of religious evidence. The principal objections suggested by Rationalism are of the former kind; common to all human thinking as such, and therefore to Rationalism itself. - Proof of this position by the exhibition of parallel difficulties in Theology and Philosophy. Our ignorance of the nature of God compared with our ignorance of the nature of Causation.-Doctrine of the Trinity compared with the philosophical conception of the Infinite and the Absolute, as one and yet as many. - Doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son compared with the relation of an Infinite Sub stance to its Attributes. - Purpose of such comparisons, not to prove the doctrines, but to show the weakness of human reason with regard to them true evidence of the doctrines to be found, not ' in Reason, but in Revelation. Further parallels. Doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ compared with the philosophical conception of the Infinite as coëxisting with the Finite.-Reason thus shown not to be the supreme judge of religious truth; for Religion must begin with that which is above Reason. Extension of the same argument to our conceptions of Divine Providence. — Representations of General Law and Special Interposition supposed difficulty in the conception of the latter shown to be really common to all human conceptions of the Infinite. Both representations equally imperfect as speculative truths, and both equally necessary as regulative. - Imperfections in the conception of General Law and mechanical action of the universe - this conception is neither philosophically necessary nor empirically universal; and hence it is not entitled to supersede all other representations it is inapplicable to the phenomena of mind, and only partially available in relation to those of matter. - Conception of Miraculous Agency, as subordinate to that of Special Providence - no sufficient ground, either from philosophy or from experience, for asserting that miracles are impossible. - Comparison between the opposite conceptions of a miracle, as an exception to a law, or as

the result of a higher law-both these conceptions are specula
tively imperfect, but the former is preferable as a regulative truth.
- Summary of Conclusions — parallel difficulties must exist in The-
ology and in Philosophy-true value and province of Reason in re-
lation to both,
158

-

-

LECTURE VII.

-

Philosophical parallel continued with regard to the supposed moral
objections to Christian doctrines. - Error of the moral theory of
Kant. Moral convictions how far necessary and trustworthy, how
far contingent and fallible-parallel in this respect between moral
and mathematical science, as based on the formal conditions of ex-
perience — possibility of corresponding errors in both. - Human mo-
rality not absolute, but relative. The Moral Law cannot be con-
ceived as an absolute principle, apart from its temporal manifesta-
tions - parallel in the idea of Time and its relations. - Morality,
as conceived by us, necessarily contains a human and positive ele-
ment; and therefore cannot be the measure of the Absolute Nature
of God. Application of the above principles to Christian Theology.
The Atonement - weakness of the supposed moral objections to
this doctrine-such objections equally applicable to any conceivable
scheme of Divine Providence. - Predestination and Free Will - Pre-

-

destination, as a determination of the Absolute Mind, is specu-
latively inconceivable, and therefore cannot be known to be incom-
patible with human Freedom - parallel in this respect between Pre-
destination in Theology and Causation in Philosophy. - Eternal Pun-
ishment-rashness and ignorance of rationalist criticisms of this
the difficulties of the doctrine are not peculiar to Theol-
ogy, but common to all Philosophy, and belong to the general

doctrine

-

problem of the existence of Evil at all, which is itself but a subor-

dinate case of the universal impossibility of conceiving the coëxist-

ence of the Infinite with the Finite. Contrast between illegitimate

and legitimate mode of reasoning on evil and its punishment-

illustrations to be derived from analogies in the course of nature

and in the constitution of the human mind. - Extension of the

argument from analogy to other religious doctrines - Original Sin

- Justification by Faith-Operation of Divine Grace.-Limits of

the Moral Reason. Conclusion,

-

182

LECTURE VIII.

-

Right use of Reason in religious questions Reason entitled to judge
of a Religion in respect of its evidences, as addressed to men, but
not in respect of its correspondence with philosophical conceptions
of the Absolute Nature of God. No one faculty of the human
mind is entitled to exclusive preference as the criterion of religious
truth the true criterion is to be found in the general result of
many and various Evidences-practical neglect of this rule by dif
ferent writers. Comparative value of internal and external evi-
dences of religion, the former as negative, the latter as positive. -
Cautions as requisite in the use of the negative argument from in-
ternal evidence-external and internal evidence can only be esti-
mated in conjunction with each other. Distinction between the
proper and improper use of the Moral Sense in questions of relig-
ious evidence. - Application of this distinction to facts recorded in
Sacred History. - Analogy between physical and moral laws as re-
gards miraculous interventions. - Probable and partial character of
the moral argument; error of supposing it to be demonstrative
and complete; possibility of mistakes in its application.- General

- Specu

anal

summary of Christian Evidences - alternative in the case of their rejection - Christ's teaching either wholly divine or wholly human. - Impossibility of an eclectic Christianity. - Value of the a priori presumption against miracles nothing gained in point of probability by a partial rejection of the supernatural. - Christianity regarded as a Revelation must be accepted wholly or not at all. lative difficulties in religion form a part of our probation ogy between moral and intellectual temptations.- General result of an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought-Theology not a speculative science, nor in the course of progressive developCautions needed in the treatment of religious knowledge as regulative-this view does not solve difficulties, but only shows why they are insoluble. Instance of the neglect of this caution in Archbishop King's rule of scripture interpretation as regards the Divine Attributes. No explanation possible of those difficulties which arise from the universal laws of human thought—such difficulties are inherent in our mental constitution, and form part of our training and discipline during this life.. The office of Philosophy is not to give us a knowledge of the absolute nature of God, but to teach us to know ourselves and the limits of our faculties.- Conclusion, . 204

ment.

THE

LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

EXAMINED.

LECTURE I.

UNTO

YE SHALL NOT ADD
THE WORD WHICH I COMMAND YOU,
NEITHER SHALL YE DIMINISH AUGHT FROM IT.- DEUT. IV. 2.

DOGMATISM and Rationalism are the two extremes between which religious philosophy perpetually oscillates. Each represents a system from which, when nakedly and openly announced, the well regulated mind almost instinc-. tively shrinks back; yet which, in some more or less specious disguise, will be found to underlie the antagonist positions of many a theological controversy. Many a man who rejects isolated portions of Christian doctrine, on the ground that they are repugnant to his reason, would hesitate to avow broadly and unconditionally that reason is the supreme arbiter of all religious truth; though at the same time he would find it hard to point out any particular in which the position of reason, in relation to the truths which he still retains, differs from that which it occupies in relation to those which he rejects. And on the other hand, there are many who, while they would by no means construct a dogmatic system on the assumption that the conclusions of reason may always be