proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.) South Carolina.-Tisdale v. Kingman, 34 S. C., 326; s. c. 13 S. E. Rep., 547. (Demurrer sustained on the ground that complaint did not show that the alleged malicious prosecution terminated in plaintiff's favor.) Wisconsin.-King v. Johnston (Weed), Wisconsin, 1892, 51 N. W. Rep., 1011. (Complaint held demurrable which failed to show that the criminal action had been determined.) Lawrence v. Cleary, 88 Wis., 473; s. c. 60 N. W. Rep., 793. (Petition held demurrable which showed that plaintiff pleaded guilty in the criminal action, and did not allege anything to show that the judgment therein was procured by defendant's fraud.) (3) Damages, etc. New York.-Cumber v. Schoenfeld, 34 N. Y. St. Rep., 770; s. c. 12 N. Y. Supp., 282. (A complaint seeking to recover for malicious prosecution only, held not amendable so as to allow for recovery for false imprisonment.) South Dakota.-Jackson v. Bell, South Dakota, 1894, 58 N. W. Rep., 671. (Held, that plaintiff is entitled to recover for injury to his feelings without specially pleading such injury, where it appears to be the ordinary and natural consequence of the acts set out in the complaint and proved without objection at the trial.) COMPLAINTS IN ACTIONS FOR LIBEL OR SLANDER. [Principal Case, p. 251, this Vol.] (1) Extrinsic facts, inducement, averment, colloquium, etc. (2) Publication, utterance, etc. (3) The defamatory words. (4) Innuendo. (5) The falsity of the words or publication, malice, etc. (1) Extrinsic facts, inducement, averment, colloquium, etc. California.-Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal., 59; s. c. 28 Pac. Rep., 845. (Demurrer properly overruled, to a complaint alleging that defendant in the presence and hearing of divers persons "spake the following words of and concerning plaintiff: 'She is a damned thief,'" though there was no averment that the words were understood by those who heard them to refer to plaintiff.) Colorado.-Craig v. Pueblo Press Co., Colo. App., 1894, 37 Pac. Rep., 945. (It seems, that even where the person against whom a libelous charge is made is so ambiguously described, that without aid of extrinsic facts his identity cannot be ascertained, it is sufficient to allege generally, that it was published concerning plaintiff, without other averment to connect him with the libel.) Georgia.-Hardy v. Williamson, 86 Ga., 551; s. c. 12 S. E. Rep., 874. (Complaint held not demurrable, though the defamatory words set out therein referred only to a class of persons to which plaintiff belonged, where it was alleged that the words referred to plaintiff.) Illinois.-Doan v. Kelley, 121 Ill., 413; s. c. 23 N. E. Rep., 266. (Allegation that a publication referring to Louise K., was published concerning the plaintiff, is sufficient, though plaintiff sues as Laney K.) McLaughlin v. Fisher, Ill., 1890, 24 N. E. Rep., 60. (If the words alleged to have been spoken are not slanderous per se, they cannot be made so by an innuendo, where the extrinsic facts rendering the words slanderous have not been alleged by the way of inducement.) Indiana.Emig v. Daum, 1 Ind. App., 146; s. c. 27 N. E. Rep., 322. (Demurrer sustained on the ground that the alleged words spoken were not properly connected by a colloquium with the facts necessary to make them slanderous, and that such facts could not be supplied by the way of innuendo.) Casand v. Lee, Ind. App., 1894, 38 N. E. Rep., 1099. (Where the alleged slanderous words are capable of conveying the meaning claimed for them, and also equally capable of conveying some other, and innocent meaning, it should not only be shown by innuendo that the words were spoken in a slanderous sense, but it should also be alleged that they were also understood in that sense.) Kentucky.-Hargan v. Purdy, 93 Ky., 424 ; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep., 432. (Complaint held demurrable where the alleged libel concerned plaintiff as a physician and the petition showed that he had no authority to practice medicine within the State.) Maryland.— Huffer v. Miller, 74 Md., 454; s. c. 22 Atl. Rep., 205. (Declaration held not demurrable which alleged the defamatory words to be, that plaintiff "swore to damn lies before Justice B., and that was the reason he [plaintiff] was acquitted," although it was not set forth in the colloquium that the words were spoken of plaintiff in connection with his trial before the justice named.) Massachusetts.-Clarke v. Zettick, 153 Mass., 1; s. c. 26 N. E. Rep., 234. (Demurrer overruled, where declaration alleged sufficient extrinsic facts from which it might be inferred that by the alleged words spoken a charge of forgery was intended; since, under Pub. St. C. 167, sec. 91, it was unnecessary, if not improper, to expressly allege by the way of innuendo, that the defendant meant that plaintiff had committed forgery.) Michigan.-Simons v. Burnham, Michigan, 1894, 60 N. W. Rep., 476. (An innuendo cannot impute to unambiguous words a meaning different from their ordinary import, where there is nothing alleged by the way of inducement to show that they were used and intended to be understood in any other than their ordinary sense.) Minnesota.-Glatz v. Theim, 47 Minn., 278; s. c. 50 N. W. Rep., 127. (Demurrer overruled, where allegations were sufficient to show that the language employed by defendant, although apparently harmless, was intended to have a covert libelous meaning, and was so understood.) Carlson v. Minn. Tribune Co., 47 Minn., 337; 50 N. W. Rep., 229. (Demurrer sustained on the ground that complaint did not allege that plaintiff was the unnamed woman mentioned in the libelous article.) Cady v. Minneapolis Times Co., Minn., 1894, 59 N. W. Rep., 1040. (Demurrer overruled, where complaint alleged that plaintiff was the person intended in the article complained of, and the other allegations did not negative such fact.) Missouri.-Powell v. Crawford, Missouri, 1891, 17 S. W. Rep., 1007. (If the words attributed to defendant are not slanderous per se, the colloquium must show that they were used in a connection and sense to make them slanderous; and this cannot be shown by innuendo.) S. P. Unterberger v. Scharff, 51 Mo. App., 102. New York.-Mattice v. Wilcox, 13 New York Supp., 330; s. c. 36 State Rep., 914. (Complaint held sufficient which after setting out the alleged libelous matter alleged that such libel "referred to and meant plaintiff.") Wellman v. Sun Print. & Pub. Ass'n, 66 Hun, 331; s. c. 21 N. Y. Supp., 577. (Demurrer sustained where the alleged libel only showed a libel on plaintiff's deceased wife, though it was alleged that the article was published concerning the plaintiff.) Oregon.-Cole v. Neustadter, 22 Or., 191; s. c. 29 Pac. Rep., 550. (Demurrer sustained, where the words of the alleged libel were unambiguous, and there was nothing alleged by the way of inducement to show that the language used could have the libelous signification averred in the innuendo.) Vermont.-Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt., 481; s. c. 20 Atl. Rep., 813. (No prefatory averment is necessary, where the alleged defamatory words themselves support the innuendo that plaintiff was engaged in a criminal occupation.) Wisconsin.-Benz v. Wiedenhoeft, 83 Wis., 397; s. c. 53 N. W. Rep., 686. (Complaint held demurrable in which no fact was alleged by the way of inducement to show that the words, not actionable in themselves, had a slanderous meaning; and that complaint could not be sustained merely upon the imputations supplied by the way of innuendo.) Karger v. Rich, 81 Wis., 177; s. c. 51 N. W. Rep., 424. (Complaint held sufficient, where the words taken in connection with the matter alleged by the way of inducement imputed a crime, though the words were not of themselves actionable.) (2) Publication, utterance, etc. New York.-Thomas v. Smith, 75 Hun, 573; 27 N. Y. Supp., 589. (Held, that it was error to dismiss complaint at the trial, which after setting forth the libel, and alleging its falsity, alleged that the libelous statements were made by defendant to be published, and that they had been published as intended by him.) Turner v. Beaven, 23 Abb. N. C., 432; s. c. 10 N. Y. Supp., 128. (Plaintiff required to give bill of particulars giving the name of at least one person present on each occasion on which the alleged slander was uttered.) Vermont.-Wilcox v. Moon, 63 Vt., 481; s. c. 22 Atl. Rep., 80. (Allegation that defendant "composed and published certain false, scandalous and defamatory matter of and concerning plaintiff" without showing the manner of publication or to whom the communication was made, held sufficient averment of publication, though the libelous article set forth was apparently addressed to plaintiff only.) Wisconsin.-Street v. Johnson, 80 Wis., 445; s. c. 50 N. W. Rep., 395. (In action against one selling a paper containing a libelous article, complaint sustained on demurrer, which alleged a wilful and intentional sale of the paper by defendant without alleging that the defendant knew that the paper contained the libelous article.) (3) The defamatory words. Georgia.-White v. Parks, 93 Ga., 633; s. c. 20 S. E. Rep., 78. (Failure to copy libel in the declaration, or to set forth its exact words, is only bad rer. pleading in matter of form, and will be disregarded upon a general demurSuch a defect must be pointed out by special demurrer. (Indiana. --Branaman v. Hinkle, Indiana, 1894, 37 N. E. Rep., 546. (Demurrer sustained, because the language employed in the alleged libelous writing was not set forth.) S. P. Small v. Fisher, 2 Ind. App., 426; s. c. 28 N. E, Rep. 714. Kentucky.-Hargan v. Purdy, 93 Ky., 424; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep., 432. (Plaintiff may unite two causes of action for libels published at different times, though practically of the same import, and he cannot be required to elect between them at the trial.) Michigan.-Randall v. Gartner, 96 Mich., 284; s. c. 55 N. W. Rep., 843. (Plaintiff may join in one action several causes of action against defendant for distinct libels published on different occasions). Minnesota.-Irish-Am. Bank v. Bader, Minn., 1894, 61 N. W. Rep., 328. (In an action for slander, held that proof of different words from those alleged, although conveying the same general idea, was not sufficient.) Mississippi.—Fritz v. Williams, Miss., 1894, 16 So. Rep., 359. (It is sufficient to prove synonymous words conveying the same specific idea as the words alleged.) Missouri.—Walter v. Hoeffner, 51 Mo. App., 46. (Distinct defamatory statements imputing the same offense to plaintiff, but couched in different phraseology, and not appearing to have been spoken to the same persons need not be embraced in one count, and, if plaintiff alleges each statement in separate counts, he cannot be required at the trial to elect on which one he will proceed.) Unterberger v. Scharff, 51 Mo. App., 102. (It is sufficient, if plaintiff prove enough of the exact words charged in the petition, or substantially the same words, containing the gravaman of the charge.) New York.-Germ Proof Filter Co. v. Pasteur-Chamberland Filter Co., 81 Hun, 49; s. c. 62 State Rep., 562; 30 N. Y. Supp., 584. (Complaint dismissed on the ground that it did not set out the particular words spoken by defendant.) Enos v. Enos, 135 N. Y., 609; s. c. 32 N. E. Rep., 123. (The words set forth as constituting the slander must be proved in substance, and different words, although imputing the same charge, but in entirely different language, will not support the complaint.) Miller v. Holmes, 19 N. Y. Supp., 701. (Held an immaterial variance where it was alleged, that defendant had said that plaintiff robbed him of $400, and the proof tended to show that defendant said that plaintiff had robbed him of $1,200.) Cassidy v. B'klyn Eagle, 18 N. Y. Supp., 930; s. c. 46 State Rep., 334. (Where the alleged words were libelous per se, evidence of other publications were admitted in evidence to explain their meaning, though not pleaded.) Ronnie v. Ryder, 8 N. Y. Supp., 5. (Complaint will not dismissed, if there is a doubt whether the slanderous words imputed unchastity.) Holmes v. Jones, 50 Hun, 345; s. c. 20 N. Y. S. R., 175. (A complaint setting out different portions of the same publication in separate paragraphs, held to contain but one count, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover on a general verdict, though weight of evidence showed a justification as to the matter alleged in one of the paragraphs.) North Carolina.-Gudger v. Penland, 108 N. C., 593; s. c. 13 S. E. Rep., 168. (Though repetitions of utterances of slanderous words of like import may be counted on separately, it is not necessary that a separate demand for damages should be appended to each count.) Rhode Island.-Kenyon v. Cameron, 17 R. I., 122; s. c. 20, Atl. Rep., 233. (Declaration held to be fatally defective, which did not set forth the alleged slanderous words, or their substance.) Texas.Brown v. Durham, 3 Tex. Civ. App., 244; s. c. 22 S. W. Rep., 868. (As against a general demurrer, petition held to be good, which alleged in a general way, that plaintiff was published as a dishonest man who would not pay his debts, and reference was made to exhibits, and all the statements and intimations therein characterized as false.) Nettles v. Somervell, 6 Tex. Civ. App., 627; s. c. 25 S. W. Rep., 658. (In an action for libel, an amendment setting out other libelous statements of like import, and published at the same same as those alleged in the original petition, held not to state a new cause of action, but to merely make more definite, and to elaborate, the original cause of action.) Wisconsin.-Schild v. Legler, 82 Wis. 73; s. c. 51 N. W. Rep. 1099. (Held, that there was no variance, where complaint set forth the alleged slanderous words in a foreign language, and the English translation thereof, and there was no proof of the foreign words used, but only of the English equivalents as alleged.) (4) Innuendo. Colorado.-Republican Pub. Co. v. Miner, 3 Colo. App., 568; s. c. 34 Pac. Rep., 485. (Where article is absolutely libelous, the innuendo may be disregarded.) Illinois.-Ulery v. Chic. Livestock Exch., 54 Ill. App., 233. (An inuuendo cannot perform the office of a colloquium, nor can it extend the meaning of defamatory matter, unless by reference to matter of inducement.) Michigan.-Sanford v. Rowley, 93 Mich., 119; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep., 1119. (Where the meaning of the alleged libelous language is clear, an innuendo will be treated as surplusage.) S. P. Randall v. Evening News Ass'n, Mich., 1890, 44 N. W. Rep., 783. Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich., 583; s. c. 47 N. W. Rep., 674. (Demurrer overruled, where (declaration alleged that defendant's newspaper falsely and maliciously reported plaintiff, a congressional candidate, as saying in a speech, that he would refrain from discussing the tariff question because "he wasn't built that way," meaning that the plaintiff was too ignorant and imbecile to discuss said question, or to express in a decent way his intention not to discuss it.) Minnesota. Frederickson v. Johnson, Minnesota, 1895, 62 N. W. Rep., 388. (In an action for slander, held that an innuendo was surplusage, where the alleged words were unambiguous.) Missouri.—McGinnis v. Geo. Knapp & Co., Mo., 1892., 18 S. W. Rep., 1134. (Though the innuendos cannot extend the meaning of the alleged defamatory words beyond their natural import, the imputed meaning may be considered in connection with the alleged extrinsic facts and circumstances in determining the meaning of the words upon demurrer.) Callahan v. Ingram, 122 Mo., 355; s. c. 26 S. W. Rep., 1020. (Innuendo disregarded, and not required to be proved, which charged that defendant meant by calling plaintiff a downright thief" to charge that he was guilty of official corruption; since the words themselves were actionable without the innuendo.) New York.-Turton v. N. Y. Recorder Co., 144 N. Y., 144; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep., 1009. (No innuendo necessary where the alleged article is libelous per se.) Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y., 517; 20 L. R. A., |