We praise Thee in our songs to-day,
To Thee in prayer we call;
Make swift the feet and straight the way
Of freedom unto all!

Come, quickly come, thou gracious Lord!
Come walking on the sea,
And let the mainlands hear the word
That makes the islands free!

COME, SUNSHINE, COME!

TRANSLATED BY THE EDITOR OF THE "WINE PRESS,"
FROM THE FRENCH OF CHARLES VINCENT.

COME, sunshine, come! thee Nature calls!
Give to the grape its vermeil hue,
Dispel the frost, the clouds, the storm,
Come sunshine, come! the year renew!
The grain lies dormant in the soil,

The bird sings from the withered tree,
The frost-bound brook, the buried flowers,
Tarry, and watch, and wish for thee.
Come, sunshine, come! the torpid Earth
Beneath thy kisses will awake;
Her cheeks' own blush shall truly tell-
She loves thee for her own love's sake.

Lo, at the opened sash, the Poor!

Waiting for thee, their being's sumCold their abode and scant their storeCome and relieve them, sunshine, come! Mountain and vale and desert waste,

Prairie and wood and sea-bound isle,

Blue-bird, robin, happy bob'link,
Shall we see you soon again,
Hear your notes from morn to even,
O'er the hill-tops, in the glen?

Will the trees be clothed with verdure
Will the air be mild and sweet-
Will the grass be green and lovely,
Spring up gayly at our feet?

Shall we see in all the meadows,
Clusters of blue violets gleam?
Shall we go to hunt for lilies,

Close beside the mountain stream?

Spring is coming; friends are coming,
Well-known voices we shall hear,
When the breeze of May is humming,
While the waters ripple clear,

They are coming-not all coming!

Is there one, whose fast-shut eyes Will not open with the blossoms,

Will not smile upon the skies?

Is she hid beneath the snowdrop?
Shall we hear her voice no more,
When her playmates gather round us,
Here beside the open door?

Yet, believe me, she is coming,
As the crocus from the clod,
She will waken up to beauty,
When she feels the touch of God.
Ah, then, with tears of sorrow,

Should we dim these smiling skies,
Since we know some glad to-morrow,
Will restore her to our eyes?
Spring is coming; let us hasten

All its loveliness to greet, With our hearts as bright and springing As the grass beneath our feet. Fair memorial of Eden,

By our race so long deplored; Brightest shadow of that heaven, By the cross to be restored.

With the yearning of affection,

We have watched thy coming long ; Blessed type of resurrection,

Be thou welcomed with a song.

-Boston Recorder.

From The N. Y. Evening Post, 14 April. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 AND 1863.

ARE WE ON THE RIGHT TRACK?

ON the 17th of September last we took some notice of a remarkable though very unpretending volume, entitled "Summary of the Art of War," by Emil Schalk-published by Messrs. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia. In that volume, which was published in the spring of 1862, Mr. Schalk discussed the probable course and results of the campaign, then but just opening, and foretold, with singular accuracy, the leading events, especially of the operations against Richmond, going so far even as to point out then-six or eight months before it happened -the rebel invasion of Maryland.

Mr. Schalk is no conjurer; but he seems to have studied very thoroughly the rules and laws on which is founded the art of war; and in applying these rules to the facts and movements going on before all our faces, he was able to see what were the almost inevi

table results.

That an observer should be able to tell us

in February of an event most unlikely to happen, but which nevertheless did occur in September, and that he should prove to us why it would happen, and that it was the sure result of the breach of certain laws and rules of the military art, is sufficient to prove, not only that there are such rules and laws, but that to violate them is most dangerous, even to a power so much stronger than its opponent as we are stronger than the rebels. Mr. Schalk has just issued (by Messrs. Lippincott & Co.) a second volume, a discussion of the "Campaigns of 1862 and 1863, Illustrating the Principles of Strategy," in which he criticises and discusses at greater length the unfortunate campaign of last year; and points out, in a separate and most interesting chapter, the inevitably disastrous results of pursuing, during the present year as we seem at present to be doing a plan similar, if not identical, with that which brought defeat to our arms, as a general result, in 1862.

Our author recites three great principles which may be laid down as belonging to the entire science of war. They are :

"1. To concentrate all disposable forces, and to act with the whole of them against a part only of the enemy's forces.

"2. To act against the weakest part of the enemy; against his centre if his forces be not united, and against his flank or rear, if they be concentrated. Also, to act against his communications without endangering our own.

"3. Whatever plan of operations has been decided on, it should be executed with

the utmost promptness, so that the object may be attained before the enemy can prevent it."

He is of opinion that we have violated, more or less, all three of these fundamental principles.

As to the nature or character of our war, he remarks very justly :

"We have said above that, according as the war is national, or merely governmental, as regards the invaded country, so the operations and especially the mode of occupying the country, have to be different. In the present case, though perhaps as regards the South, the war may be called national, there is no danger of such effects or results as generally attend national uprisings, because the whole male population able to bear arms is already enrolled in the regular armies; and the country being thus stripped of its defenders is void of all material for resistance, except where those armies happen to be. Occupation becomes, therefore, a secondary affair; and our main object should be the mies. This successfully accomplished, and destruction or breaking up of the rebel arall resistance thereby destroyed, the downfall of the Confederate Government becomes a matter of course, as well as the surrender and occupation of the Southern towns and sea-ports.

"Three systems," he says, "have been country. The first is to march several armies principally employed for the conquest of a from the circumference into the centre of a country; the second, is to conquer by subduing and occupying one province after another; the third, is by marching one large force, on a single line of operation, right into the centre of a country, and when arrived there, spreading it out in all directions, like a fan, forming interior lines, dividing thereby the enemy, and forcing him to act on exterior lines. It is the very inverse of the first system.

"Grand operations in accordance with the geography of the theatre of war and those maxims which we have laid down as the third system,' will alone be able to bring about the destruction or breaking up of the rebel armies, an object which must be accom|plished before attempting anything else."

"Success is in the legs of the soldier,' was the saying of Marshal Saxe; and if this be true for every kind of war, it is more especially so for great wars of conquest. Movement, continued, rapid movement, is the secret for obtaining success; and what soldiers can accomplish in that.respect may be seen in the campaigns of 1805, 1809, 1812, and

1814, etc.

"In 1805, Napoleon's army was at Boulogne for the grand expedition against England, when the war with Austria broke out. Napoleon marched his army to Ulm, thence to Vienna, and thence to Austerlitz, making a total distance of three hundred and thirtythree leagues, or one thousand miles. From Boulogne to Vienna, nine hundred miles, was one continuous march. In 1809, Napoleon's guard was in Spain, at Madrid and Valencia. When Napoleon was obliged to make preparations for the Austrian war, his guard marched, in nearly one continuous route from Madrid to Vienna, a distance of not less than six hundred and sixty-six leagues, or two thousand miles. In 1812, the army marched from the Rhine to Moscow, a distance of six hundred leagues, or eighteen hundred miles-equal to the distance between Washington and Galveston, in Texas."

He remarks of the system which has been pursued in supplying our armies :

"It is scarcely necessary to remark that, in consequence of the slow marching and the frequent halts, in order to maintain the supply of provisions, the enemy gains ample time to prevent the success of any plan of operation, not to mention the inducement which such large wagon trains offer for cavalry raids in the rear of the army. Do away with this system of feeding the troops, and movement will become a necessity; the most advantagethere is no stoppage, except by the enemy; but ous strategic lines of operation can be chosen ; this resistence is, under such circumstances, such as a general would desire. In other words, all that is impossible when following the old system becomes possible with the new. Where two men can plant their feet, an army can march. Nothing but a good administration or organization for collecting the provisions and paying for them is required. Based of its immense wagon trains, an army in this on such a system of living, and freed of part teen to eighteen miles with ease. country may march on an average from seven

IMPORTANCE OF THE MOUNTAIN DISTRICTS.

"I do not wish to advocate here a system of great and legally organized robbery, which takes from the countryman all he has without any indenmification. I advocate only a reasonable and well-organized system of requisition, paying liberally for all it obtains, but furnishing the army with all the principal provisions from the country through which it passes. The greater the distance an army marches in one day, the more plentifully it may be supplied.

All wars of invasion or conquest from the earliest times down to the most modernfrom the Romans to Napoleon-were based upon and rendered possible by this principle

Mississippi; the centre, lying between the Mississippi and the mountains; and the left, between the mountains and the seaboard. The last he esteems the chief, on which the principal operations will be conducted, and he regards the right flank of the left zone as the true field of grand operations.

"The army operating in the centre zone will be secondary to that of the left zone, and should only serve as a kind of diversion.

66

Comparing what has been said, under the the head of Base of Operation,' fig. 1, with the left zone, we shall find that it exactly corresponds with the case stated there: ab would represent the Potomac: bd, the Atlantic Ocean: ac, the mountain chain, or the frontier of Western Virginia: and cd, the Savannah. If we succeed in placing our army along a c, we should be able to act or take hold at any moment of the communications of the army A, which has for its only retreat the line c d, or the Savannah. The very moment a rebel army permits a Union army to act from the mountain district against its communications, or, what is better, to take hold of them so as to force it to fight, form

ing its line of battle parallel with the sea, and facing the Blue Ridge- that is, forming its line of battle parallel with its natural line of retreat to the Savannah-this rebel army, in case of defeat, will not only be beaten, but, by a rapid pursuit, will be obliged to surrender, as it will be thrown back in the direction of the ocean, an obstacle which soon stops all further retreat.

The possession of the mountain district is, therefore, for the holding of the left zone a necessity; and still better, it is a necessity for the possession of the whole theatre of war. In fact, this chain of mountains is like a wedge driven from the North right into the very heart of the theatre of war. It is the only elevated part of it, and dominates it in all directions. It is like a bulwark, or, better still, like the citadel of a large fortress, of which the walls are formed by the parallel ridges, the ditches by the rapid streams in the valley, and the doors by the gaps.

"Take the whole fortress - that is, the whole South-but leave this citidel untouched, and it will be the same as if nothing had been taken. In these mountains the Southern armies can rally; and, as by their occupation they maintain a decidedly central position, combined with the facility of debouching in any place, they can throw themselves, with their whole force, on all the surrounding fragments of our armies, and beat them in detail."

We have not space for the details of a campaign which he lays out, in which an army marching through the valley of Virginia, and another meeting it from the upper Ohio, would join in Southern Virginia, and menace the Southern army. He says of the results of this grand movement, however :

He expresses the opinion that the campaign, or rather the plan of the campaign (of 1862), had some resemblance to the invasion of France in 1793. "The result was partly like that of this invasion, and would have been still more so, had the rebels taken a lesson from Carnot, and followed from the first his plan of defence."

We have not space, for a condensation even, of his analysis of the campaign of 1862, in which he shows that our defeat was certain from the moment the plan was made, and

would have been more fatal had the rebels not also made blunders. We wish to take notice of the last chapter of his book, in which he discusses the campaign of 1863 :–

"In passing in review the campaign of 1862, we have seen how a wrong general plan, a division of force, a choice of indecisive lines of operation, led to insignificant results, and even reverses. The campaign of 1863 opens for the Union forces without any change in the general plan of operations; it is but the continuation of the campaign of 1862. The capture of Richmond, and the opening of the Mississippi, seem still to be the main objects to be obtained by the Eastern and Western Union armies.

"A wrong general plan of operation will lead to bad or insignificant results if the counter-plan be correct, whatever the minor or detailed operations may be. In the plan of 1863, probably these latter will be different from those of 1862; but nevertheless the result ought to be the same.

A long study of military history has led me to the conviction that great decisive results can only be obtained by a thoroughly correct action, especially in a case like ours, where the adversary is a skilful one, and understands the great rules of war himself, and, what is of more importance, knows how to apply them.

"The campaign of 1862, as well as that of 1863, are conducted on a great number of lines of operation, and consequently on wrong principles. Moreover, the general plan of operation being wrong, the objects which are to be attained by the different armies are such that, even were the plan of operation right, nothing decisive could be achieved."

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1863.

He thereupon endeavors to depict the features of a campaign in which the rebels, acting on right principles, oppose, and successfully, our wrong plans. He gives the Gov

ernment armies 650,000 men, and the rebels 330,000.

"Correct, but audacious, and perhaps even somewhat adventurous, operations by the rebels alone can obtain them brilliant successes; and the war, as we understand it, on the part of the South, is that of Napoleon's campaign in 1796, only on a larger scale. Giving up everything, except the place where the army stands; concentrating their entire force on the decisive point; being victorious blows, not only what has been lost, but more there, and gaining, by a few well-directed too, is the lesson we may derive from this campaign.

"The object of the South in making war