Cooper were immediately sent for; when it appeared that his lordship had been seized by a fit both of an apoplectic and of a paralytic nature; which affected the whole of his right side. The history of the progress of the infirmity, which thus at once prostrated his mind and body, belongs to that sacred privacy, which ought never to be invaded. As soon as his situation would admit, he was removed to his seat at Combe Wood. After various fluctuations, although at no time with the slightest prospect of convalescence, the fatal moment at length arrived. The noble earl had for some days been in his ordinary state, and no

symptoms calculated to excite immediate apprehension had occurred. On Thursday, the 4th of December, 1828, he had breakfasted as usual, when, about half-past nine o'clock, he was attacked with convulsions and spasms. A messenger was instantly despatched to Mr. Sandford, one of his medical attendants, who resides in the neighbourhood; but, before that gentleman could arrive, his lordship had breathed his last. The countess of Liverpool, the honourable Cecil Jenkinson, and Mr. Childs, his lordship's steward, were in the apartment when the noble earl expired.

Lord Cochrane, after cruising about for some time, determined, in January, 1820, to return to Valparaiso, and to look in upon Valdivia, by the way. He arrived off the latter place on the 2nd of February, with the O'Higgins in a sinking state, the Montezuma schooner, and the Intrepido brig, having major Miller, with a party of marines, on board. When about thirty miles from land, the troops were removed into the lighter vessels, to one of which, the schooner, lord Cochrane, also shifted his flag; and the frigate, being left to beat off and on, her less formidable partners made what way they could for the port, in the hope of taking the Royalists by surprise,

The harbour of Valdivia is situated in 39° 50′ south latitude, and 73° 28′ west longitude, and forms a capacious basin, girdled in by

a deep and impenetrable forest, which advances to the water's edge. It is protected on the east by Fort Niebla, on the west by Amargos, completely commanding the entrance, which is only threequarters of a mile across; and by forts Corral, Chorocomayo, San Carlos, El Yngles, Manzanera, on an island at the extremity, and El Piojo and Carbonero, which bend round it in a semicircle. These are so placed as not only to defend the approach, but to enfilade one another: they mounted, at this time one hundred and eighteen pieces of ordnance, eighteen and twenty-four pounders; and they were manned by no fewer than seven hundred and eighty regulars, and eight hundred and twenty-nine militia. Wherever they were not washed by the sea, the faces of these castles were co

vered by deep ditches and ramparts, with the solitary exception of El Yngles, which had merely a rampart faced with palisades. In addition to all this, it is necessary to state, that such is the nature of the country behind, that no communication by land can be held between one fort and another, except by a path along the beach; and even this, which admits but of one man abreast, was enfiladed at a point where it crosses a ravine between forts Chorocomayo and Corral, by three guns. Against this place lord Cochrane determined to make an attempt; and he justified himself by observing, that "they must succeed, because the Spaniards would hardly believe that they were in earnest, even after the attack began.'

The schooner and the brig, having hoisted Spanish colours, anchored on the 3rd of February, at three P. M., under the guns of the fort of El Yngles, opposite the caleta, or landing-place, and between the two. When hailed from the shore, captain Basques, a Spaniard by birth, who had embarked at Talcahuano as a volunteer, was directed to answer that they had sailed from Cadiz with the S. Elmo, of seventy-four guns, from whose convoy, he added, they had parted, in a gale of wind, off Cape Horn, and requested a pilot might be sent off. At this time, the swell was so great as to render an immediate disembarkation impracticable, as the launches would have drifted under the fort. Lord Cochrane's object, therefore, was to wait until the evening, when the wind would have abated, and the swell subsided. The Spaniards, who had already begun to entertain suspicions, ordered the vessels to send a boat ashore; to which

it was answered, they had lost them in the severe gales they had encountered. This, however, did not satisfy the garrison, which immediately fired alarm guns, and expresses were despatched to the governor at Valdivia. The garrisons of all the southern forts united at Fort Yngles. Fifty or sixty men were posted on the rampart commanding the approach from the caleta; the rest, about three hundred, formed on a small esplanade in the rear of the fort.

Whilst this was passing, the vessels remained unmolested; but, at four o'clock, one of the launches, which had been carefully concealed from the view of those on shore, by being kept close under the off-side of the vessel, unfortunately drifted astern. Before it could be hauled out of sight again, it was perceived by the garrison, which, having no longer any doubts as to the hostile nature of the visit, immediately opened a fire upon the vessels, and sent a party of seventy-five men to defend the landing-place. This detachment was accurately counted by those on board, as it proceeded one by one, along the narrow and difficult path to the caleta. The first shots fired from the fort having passed through the sides of the brig, and killed two men, the troops were ordered up from below, to land without further delay. But the two launches, which constituted the only means of disembarkation, appeared very inadequate to the effectual performance of such an attempt. Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushed off in the first launch. After overcoming the difficulties of the heavy swell, an accumulation of sea-weed, in comparatively smooth water, loaded the oars at every stroke, and

impeded the progress of the assailants, who now began to suffer from the effects of a brisk fire from the party stationed at the landingplace. Amongst others, the coxswain was wounded, upon which major Miller took the helm. He seated himself on a spare oar, but, finding the seat inconvenient, he had the oar removed, by which he somewhat lowered his position. He had scarcely done so, when a ball passed through his hat, and grazed the crown of his head. He ordered a few of his party to fire, and soon after jumped ashore with his marines, dislodged the Royalists at the inlet, and made good his footing. So soon as the landing was perceived to have been effected, the party, in the second launch, pushed off from the brig; and, in less than an hour, three hundred and fifty Patriot soldiers were disembarked. Shortly after sunset, they advanced, in single files, along the rocky track, leading to Fort El Yngles, rendered slippery by the spray of the surf, which dashed, with deafening noise, upon the shore. This noise was rather favourable than otherwise to the adventurous party. The Royalist detachment, after being driven from the landing place, retreated along this path, and entered Fort Yngles by a ladder, which was drawn up, and, consequently, the Patriots found nobody on the outside to oppose their approach. The men ad vanced gallantly to the attack, but, from the nature of the track, in very extended order. leading files were soldiers whose courage had been before proved, and who, enjoying amongst their comrades a degree of deference and respect, claimed the foremost post in danger. They advanced with VOL. LXX.

The

firm but noiseless step, and, while those who next followed cheered with cries of "Adelante” (forward), others, still farther behind, raised clamorous shouts of "Viva la Patria," and many of them fired in the air. The path led to the salient angle of the fort, which, on one side, was washed by the sea, and, on the other side, flanked by the forest, the boughs and branches of which overhang a considerable space of the rampart. Favoured by the darkness of the night, and by the intermingling roar of artillery and musketry, by the lashing of the surge, and by the clamour of the garrison itself, a few men, under the gallant Ensign Vedal, crept under the inland flank of the fort; and, whilst the fire of the garrison was solely directed towards the noisy Patriots in the rear, those in advance contrived, without being heard or perceived, to tear up some loosened pallisades, with which they constructed a rude scaling-ladder, one end of which they placed against the rampart, and the other upon a mound of earth which favoured the design. By the assistance of this ladder, Ensign Vedal and his party mounted the rampart, got unperceived into the fort, and formed under cover of the branches of the trees which overhung that flank. The fifty or sixty men who composed the garrison, were occupied in firing upon those of the assailants, still approaching in single files. A volley from Vedal's party, which had thus taken the Spaniards in flank, followed by a rush, and accompanied by the terrific Indian yell, which echoed by the reverberating valleys around, produced terror and immediate flight. The panic was communicated to the column of 2 H

was

three hundred men, formed on an arena behind the fort, and the whole body, with the exception of those who were bayoneted, made the best of their way along the path that led to the other forts, but which, in their confusion, they did not attempt to occupy or defend. Upon arriving at the gorge of a ravine, between Fort Chorocomayo and the Castle of Corral, about one hundred men escaped in boats that were lying there, and rowed to Valdivia. The remainder, about two hundred men, neglecting the three guns on the height, which, if properly defended, would have effectually checked the advance of the pursuers, retreated into the Corral. This castle, however, was almost immediately stormed by the victorious Patriots, who, favoured by a part of the rampart which had crumbled down, and partly filled up the ditch, rushed forward, and thus obtained possession of all the western side of the harbour. The Royalists could retreat no farther,

for there the land communication ended. One hundred Spaniards were bayoneted; and about the same number, exclusive of officers, were made prisoners. Such was the rapidity with which the Patriots followed up their success, that the Royalists had not time to destroy their military stores, or even to spike a gun. Day-light of the 4th found the Independents in possession of the five forts— El Yngles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo, and Corral."

The fall of these forts was speedily followed by the reduction of Valdivia itself; after which, lord Cochrane, leaving a detachment to preserve his conquests, set sail for the Island of Chiloe. But his efforts, in that quarter, were not attended with success. The inhabitants, excited by their priests, gave the invaders so warm a reception, that the latter were compelled to take to their boats, and the fleet returned to Valparaiso.

In the beginning of 1799, the French army in Italy consisted of little more than five-and-twenty thousand soldiers, who were distributed in the following manner. The right, under Soult, extended from Recco, on the eastern Riviera of Genoa, to Mount Cornua and Torriglio, and from the Bocchetta through Campofreddo, Stella, and Montelegina,

on the western Riviera, as far as Cadibuona and Savona; and commanded Gavi,

and also Genoa, where the generalissimo Massena held his headquarters. The left, under Suchet, guarded the western district from Vado to the Varo, with garrisons in the principal places: viz. San Giacomo, Settepani, Santo Stefano, Madonna della Neve, Montecalvo, Montegrosso; and also on the summits of the maritime Alps. This front was certainly too wide to be well defended by such a small body of men; but Genoa

was necessary to the designs of France, because it was of consequence to the ulterior movements of the Consul that it should long hold out, and Massena wished to occupy a large tract of country for the supply of provisions, of which he was in great want, therefore he was resolved to keep the command of the Riviera until compelled to abandon it.

On the other side, Melas, though a skilful and experienced general (and, perhaps, chiefly because he was so), could not persuade himself that the troops assembled at Dijon were to descend like a tempest on Italy, deeming it impossible that the republicans could, in so short a time, after so many discomfitures, have collected troops and arms sufficient for a movement of such consequence on those very plains where he had defeated, and from whence he had driven, them a few months back; but he knew not how to estimate the promptitude of Buonaparte, nor the readiness with which the French speeded to whatever point his name and voice called them. Hence he remained in too great security as to what might happen on his rear and on his right flank; and thus, intent only on driving the French from Genoa, he directed his whole force against a distant division of the French army, against difficult passes, against sterile rocks, leaving the field open to his adversary to descend to the rich and level plains of Lombardy with all the weight of his central force. From the subsequent occurrences, it will appear evident that Melas in this committed a great error, because he did exactly that which Buonaparte would have chosen him to do. This is so certain that

SO

I am inclined to believe that, leaving the Ligurian territory so feebly guarded, garrisoning the capital, and spreading so wide a front, proceeded rather from stratagem on the part of Buonaparte, as a bait to Melas to carry on the war where success promised to be so easily secured, than from error or weakness. In any case, it does not appear what advantage Austria could derive from the reduction of Genoa, which she could not, and probably did not wish to keep, or from the occupation of the shores, which she certainly neither felt the desire, nor possessed the means of permanently retaining. Then, too, the hope of displaying the Austrian standards on the frontiers of France, with the idea of exciting the people to rise against Buonaparte, was entirely vain, and undoubtedly was thought by every one who had means of knowing the temper of those times. Not in France, not amidst the rocks of Liguria, but in the fertile plains of Piedmont and Lombardy, was the contest to be decided, whether Italy should lie at the discretion of France or of Austria. The Austrians, therefore, being masters of the passes, should have guarded them jealously, and should have remained in force in the plain, instead of wandering away to an extreme point of the field of war. Melas, directing his efforts on one side against Genoa, and on the other against Nice, turned his back on Buonaparte, who was marching from Dijon,-an accident of war of peculiar singularity, which denoted in the Austrian general either too much confidence in himself, blameable ignorance of the designs already publicly manifested by the enemy, or a false