on the prisoner's part is evidence as to character, though the counsel for the prosecution is in strictness entitled to a reply, it is not usual to exercise it except in extreme cases. See R. v. Stannard, 7 C. & P. 673: R. v. Whiting, Id. 771. (See ante, p. 95).

[ *166 ]

*When, in cross-examining a witness, you shew him a letter, and he admits it to be of his handwriting, the ordinary course is to have the letter read as part of your evidence, after you have opened your case. But if it become necessary to have the letter read, in order to found certain questions with relation to the contents of the letter to be propounded to the witness, the court, upon application, will allow the letter to be read at the time of the cross-examination, subject, of course, to the consequences of the letter being considered as part of your evidence. The Queen's case, 2 B. & B. 288. If a witness refresh his memory from entries in a book, the opposite counsel may cross-examine on those entries, without making them his evidence, and the jury may see them if they think fit; but, if the opposite counsel cross-examine as to other entries in the same book, he makes them his evidence. Gregory v. Taverner, 6 C. & P. 281. If the cross-examining counsel put a paper into the witness's hands, and put questions on it, and anything comes of those ques- • tions the opposite counsel has a right to see the paper and cross-examine on it; but, if the cross-examination founded on the paper entirely fails, and nothing comes of it, the opposite counsel cannot demand to see the paper. Reg. v. Duncombe, 8 C. & P. 369. As to cross-examining on the depositions, see ante, p. 152.

If upon the trial of on indictment, it appear, upon cross-examination of one of the witnesses for the prosecution, that J. S. was employed by the prosecutor for the purpose of procuring and examining evidence and witnesses in support of the indictment, the defendant cannot give evidence of J. S.'s having offered a bribe to a certain person, to induce him to give evidence touching the matter of the indictment, unless such person have been examined as a witness. The Queen's case, 2 B. & B. 302.

It may be necessary to mention, that, if, upon the trail of an indictment, the defendant himself address the jury, he will not be entitled to crossexamine the witnesses; but counsel may argue points of law, and suggest questions to be put to the witnesses. R. v. White, 3 Camp. 98: R. v. Parkins, Ry. & M. N. P. 166. If the prisoner's counsel has addressed the jury, the prisoner himself will not be allowed to address them too; R. v. Boucher, 8 C. & P. 141: Reg. v. Rider, 1d. 539: Reg. v. Burrows, 2 M. & Rob. 124; though it has been permitted in very peculiar cases. See Reg. v. Malings, S C. & P. 242: Reg. v. Walkling, Id. 243. And the counsel for the prisoner cannot be permitted to state the prisoner's account of the transaction, which he is not in a situation to support by evidence. R. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 142: Reg. v. Butcher, 2 M. & Rob. 229.

Re-examination.]-If any new fact arise out of the cross-examination, the witness may be examined as to it by the counsel who first examined him. In the same manner he may be re-examined when necessary, in order to explain any part of his cross-examination. In The Queen's case it was holden, that, if a witness, upon his cross-examination, admit his having used certain expressions in a conversation with a person not a party to the cause, the opposite counsel, in re-examining the witness, is confined to such questions as may elicit the meaning of the expressions, and the motives of the witness for using them. But where a witness deposes to certain expressions *being used by a party [ *167 ] to the cause, the counsel for that party is entitled to re-examine the witness as to the whole of the conversation in which the expressions occurred; because the expressions are given in evidence in such a case, as an admission of the party, and the whole of his admission should be taken together. 2 B. & B. 294. If a witness whose name is on the back of the indictment be called merely to allow the prisoner to cross-examine him, any question put by the prosecutor's counsel afterwards must be considered as a re-examination, and nothing can be asked which does not arise out of the cross-examination. R. v. Beezley, 4 C. & P. 220.

26

7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 2.-Distinction between Grand and Petit Lar ceny abolished.]-Enacts, that the distinction between grand larceny and petty larceny shall be abolished; and every larceny, whatever be the value of the property stolen, shall be deemed to be of the same nature, and shall be subject to the same incidents in all respects, as grand larceny was before the commencement of this act; and every court, whose power as to the trial of larceny, was before the commencement of this act, limited to petty larceny, shall have power to try every case of larceny, the punishment of which cannot exceed the punishment hereinafter mentioned for simple larceny, and also to try all accessaries to such larceny.

Sect. 3.-Punishment for Simple Larceny]—Enacts, that every person convicted of simple larceny, or of any felony hereby made punishable like simple larceny, shall (except in the cases hereinafter otherwise provided for) be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be trans

ported beyond the seas for the term of seven years or to be [ *169 ] imprisoned for any term not exeeeding two years, and, if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice, publicly or privately whipped, (if the court shall so think fit), in addition to such imprisonment.

Sect. 4.-Place and Mode of Imprisonment for Larcenies, &c.]— With regard to the place and mode of imprisonment for all indictable offences punishable under this act, enacts, that, where any person shall be convicted of any felony or misdemeanor punishable under this act, for which imprisonment may be awarded, it shall be lawful for the court to sentence the offender to be imprisoned, or to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour in the common gaol or house of correction; and also to direct that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for the whole (see 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 90. s. 5, infra) or any portion or portions of such imprisonment or of such imprisonment with hard labour as to the court in its discretion shall seem meet.

7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5.-Solitary Confinement.]—Enacts, that, from and after the 1st day of October, 1837, it shall not be lawful for any court to direct that any offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any longer period than one month at a time, or than three months in the space of one year. [By the Prisons Regulation Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 56, s. 4, the separate confinement provided for by that act is not to be deemed solitary confinement, within the meaning of any act forbidding solitary confinement for more than a limited time.]

7 & 8 G. 4, c. 28, s. 10.-Where the Convict is under a previous Sentence.]-Enacts, that, wherever sentence shall be passed for felony on a person already imprisoned under sentence for another crime, it shall be lawful for the court to award imprisonment for the subsequent offence, to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which such person shall have been previously sentenced; and where such person shall be already under sentence, either of imprisonment or of transportation, the court, if empowered to pass sentence of transportation, may award such sentence for the subsequent offence to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment or transportation to which such person shall have been previously sentenced, although the aggregate term of imprisonment or transportation respectively may exceed the term for which either of those punishments could be otherwise awarded.

Indictment.

MIDDLESEX, to wit: The jurors for our lady the Queen upon their oath present, that J. S., late of the parish of B., in the county of M., labourer, on the third day of August, in the ninth year of the reign of our sovereign lady Victoria, [or in the year of our lord], at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, [three pairs of shoes, of the value of twelve shillings, one shirt, of the value of four shillings, and one waistcoat, of the value of seven shillings], of the goods and chattels of one J. N., then and there being found, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away: against the peace of our lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

Felony, transportation for seven years, or imprisonment not [ *170] exceeding *two years, (with or without hard labour for the whole or any part of the imprisonment, and with or without solitary confinement 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 4; such confinement not exceeding one month at any one time, nor three months in any one year; 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5); and, if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped, in addition to the imprisonment, if the court shall think fit. 7 & S G. 4, c. 29, s. 3.

If the defendant be already under sentence of transportation or imprisonment for another crime, the court may award the transportation or imprisonment for every subsequent felony to commence at the expiration of the transportation or imprisonment to which the prisoner was previously sentenced. 7 & 8 G. 4. c. 28, s. 10. [This enactment is applicable to all felonies, but will not be repeated after each sentence in the subsequent pages of this book.]

Evidence.

J. S. late of, &c.]—It is immaterial whether this be the correct name and addition of the defendant or not; if he do not plead the misnomer or wrong addition in abatement, he waives all objection to the indictment for any error in this respect. The prosecutor has only to prove that the defendant is the person who actually committed the offence; which is done either by identifying him as the party who committed it, or by circumstantial evidence. (See ante, p. 122).

On the third Day of August, &c.]—The time and place here stated need not be proved as laid: if the offence be proved to have been committed at any time before or after, provided it be some day before the finding of the indictment, (ante, pp. 40, 96) or at any other place, provided it be within the county, or other extent of the court's jurisdiction, (ante, pp. 40, 97), it will be sufficient. Or if it be proved that the larceny was actually committed by the defendant in another county, or in another part