(Venet. 1522), one of the best of his works, and indeed as sound a treatise on the philosophy of syntax as any which has come to our knowledge. Arguments and syllogisms, says Occham, are made up of propositions, and these again of terms. Of terms there are three kinds, (1) that which is conceived, (2) that which is spoken, (3) that which is written: the last two are parts of a proposition meant to be heard by the bodily ear or seen by the bodily eye; the first is merely an intention of affection of the mind signifying or consignifying something as a part of a mental proposition*. We say that words are signs subordinated to the conceptions or intentions of the mind, not because, in the strict acceptation of the term "sign," words primarily and properly signify the actual conceptions, but because words are imposed to signify those very things which are signified by the conceptions of the mind: for the word signifies secondarily what is primarily signified by the conception, and is instituted to denote something implied by a conception, so that if the conception changes its meaning, the word would also change its meaning unless it were altered to suit the change in the conception. The intention, conception, or affection of the mind, is defined to be something in the mind naturally signifying something. As writing is the secondary sign of speech, so speech in the secondary sign of the intention or conception, which is the primary sign of the thing signified as forming a part of a mental proposition, which belongs to no particular idiom. An intention is either primary or secondary: primary, when it is the mental representative of the thing signified; secondary, when it is a sign of such primary intentions: genus, species, &c. are secondary intentions §. With regard to universals, under which are included the five predicables, genus, * Cap. 1. fol. 2. Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animæ aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, nuta esse pars propositionis mentalis. Cap. XII. fol. 6. Intentio animæ vocatur quoddam ens in anima natum significare aliquid. ‡ Propositio mentalis quæ nullius idiomatis est. § Stricte vocatur intentio prima nomen mentale natum pro suo significatu supponere. Intentio autem secunda est illa quæ est signum talium intentionum primarum: cujusmodi sunt talis intentiones: genus, species &c. species, difference, property and accident, he adopts Avicenna's definition with the following explanation*:—an universal is a single intention of the mind made to be predicated of many, not for itself but for the things themselves, and because it is thus predicable of many it is called universal; but it is called singular because it is one form really existing in the mind. Of the arguments which Occham advances to prove that an universal is not a substance, it will be sufficient to mention one. This intention which we call an universal is a perfectly arbitrary sign, for this is the only thing that is predicable of many. Substance, however, cannot be thus predicated, otherwise a proposition would be composed of particular substances. Now aproposition is either mental, or spoken, or written. But these are not particular substances. Therefore no proposition can be composed of substances. They are however composed of universals. Therefore universals are not substances. Occham says the same of the categories or predicaments, respecting which, in his important treatise de Sacramento altaris, he adopts the grammatical views of Joannes Damascenus. The ten predicaments, he says, are the most general signs, under which are included all mere words. For every word which can be placed at the end of a proposition, or employed in answering a question, may be arranged under some one predicament; for example, all words which make answer to the question "How much?" are placed in the predicament of quantity. And the words thus placed in the predicaments are not only nouns, but also verbs, and other parts of speech: and even phrases, such as prepositions with their cases. So that predicaments are only certain predicables and uncombined signs of things, out of which true or false combinations may be made. * Cap. XIV. fol. 6, 2. Vult dicere quod universale est intentio singularis ipsius animæ nata prædicare de pluribus non pro se sed pro ipsis rebus: ita quod per hoc quod ipsa nata est prædicari de pluribus, non pro se sed pro illis pluribus, illa dicitur universalia: propter hoc autem quod est una forma existens realiter in intellectu, dicitur singulare. † Cap. XLI. fol. 13. Tractatus Venerabilis Inceptoris Guilgelmi Ocham de Sacramento altaris, Cap. xxxv. (This book is very scarce: our copy is a little blackletter duodecimo, without a date, but stated to be impressus Parisiis per Petrum Levet, impressorem.) A difference of inflexion may make an irreconcileable difference of signification between two predicaments; for example, angelus cannot be angeli, nor e converso. He adds, that such predicaments are not merely arbitrary signs, but rather meanings or intentions of the mind, because they are signs naturally denoting objects; and as words may be distinct, notwithstanding the identity of the things signified, so meanings or intentions may be distinct, although the objects signified are identical. Thus the words substance, quality, and quantity, are not synonymous because they can be predicated of the same object. 20 It is obvious, from the way in which Occham speaks throughout his logic, that his object was to draw a stronglymarked line of distinction between the method of language, as the instrument of deduction, and the science or truth of things. By doing so he not only contributed to overthrow the scholastic theology, but also laid the foundation for that system of interpretation which became philology in the hands of the scholar: and therefore it was not without reason that Luther, who so well estimated the importance of grammatical studies to the ministers of his Reformation, paid so much attention to Occham while he despised and neglected the other schoolmen*. Indeed it appears from Luther's early works that he had embraced very heartily the Occhamistic nominalism†. But the adoption of Occhamistic theology by the Reformers, whatever may have been its effect on the sacramental doctrines of Luther, or on the fate of scholastic dogmatism in general, is important to us principally as furnishing collateral testimony to the increasing influence at this period of that critical and rationalistic spirit, which is the essential characteristic of modern * "Diu multumque legit scripta Occam; hujus acumen anteferebat Thomæ et Scoto." Melancthon, Historia de vita et actis Lutheri. Viteberg. 1545. fol. 5. Laurence (Bampton Lectures, Serm. III. note 6) after quoting Melancthon, Op. 1. p. 414, Loci Theol. p. 113, says, "William of Occam here alluded to (an English Scholastic of great reputation) had been a peculiar favourite of Luther and Melancthon; the former styling him carus magister meus, and the latter deliciæ quondam nostræ." Ranke (Hist. of Reform. 1. p. 310, Engl. Tr.) says, "Luther and Melancthon are the offspring of nominalism." times*. To deprive words of their mysterious attributes, to rescue the mind from the thraldom of metaphors, and to subject every sentence to the fearless searching of the critical faculty, is the greatest triumph of iconoclastic reason, which has yet to celebrate the last of a long series of victories. This was the result in part effected by the early success of the nominalistic school. 21 The overthrow of the scholastic philosophy, however, and the proper cultivation of grammar, though good in themselves, would have had but little effect in dispelling the darkness of the middle ages, had it not been for the classical enthusiasm of the poet Petrarch, and the subsequent exertions of Poggio Bracciolini, who laboured incessantly, and to a certain extent successfully, in saving and bringing to light the remains of the great Latin writers. The increased study of pure Latinity, produced by the gradual diffusion of these books, naturally created a desire to become acquainted with the sister literature of ancient Greece, which the overthrow of the Eastern Empire by the Turks accidentally favoured; because those of the Greeks who had retained a knowledge of their ancestors' language hastened to Italy, where the patrons of learning offered them protection and reward. For some time, however, the number of Greek scholars was very limited, and nothing was done for scholarship beyond the translation of Greek authors into Latin, which, as the performers were mostly modern Greeks who were indifferently acquainted with Latin, and had but a traditional knowledge of the language of their ancestors, have little to recommend them beyond the merit of the attempt. But although the influence of the new learning was somewhat limited, still a beginning was made, a learned class was formed, comparisons were inevitably suggested between the enlightened views of the old world and the ignorance of the day, and the first seeds were sown of that * Even the late Dr. Mill, the uncompromising advocate of "old paths," was willing to admit that the perfection of critical skill "is undoubtedly one of the real boasts of the later generations over the most intellectual and able of the ancient world" (Four Sermons, 1849, p. 114). With this admission, we need not wonder at the ill success of any attempts to restore the authority of a dry and scholastic dogmatism in our chief seat of learning and science. D freedom of inquiry which shook the papal throne and changed the tendencies of the world. 22 The third and greatest cause of the revival of letters was the invention of the art of printing, which, by the multiplication of books, spread the influences of revived learning over the whole of Europe, and, it is not too much to say, produced immediately and at one birth the Reformation and Philology. This invention is due to Germany or to the Low Countries; and though it must not be overlooked that its immediate effects and its application to the diffusion of classical learning were first felt in Italy, yet the origin of philology or sound scholarship is to be sought on this side of the Alps; its beginner was John Reuchlin (Capnio) a German (born in 1455, died in 1522); the two men who brought it forward most prominently and tangibly were William Budé (Budæus), a Frenchman, and Desiderius Erasmus, a Dutchman (both born in the year 1497); and while the combined influences of scholarship and printing, as far as they conduced to the overthrow of the papal system, were developed in Germany by Martin Luther (born in 1483, died in 1546), and by Philip Schwarzerde (Melancthon), a kinsman of Reuchlin (born in 1497, died in 1560), the more profound and speculative studies of Reuchlin in the later Jewish and Greek philosophy, in the occult sciences, and in the Cabalistic art, were prosecuted with great ability and learning, but with a growing consciousness of their futility, by Henry Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (born in 1486, died in 1535), who, like Budæus and Erasmus, lived and died in communion with the Church, but, unlike them, was persecuted and reviled as a magician and conjurer*. Under the more immediate domination of the papal chair, and shrinking from German sway with all the aversion produced by their his The character of this eminent man has been vindicated by Mr. Morley in his spirited and interesting book, The Life of Henry Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, Doctor and Knight, commonly known as a Magician, London, 1856. It is to be regretted that the life of a scholar, written by a well-informed man, and derived from Latin authorities, should be deformed by such indications of laxity or carelessness (e. g. we have litera humaniora! in Vol. 1. p. 64, and Gregory of Nazianzen, in Vol. 1. p. 165). |