2 his mandate enables him to bestow." "Before the passing of the factors' act," says. Baron Parke, "it was clearly settled that a factor or agent for sale had no power to pledge, whether he was in possession either of the goods themselves or of the symbol of the goods, and even though the symbol might bear on the face of it some evidence of the property being in himself, as in the case of a bill of lading in which he was consignee or indorsee." The several factors' acts, though not all in the same terms, agree in their general purpose, which is to enable third persons to deal with an agent intrusted with goods, or with the documents of title to goods, for sale, as though he were the absolute owner of the goods. "The general rule of law is, that, where a person is deceived by another into believing that he may safely deal with property, he bears the loss, unless he can show that he was misled by the act of the true owner. The legislature seem to us to have wished to make it the law, that, where a third person has intrusted goods or the documents of title to goods to an agent who in the course of such agency sells or pledges the goods, he should be deemed by that act to have misled any one who bona fide deals with the agent and makes. a purchase from or an advance to him without notice that he was not authorized to sell or to procure the advance."" § 333a. California.-A factor has actual authority: 1. To insure property consigned to him uninsured. 2. To sell, on credit, anything intrusted to him for sale, except such things as it is contrary to usage to sell on credit; but not to pledge, mortgage, or barter the same; and, 3. To delegate his author 64, 79 Am. Dec. 196; Davis v. Russell, 52 Cal. 611, 28 Am. Rep. 647; Dodge v. Meyer, 61 Cal. 405; Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521; New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lipman, 157 N. Y. 551, 52 N. E. Rep. 595, affirming 91 Hun 554, 36 N. Y. Supp. 355. Cole v. North Western Bank, per Blackburn, J., L. R. 10 C. P. 354, 372. ity to his partner or servant, but not to any person in an independent employment.' § 334. Louisiana.2-All merchants, factors, and others who may have a general balance of account, or any sum of money due them by any consignor or other person sending them cotton, sugar, or other agricultural products for sale at the port of New Orleans, or at any other town in the state, shall have a pledge upon all such property consigned or sent to them by ship, vessel, railroad, or other carrier, from the time the bill of lading or receipt therefor by the carrier, is deposited in the mail or given to the carrier for transmission, which pledge shall be perfect, with the right of sale of said property, which shall be fully vested in said consignee, with the right to appropriate the proceeds of sale to the amount due consignee; provided that nothing herein shall be so construed as to defeat or lessen the privilege of any laborers and landlords in this state for wages and rent, as now existing by law. Under a statute giving a consignee a lien by way of pledge upon goods consigned to him for his advances upon them, if he has control of the goods, "or if before their arrival he can show by a bill of lading, or letter of advice, that they have been dispatched to him,' "" the consignee, after receiving such letter of advice, or a bill of lading, has a lien which can not be defeated by the consignor's drawing a draft against the goods, obtaining a discount of it, and using the proceeds for the purchase of the goods so consigned.* By a recent statute in this state, it is provided that a party 1 Civ. Code, § 2368; Dodge v. Meyer, and shipped it to New Orleans, it was 61 Cal. 405, 429. held that the consignee had a pledge 2 Act of 1874, No. 66. See, as amend- of the cotton from the time the bill of ed, R. S. 1897, p. 685. Under this act a consignee of goods has possession from the moment the bill of lading is given to the carrier for transmission, and from that moment they are effectually pledged to him. Therefore, when one purchased cotton at Shreveport without paying for it, lading was given to the carrier for transmission, superior to the vendor's lien under the code for the unpaid purchase-money. Florsheim v. How ell, 33 La. Ann. 1184. 3 Louisiana R. Code 1900, Art. 3247. Helm v. Meyer, 30 La. Ann. 943. 5 Acts of 1876, p. 114, §§ 4, 5. who may borrow money on the faith of warehouse receipts representing property in store, shall file their affidavit with the pledgee that such property is his, the pledgor's, personal property, or that it is the property of some party for whom the pledgor is acting as agent, factor, commission merchant, or in any other fiduciary capacity, and that said party is justly and truly indebted to the pledgor in an amount equal in value to the value of the property pledged, as specified in the warehouse receipt, for moneys paid to him, or paid by his order, and for his account, by the party or consignee making the pledge. The vendor's lien of five days' privilege, now allowed in commercial transactions for the payment of the purchase price, shall not be affected by the provisions of this act, except in cases in which a warehouse receipt has been pledged as collateral for money borrowed. The holder of the warehouse receipt shall be considered and held as the actual owner of the property described in the receipt, and no clause of this act shall operate to the detriment or injury of the holder of a warehouse receipt, to the extent of the value of the property specified, made and issued in accordance with, and under the provisions of this act, provided that where the factor, agent, or pledgor may have wrongfully pledged, in violation of this act, any property, the lien of the owner shall be valid, even against the third holder of the warehouse receipt. Before the enactment of this latter statute,' a factor could not pledge for his own debts the property of his principal.2 This act makes warehouse receipts the representatives of property in store, and provides for their use to borrow money upon; but the implication is clear that their use in that way by a factor for more than the value of his interest in the property would be wrongful and invalid against the owner. Therefore, where a factor has no interest in the consigned property, he can not now pledge it for his own debt any more than he could before 1 Acts 1876, p. 113, No. 72. 2 Stetson v. Gurney, 17 La. Ann. 163, 166; Hadwin v. Fisk, 1 La. Ann. 43; Miller v. Schneider, 19 La. Ann. 300, 92 Am. Dec. 535; Young v. Scott, 25 La. the enactment of the statute. His pledge of such property, though accompanied by a warehouse receipt setting forth that the property is deliverable to the pledgee, is invalid, and confers no title adverse to that of his consignor. The factor's pledge to his creditor is good to the extent of his advances to his principal, and only to that extent.' § 335. Maryland.'-Any person intrusted with and in possession of any bills of lading, storekeeper's or inspector's certificates, order for the delivery of goods, or other document showing possession, shall be deemed the true owner of the goods, wares, or merchandise described therein, so far as to give validity to any contract thereafter to be made by such person with any other person or body corporate for the sale or disposal of the said goods, wares, or merchandise, or for the pledge or deposit thereof as a security for any money or negotiable instrument advanced or given on faith of such documents, or either of them; provided, that such person or body corporate shall not have notice, by such document or otherwise, that the person so intrusted is not the actual and bona fide owner of such goods, wares, and merchandise. If any person or body corporate shall take any goods, wares, or merchandise, or any document mentioned in the foregoing clause, in deposit or pledge from any person so intrusted with the same, or to whom the same may be consigned, or who may be intrusted with and in possession of any such bill of lading, storekeeper's or inspector's certificate, order for the delivery of goods, or other such document showing possession, without notice, as a security for any debt or demand existing before the time of such deposit or pledge, then such person shall acquire such right, title, or interest as was possessed and might have been enforced by the person from whom he received the same, and no more. Any person or body corporate may take any goods, wares, 1 Chambers v. Hubbard, 51 La. Ann. 6, p. 294, § 14; 1 Pub. Gen. Laws, p. 887, 25 So. Rep. 536. 4, § 3, p. 5, §§ 5, 6, p. 7, § 13. 2 R. Code 1878, pp. 291, 292, §§ 3, 5, or merchandise, or any such document as aforesaid, in deposit or pledge as a security for a pre-existing debt or demand from such agent or factor, knowing him to be such, but with such notice they shall only acquire the right or interest therein which was possessed by such agent or factor at the time of the deposit or pledge; but if he shall have notice that such agent or factor had no authority from his principal to pledge or deposit the same, or to part with the possession thereof, in such case such person or body corporate shall acquire no right or interest therein. Every mortgage, pledge, deposit, or other disposal by said commission merchant, factor, agent, bailee, or consignee of agricultural productions, consigned for sale alone, unless with the consent of the grower, producer, or other owner, expressly given, shall be null and void, and no title to said articles, or any of them, shall pass to the person receiving the same, but the title thereto shall remain in the grower, producer, or other consignor thereof, as if no such mortgage, pledge, deposit, or other disposal had been made. § 336. Massachusetts.'-Every person in whose name merchandise is shipped for sale by a person in the lawful possession thereof at the time of the shipment, shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so far as to entitle the consignee to a lien thereon for money advanced, or securities given to the shipper for one on account of such consignment, unless the consignee, at or before the time when he made the advances or gave the securities, had notice by the bill of lading, or otherwise, that the shipper was not the actual and bona fide owner. Every factor or other agent intrusted with the possession of merchandise or a bill of lading, consigning merchandise to him for the purpose of sale, shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any bona fide contract made by him, with any other person for the sale of the whole or any part of such merchandise. When a person intrusted with merchandise, and having au 1 G. S. 1860, c. 54; P. S. 1882, c. 71. |