a negotiation. The negotiation took place, but it terminated, in the end of September, without having led to any result. The Dutch governor, in an address to the people of Java, which he published on the occasion, imputed the failure to the ambition of Dopo Negoro, now the head of the armed natives, who had made, he said, inadmissible demands, not only unreasonable as regarded the Dutch, but humiliating likewise to the sultans, the great men, and the priests, and even altogether contrary to the religion of the country. The proclamation did not state what these demands had been; and as the Javanese published no gazettes, we cannot judge how far the Dutch authorities described them correctly. It was perfectly natural that the success, which had hitherto attended the insurrection, should have given its leaders confidence. But when the Dutch government told the people of Java, "It would not have been difficult for us, by means of our own force, and it would have been still less so, supported by the efficacious assistance of the great emperor of Socracarta, as of our faithful allies the sultans of Madura and Sumanah, to reduce the insurgents and to punish their rebellion; but we have spared them, because we love the Javanese people, and because most of them had been misled by their instigators: and it was for that reason, and solely out of love to the nation, and attachment to the country which it inhabits, that very recently, when a considerable force was ready to crush the party of the insurgents, we gave to Krai Modjo, who appeared to have placed himself at their head, an opportunity to make peace, and to return to obedience, and to spare

the lives of so many unfortunate people."-When, we say, the Dutch government told the people of Java all this, we cannot help suspecting that it was guilty of the silliness of telling them what every man in Java knew to be not true, and what the military events of the insurrection contradicted. If it was so easy for the government to vindicate its authority against rebellious subjects, it had acted with inexpressible folly in allowing them, year after year, successfully to resist its power, and to shake its very foundations. Governments do not lose battles against insurgents for the sake of philanthropy.

The military operations, therefore, were renewed so soon as the season permitted. The Dutch force was now in a more effective condition than it had been at former periods of the contest. Besides the reinforcements which had been received in the preceding year, upwards of six hundred fresh troops arrived from Holland in January, and, in the course of the summer, considerable bodies of auxiliaries were obtained from Ternate, and the neighbouring islands. The forces of the insurgents sometimes amounted to thirty thousand

men.

There was no regular campaign; the system of Negoro, was one of constant alarm, and exhausted European troops in an Indian climate by imposing perpetual watchfulness, and unceasing activity. According to the Dutch accounts, the only accounts of these transactions accessible to the public, the insurgents never stood to fight, but fled immediately on the approach of the troops. But they were no sooner dispersed on one point, than they re-appeared, in equal force, upon another. When it was necessary, however, not only

did they fight, but, it was admitted, they fought with great courage and perseverance. They defeated a strong detachment under a colonel Nahays; they took Bandjar, a large ship-building establishment; and cut off the communication between the capital and Sourabya by taking possession of the road with an overwhelming force. On other points, again, the Dutch claimed the victory; and their own account of the state of matters on the whole was, that affairs, if not much better, were very far from getting worse.

Among the states of GERMANY the year passed over in undisturbed repose. The confederation lost by death, the grand duke of SaxeWeimar, the sovereign of a very limited, but most happy state, among the least powerful princes of the confederation in territory and influence, and a cipher in the political arithmetic of Europe, but the most respectable of its princes in every thing that makes power lovely and estimable. He had been the first German prince who took under his protection the rising literature of his country; he had gathered around him, at his little court, the greatest of the great men who, during the last fifty years have been elevating German literature to its present rank. Weimar never came into notice, when the counsels of empires were to be arranged, or their armies to be marshalled; but Weimar was the first name pronounced, when poetry, or philosophy was to be cherished. As a prince, he governed with mildness, with kindness, with unspotted justice. He loved liberty, and he established it among subjects. Before either Wirtemberg or Bavaria introduced the institutions which they now pos

his

sess, he had placed the grand duchy of Weimar under the protection of a representative system. In the family vault in which he was interred, his coffin, by his own desire, was placed between that of Schiller, and the spot which is reserved for that of Göthe.

The students of Heidelberg, and the workings of the secret and impenetrable Burschenschaft which connected them with all the students of Germany, and all the students of Germany with each other, still continued to pester the grand duke of Baden. He attacked them with an edict which set forth, that a resolution of the German diet, in 1819, had strictly prohibited all secret associations in the universities, and that he had himself issued various ordinances to destroy their pernicious influence; that late events, however, proved that they still subsisted, and still produced the same fatal effects. He therefore declared, that these associations should henceforth be treated, not as transgressions of the discipline of the universities, but as misdemeanors, cognizable by the courts of justice; and that the authors, principals, and other functionaries of these societies, even if they had no criminal object, should be punished by three or six months' confinement in a fortress. Persons suspected of participating in secret associations might be dismissed from the universities without any formal proof. If the object of the society was criminal, the penalty decreed by the law was to be inflicted. Any of the inhabitants, who knowingly allowed meetings of secret societies in their houses, were to be fined from 50 to 100 florins. It is true that almost any thing would be justifiable, which could eradicate these mischievous

intention of taking possession of the fortress of Ardebil. Scarcely had he appeared before the walls of that place, the strongest in Adzerbidjan, when the Persian governor opened the gates to him on the 7th of February. Even before the news of these successes could reach Teheran, and as soon as they were informed there of the renewal of hostilities, the shah, alarmed at the new dangers which threatened him, thought only of averting them by all the means in his power. He hastened to send a direct communication to general Paskewitch, to assure him of his pacific intentions, and to announce the immediate remittance of the sums to complete the pecuniary indemnity demanded by Russia, and the half of which had already arrived at Miana. At the same time he directed Abbas Mirza to hasten on his side the conclusion of the treaty, giving him the necessary full powers. Peace was finally concluded at Tourkmantchai on the 28th of February. Persia paid dearly for her folly in having provoked this imprudent and impolitic contest; while Russia gained the two objects for which she would make war on all mankind, increase of territory, and payment of her expenses. By this treaty Persia gave up to Russia the whole Khanat of Erivan, on both sides of the Araxes, and the Khanat of Nakhitchevan, which thus brought Russia, creeping onwards, still farther south. But this was not all. Along the most southerly part of this frontier the Araxes was now declared to be the boundary. But on this part of the Araxes was the strong fortress of Abbas Abad, and, unfortunately for Russia, it stood on the right bank of the river. Persia, therefore, was com

pelled to cede the fortress, too, with three wersts and a half of the surrounding country. Persia farther agreed to pay the sum of 20,000,000 of rubles, and consented, that, while both powers should have the navigation of the Caspian for commercial purposes, Russia alone should be entitled to keep vessels of war upon it.

She further accorded an amnesty to such inhabitants of Adzerbidjan as had espoused the cause of Russia, allowing them to emigrate into Russia if they should be so inclined, and granting them, for that purpose one year in which to dispose of their moveable property, and five years to dispose of their lands. Russia, in return, recognized the crown prince, Abbas Mirza, as heir apparent of the Persian crown. In the policy of Russia there is nothing more insidious than her practice of first stirring to rebellion provinces of the countries which she invades, and then stipulating for a pardon to their rebellion when she makes peace. The population of these provinces (and they are always frontier provinces) come to regard her as a protector; she acquires a right to take care that the indemnity is duly observed; rebels pardoned by compulsion are never treated with kindness; and their protector can never be at a loss for complaints of violations of treaty, to serve as pretexts for a war, whenever he shall wish one.

The Russian army which had been employed against Persia was thus left at liberty to lend its aid to the attack which was now meditated against Turkey, in whom the invader must expect to find a much tougher enemy. Persia had been presumptuous, rash, and feeble; Turkey was cautious, prudent, and vigorous.