POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE

OF

RAILWAYS IN BRITISH INDIA.

THE imperious necessity of rapid intercommunication in reference to our Indian possessions, in a political and military point of view, is so obvious, that it would be matter of surprise, were it not for the still more pressing claims on their attention formerly alluded to, that the authorities have not long ere this prosecuted the subject with the assiduous and careful energy which they have only recently begun to evince; but the insult offered to our arms by the invasion of the Sikhs, and the delay which took place before that insult could be avenged, must have effectually demonstrated to all, the impolicy, the impossibility of further procrastination, in summoning science to our aid, to take advantage of the natural facilities of the country-to bring what is distant near-the weak outpost, under the immediate protection of the great station, with its troops and military stores, in its rear. During the late

campaign against the Sikhs, nothing could be more apparent, than that our vast resources were for weeks unavailing from the want of rapid transit; powerless to hurl back aggression, we were compelled to suffer, for more than a month, the presence of an enemy within our border, too formidable to be dislodged. It is true that this indignity, offered to the majesty of the British name, is now almost lost in the completeness of the subsequent triumph; but, while we rested on our arms, waiting the arrival of heavy artillery, stores and reinforcements, what might not the enemy have achieved, had he but possessed conduct and enterprise equal to his power. How wonderful the infatuation, that he did not with the first blow he struck, overwhelm Sir John Littler, and then attack in detail our wearied detachments as they came up under the Governor-General and Lord Gough, instead of reserving his strength, till it suited us to become the assailants in those memorable struggles.

A recent Indian periodical* states that, “where it takes three months now, it will take only as many days, to bring distant consignments to market, and the same capital, consequently, which at present can be returned only three or four times a year, may be returned, probably, twenty. A railroad will operate in the same manner, increasing the effective strength of

*Calcutta Review for March, 1846.

the army, by saving the time employed in marches. In the annual relief, infantry regiments are often moved from one end of India to the other, at an average of ten and a half miles per day, halting six days in the month, so that it takes about six weeks to move from this presidency (Calcutta) to Benares. Hence arises the necessity of the concentration at all times of a large force in the neighbourhood of an enemy. There are not the means existing of concentrating troops on a sudden emergency. This was strikingly exemplified in various ways, on occasion of the recent war on the north-west frontier. When it broke out, all officers, whose regiments were in the field, were ordered to join the army. About one hundred, we believe, in the different services-engineers, artillery, infantry, and medical-required to go from this presidency. They were sent at the public expense, and with the greatest despatch. How many do our readers suppose the Postmaster-General was able to send daily? Three-and as the journey took sixteen days travelling, night and day, few arrived before the war was over. Even this could not have been accomplished at any other period of the year.

"Under the order now countermanded for the establishment of depôts, the regiments stationed in the presidency division were ordered to supply about six hundred men to the depôt, intended to be formed at Benares. The utmost despatch was desired by Government; bullock hackeries, the only kind of carriage

ever available here, were put in requisition in the usual manner, but the garriwáns* had taken alarm at the rumour, industriously and perhaps maliciously circulated, that they were to go to the seat of war. They were consequently obtained with difficulty. Many ran away, and from these causes several days were lost before the march could commence, and a halt of some days more became necessary at the end of the first day's journey. Is this a predicament proper for the Government to be placed in, within a few miles of a great political and commercial capital? Is it just to the great interests involved in the stability of British power, that the movement of troops should depend on native opinion, or on the caprice of the drivers, or owners of bullock hackeries?

"The chief magazine for the supply of military stores for the forces employed in the Lower and Upper provinces, is and must be at Fort William for a century to come. No where else can the vast munitions of war, required on occasions of hostilities, be safely deposited. Their safety is itself a cause of strength, in the impression which the knowledge of it makes on the natives of India. But their use depends on their transport, which, though more easily accomplished by water, than the transport of troops, could be effected with incomparably superior advantages by a railway. The magazines of Allahabad, Cawnpore,

Agra and Delhi, from which a great part of the Bengal army is supplied, receive all their stores from Calcutta: those of Ajmir, Ferozepore, and Saugor, are also chiefly supplied from this presidency.

"Not only is transport by railroads the quickest, but, if the saving of time is taken into account, it is the cheapest, mode ofconveying troops.

"Sir James Willoughby Gordon, Quarter-MasterGeneral, was examined on this point (before a Committee of the House of Commons), and gave his evidence as follows:

"1994. Then, in consequence of the saving of time which is effected, the total cost of the transport of troops is actually less to Government, than their expenses on the road, when they go on foot?-Exactly, perhaps the better way would be, to state one case, which is as good as a thousand. We will take the distance from London to Birmingham; the expenses for marching for one man, being nine marches and one halt, is 108. 10d.; by railroad he would cost 10s. 7d.; therefore, in that distance, there is a saving of 3d. on each man.'

"1995. Lord G. Somerset.-You are now speaking of cavalry?—No, infantry. Cavalry I have moved by railroad under particular circumstances, which, if necessary, I shall state; but, so far as regards expense, the horse marching costs nothing; he eats the same as he does in the barrack-stable; but when a soldier marches, he costs the public, in addition, 1s. 1d. per